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Zusammenfassung
Städte werden traditionellerweise als Produktionszentren gesehen: Unternehmen produzieren
in Städten, da ihre Produktion dort aufgrund von Agglomerationseffekten produktiver ist.
Menschen leben in Städten, da ihnen dort die Unternehmen Arbeits- und Verdienstmöglich-
keiten bieten. Die Existenz von Städten sowie die damit eng verknüpfte Standortentscheidung
von Haushalten und Unternehmen wird in der Regel aus Sicht dieser Produktionsverflechtun-
gen erklärt. Räumliche Dichte wird mit Agglomerationsvorteilen auf der Produktionsseite und
Agglomerationsnachteilen (congestion) auf der Konsumentenseite in Verbindung gesetzt. Seit
einiger Zeit haben Stadtforscher zunehmend von dieser einseitigen Betrachtung Abstand gen-
ommen und Städte nicht nur als Produktions-, sondern auch als Konsumzentren betrachtet. Die
Präferenzen von Arbeitern sind nachweislich heterogener geworden, das Humankapital sowie
die Einkommen gewachsen. Unternehmen sind mobiler geworden, das Güterangebot diversifiz-
ierter (Brueckner et al., 1999; Kolko, 1999; Kotkin, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2001; Florida, 2002;
Dalmazzo & de Blasio, 2011; Glaeser, 2011; Bauernschuster et al., 2012; Suedekum et al., 2012;
Ahlfeldt, 2013). Diese Entwicklungen haben Arbeiter mehr Freizeit und Einkommen gebracht,
das sie zum Konsumieren nutzen können. Daher sollten Arbeiter und Unternehmen nicht mehr
nur länger auf klassische Produktionsanreize, sondern auch auf eine Reihe urbaner Annehm-
lichkeiten (amenities) reagieren.
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist eine detaillierte Untersuchung der “consumer city idea”. Motiviert
von einem Mangel an empirischer Evidenz durchleuchtet die Arbeit verschiedene Aspekte der
Rolle von Amenities bei der Standortwahl von Haushalten und Unternehmen, um auf diese
Weise zu einem noch jungen Forschungsfeld beizutragen. Die Arbeit orientiert sich dabei an
der Urban Amenity Klassifizierung von Glaeser et al. (2001). Diese Einteilung sowie verwandte
Literatur werden detaillierter in Kapitel 2 behandelt. Ziel der umfangreichen Literaturzusam-
menfassung ist es, dem Leser eine Basis für die späteren Analysen zu geben. Außerdem wird auf
die methodischen Entwicklungen im Forschungsfeld eingegangen, die sich vereinfacht als einen
Wandel von der Herstellung simpler Korrelationszusammenhänge zu Kausalität beschreiben
lassen.
Kapitel 3 untersucht, inwieweit kulturelle Annehmlichkeiten (cultural amenities) eine Rolle
bei der Standwortwahl von Unternehmen spielen. Dabei werden cultural amenities als lokale,
nicht-handelbare Güter und Dienstleistungen (wie Bars, Cafés etc.) definiert. Die Idee ist, dass
innovative Dienstleistungsunternehmen hoch mobil sind und hauptsächlich von qualifizierter
Arbeit als Inputfaktor abhängen. Gleichzeitig haben Hochqualifizierte und Kreative ein großes
Interesse an einem sozial und kulturell abwechslungsreichen Umfeld (Florida, 2002). Hieraus
ableitend stellt sich die Hypothese, dass Unternehmen, die bzgl. ihrer Standortentscheidung
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ihren Mitarbeitern folgen, als Amenity Maximierer agieren. Ich teste die Hypothese empirisch
mit Hilfe eines Location Choice Modells für Internet Start-ups in Berlin. Die Identifizierung
des cultural amenity Effekts basiert auf dem Fall der Berliner Mauer, der als quasi-natürliches
Experiment interpretiert wird. Amenities haben hiernach einen positiven Einfluss auf die Stan-
dortwahl und ziehen Unternehmen aus der Web-Branche an. Ein Anstieg der Dichte an cultural
amenities um 1% führt zu einer erhöhten Wahrscheinlichkeit der Unternehmensansiedlung von
1,2%. Ein Vergleich mit anderen Dienstleistungsbranchen macht ferner deutlich, dass vor al-
lem kreative Branchen von Amenities positiv beeinflusst werden, während die Schätzer für
traditionelle Unternehmen nicht signifikant oder sogar negativ sind.
Kapitel 4 behandelt die Amenity Rolle in Bezug auf Ästhetik und die natürliche Schönheit
eines Ortes am Beispiel von Kulturerbe. Der Ausweis von denkmalgeschützten Gebieten wird
als Lösung eines Externalitätenproblems betrachtet, das für Hauseigentümer Nutzen im Sinne
einer erhöhten Sicherheit bzgl. der Zukunft des Gebiets bedeutet, aber auch zusätzliche Kosten
der Weiterentwicklung- und Baumöglichkeiten, d.h. Einschränkungen, mit sich bringt. Es wird
ein simples theoretisches Modell entwickelt, nach dem das optimale Ausweisniveau so bestimmt
wird, dass es den Nutzen der lokalen Eigentümer Pareto-maximiert. Das Modell impliziert, dass
a) mit einer erhöhten Präferenz für historische Beschaffenheiten die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines
Ausweis als Kulturerbe wächst, und dass sich b) marginale Neuausweise nicht signifikant in
den Hauspreisen kapitalisieren. Die gewonnenen empirischen Ergebnisse entsprechen diesen
Erwartungen.
In Kapitel 5 wird mit Transportgeschwindigkeit eine dritte Klasse von Urban Amenities
nach der Definition von Glaeser et al. (2001) untersucht. Die bedeutende Rolle von Verkehr ist
in der Ökonomie unumstritten. Die Untersuchung der Auswirkungen neuer Verkehrsprojekte
gestaltet sich hingegen schwierig, da die Beziehung zwischen Verkehr und wirtschaftlicher En-
twicklung von einem offenkundigen Simultanitätsproblem geprägt ist. Transportallokation ist
nicht zufällig, sondern reagiert auf die Nachfrage nach Infrastruktur, da diese in der Regel im-
mense Investitionen voraussetzt. Herkömmliche kausale Inferenz hat sich diesem Problem nur
von einer einseitigen Betrachtung der Bereitstellung neuer Infrastruktur genähert. Die Arbeit
schlägt daher eine in der Makroökonomie bewährte Methode vor, um die Struktur der sich
gegenseitig beeinflussenden, endogenen Variablen zu untersuchen. Ich schätze bivariate Panel
Vektorautoregressionsmodelle, die auf einzigartigen historischen Daten Berlins während einer
hochdynamischen Periode, in der der Großteil des heutigen öffentlichen Nahverkehrs entwickelt
wurde (1881-1935), basieren. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die simultane Bestimmung von Trans-
portinfrastruktur und urbaner Entwicklung. Ferner lässt sich eine Verdrängung von Haushalten
durch Unternehmen in zentralen Lagen nach einem positiven Transportschock erkennen.
Kapitel 6 ergänzt die Untersuchung des Berliner Schienennahverkehrs durch die Anwendung
derselben Panel VARMethodik auf Chicago, Illinois, und der Entwicklung der Chicago Elevated
über einen Zeitraum von über 100 Jahren (1910-2010). Die Untersuchung kann als zusätzlicher
Robustheitstest sowie auch als eine Vergleichsstudie interpretiert werden. Die Ergebnisse ents-
prechen den Erkenntnissen aus der Berliner Analyse.
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Die Untersuchung verschiedener Aspekte der “consumer city idea” im Rahmen dieser Arbeit
macht die Bedeutung von Urban Amenities für das Verständnis, wie sich Haushalte und Un-
ternehmen im Raum verhalten, wo und warum sie sich für einen Standort entscheiden, deutlich.
Die räumliche Allokation von Personen sowie Unternehmen kann von mehr als nur wirtschaft-
licher Aktivität erklärt werden. Neue und verbesserte empirische Methoden, eine zunehmende
Verfügbarkeit räumlicher Daten (insbesondere “open data”) sowie verbesserte Softwarepakete
zur Datenaufbereitung/-analyse (wie GIS) ermöglichen Untersuchungen, die uns zu verstehen
helfen, wo wir leben und warum wir dort leben.
xvii

1. Introduction
Traditionally, cities have been regarded as centres of production: Firms produce goods in cities
because agglomeration economies make them more productive. People live in cities because
firms provide jobs and income. The existence of cities and closely related location decisions
by households and firms have often been explained by these production linkages. Density is
thought to offer agglomeration benefits on the production side but negative congestion effects
on the consumption side. More recently, urban scholars have departed from this view and
considered cities not only as centres of production but also of consumption (Glaeser et al., 2001).
Workers have arguably become more heterogeneous in terms of taste, more educated and their
incomes have risen. Firms have become more footloose and goods more diverse (Brueckner et
al., 1999; Kolko, 1999; Kotkin, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2001; Florida, 2002; Dalmazzo & de Blasio,
2011; Glaeser, 2011; Bauernschuster et al., 2012; Suedekum et al., 2012; Ahlfeldt, 2013). These
developments have left workers with more leisure time and income to spend on the consumption
side so that workers and firms are no longer expected to only respond to classic production
links but to a wide range of amenities.
This dissertation intends to shed further light on the consumer city idea. Motivated by a
lack of empirical evidence, I contribute to this young field of research by investigating different
aspects of the role of amenities in the location decision of households and firms. The work is
structured around the classification of urban amenities as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2001).
This classification as well as related literature is presented in Chapter 2. The comprehensive
literature review is intended to provide a background for the analyses carried out in this work.
Moreover, it shows the field’s methodological development which is characterised by a move
from correlations to establishing causality.
Chapter 3 investigates the role of cultural amenities in the location decision of firms. I define
cultural amenities as localised goods and services, which is one of the four urban amenity cat-
egories defined by Glaeser et al. (2001). The idea is that innovative service firms are highly
footloose and mainly rely on qualified labour as input factor. At the same time, highly qualified
and “creative” individuals have a strong preference for a rich social and cultural life (Florida,
2002). It is therefore expected that firms, following its workers, act as amenity-maximising
agents. I empirically test this hypothesis by estimating a location choice model for internet
start-ups in Berlin. The identification of the cultural amenity effect is based on the fall of the
Berlin Wall which is interpreted as a quasi-natural experiment. Amenities are found to posit-
ively impact on the location of web firms. A comparison with other service industries moreover
suggests that amenities are significant to the location choice of creative sectors, whereas no
effect can be observed for non-creative firms.
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Chapter 4 is centred around the amenity role of aesthetics and physical setting, and on
heritage preservation in particular. Heritage designation is considered to solve an externality
problem thus providing benefits to home owners, in terms of a reduction of uncertainty regarding
the future of an area, but at the costs of development restrictions. The chapter proposes a simple
theory of the designation process, in which it is postulated that the optimal level of designation
is chosen so as to Pareto-maximise the welfare of local owners. The implication of the model
is that a) an increase in preferences for historic character should increase the likelihood of a
designation, and b) new designations at the margin should not be associated with significant
house price capitalisation effects. The empirical results are in line with these expectations.
In Chapter 5 a third type of urban amenities according to the Glaeser et al. (2001) definition
is investigated in further detail, i.e. speed of transportation. Transport’s important role in
economics is beyond controversy. The estimation of the impact of a new infrastructure project
is, however, not entirely straightforward as the relation between transport and economic de-
velopment is plagued by a notorious simultaneity problem. The allocation of transport is not
completely random and may respond to demand as infrastructure projects usually require large
investment costs. Conventional causal inference has approached this problem by only focusing
on the uni-directional effect of transport provision. I therefore propose a method, which is well
established in macroeconomics, to explore the structure of mutually related endogenous vari-
ables. In particular, I run bivariate Panel VAR models using unique historical data for Berlin
during a dynamic period when most of today’s public rail network was established (1881-1935).
Results do indeed suggest a simultaneously determined relation between transport and urban
development.
Chapter 6 extends the previous analysis of the Berlin rail sector by applying the Panel VAR
methodology to the city of Chicago, Illinois, and the development of the ‘L’ train over a period
of over 100 years (1910-2010). The analysis can be interpreted as both an additional robustness
test and a comparative study. Results are in line with the findings for Berlin.
The dissertation ends with the conclusion in Chapter 7, where I summarise the main findings
and stress important contributions to the literature.
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This chapter reviews the recent literature on the role of amenities in the location decision of
households and firms. The review is intended to provide a background for the analyses carried
out in this work. The chapter begins with a very brief introduction to location theories and
a quick review of the empirical workhorse models used in the literature. This is followed by a
more detailed review of how the location choice is determined by different types of amenities.
2.1. Location theory and empirics
The question where people and firms locate and why they choose a particular location lies at
the centre of location theory. Combining the fields of economics and geography, the question
marks the origins of today’s economic geography, or urban economics when dealing with cit-
ies (O’Sullivan, 2009) in particular. Von Thünen (1826) is one of the first to investigate this
question from a more economic perspective. In his influential work “Der isolierte Staat” he
introduces a spatial dimension by looking at the transport cost of different crops from sur-
rounding fields to an exogenous market square. In his models, transport costs not only depend
on geographical distance but also on a crop’s weight and perishability. Assuming a (Ricardian)
land rent, i.e. a renter’s maximal willingness to pay for a unit of land, he derives concentric
rings of land use around a town centre where the goods are assumed to be traded. This trivial
but powerful model explains the location choice and land use allocation according to crops’
transport costs to the market.
Von Thünen’s early ideas were eventually picked up by Alonso (1964); Mills (1967, 1969);
Muth (1969) who replace the exogenous town centre/market square by a central business district
(CBD). This CBD is assumed to host all economic activity such that the city is characterised by
a single employment centre. In this monocentric city model workers are assumed to commute
to their jobs in the CBD. They face a trade-off between transport cost and space consumption
and will choose their location based on optimised utility. At the same time, firms determine
their location based on maximised profits; they require land for production and accessibility to
markets. While different land use types were characterised by different crops in von Thünen’s
(1826) concentric ring model, it is residents and firms who compete for land in the monocentric
city model. Final land use patterns are determined by residents’ and firms’ bid-rents. Firms are
generally expected to outbid residents in the CBD to benefit from agglomeration economies.
This widely used Alonso-Mills-Muth (AMM) Model lies at the core of urban economics and has
often been adopted to address critical assumptions. Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg (2002) introduce
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for instance an endogenously determined CBD by incorporating agglomeration economies where
firms are assumed to be more productive in a high employment surrounding.
Standard urban economic models share one common perspective on cities: A city is usually
regarded as a place of production where land use patterns are determined only by the pro-
duction side. Residential utility and hence location is predominantly defined by commuting
opportunities and employment. More recently, economists have departed from this view. Espe-
cially applied research has increasingly investigated the role of consumption amenities. Workers
have arguably become more heterogeneous in terms of taste, more educated and their incomes
have risen. Firms have become more footloose and goods more diverse, such that workers and
firms are no longer expected to respond not only to classic production links but to a wide range
of amenities (Brueckner et al., 1999; Kolko, 1999; Kotkin, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2001; Florida,
2002; Dalmazzo & de Blasio, 2011; Glaeser, 2011; Bauernschuster et al., 2012; Suedekum et al.,
2012; Ahlfeldt, 2013).
Glaeser et al. (2001) classify urban amenities into the following four categories1:
1. Localised goods and services
2. Aesthetics and physical setting
3. Public services
4. Speed in terms of transportation
Guided by this classification, the following sections provide an overview of the recent literature
on the spatial allocation problem with respect to different types of urban amenities. The main
questions which arise are: How do households and firms value amenities? Are amenities able
to explain the location decision of residents and firms?
The greater part of the applied spatial allocation literature addressing these questions relies
on a hedonic pricing approach which goes back to Rosen (1974). The approach allows for
deriving the implicit price for specific characteristics of a composite good from the market
even though only the composite is traded and not the sub-attributes. The idea is, that in
equilibrium, the marginal benefit of an additional attribute (e.g. a flat endowed with a balcony)
offsets the utility costs of the extra expenditure involved, assuming income and consumer
preferences are given. Housing expenditures are then used to derive the monetary value of
its observable attributes. The implicit price of an attribute can be determined by estimating
how a marginal change in the attribute changes the housing expenditure (Gibbons & Machin,
2008). This revealed-preference method therefore indicates how much a certain amenity is
valued by residents or firms. Following up on the hedonic pricing idea one might alternatively
investigate the spatial distribution of population or migration flows. If an area is characterised
by a high amenity endowment and hence by a higher (short-term) utility, people will relocate
to this location since they are better off at the new place. Exploiting compensating differentials
1In a similar way, Brueckner et al. (1999) suggest the division into natural, historical and modern amenities
where historical and modern amenities are theoretically linked by renovation to each other.
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and the spatial equilibrium condition one can either directly use changes in population as an
indicator for a region’s attractiveness or calculate the differences in rents and wages as in the
quality of life literature (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Greenwood et al.,
1991; Gyourko & Tracy, 1991). Most of the research reviewed in the subsequent sections as
well as my own work are based on these very briefly summarised methodological ideas.
2.2. Localised goods and services
Manufactured goods can be considered as national or even global goods in the sense that their
consumption is hardly limited to a certain location. These tradable goods can be ordered online
or in catalogs and are, thanks to a significant reduction in transport cost over the last decades,
available to anyone anywhere. A lot of services like restaurants, theatres, concerts, museums or
hair saloons are, however, only available locally (Glaeser et al., 2001). Their product cannot be
shipped and consumers need to travel to the service providers. People or firms with preferences
for the consumption of certain non-tradables will therefore locate in its proximity.
Since the provision of urban amenities like operas, bars or clubs involves high fixed costs
a critical mass is needed, which is more easily reached in dense urban areas. Producers as
well as consumers therefore benefit from agglomeration economies in dense areas. Assuming
heterogeneous preferences and fixed cost in the provision of local services enables cities to
agglomerate people with niche tastes which results in an even greater product variety. Special
book stores or antique shops, Michelin star awarded restaurants or exotic cuisines are therefore
expected to be found more in big cities than in the periphery. Theoretic models building on the
Dixit-Stiglitz assumption of monopolistic competition demonstrate how firms and consumers
co-locate, creating concentrated consumption clusters (Fujita, 1988; Glazer et al., 2003).
Empirical evidence on how local goods and services form part of the location decision process
is still rare and predominantly based on correlations. Glaeser et al. (2001) have shown that US
counties better equipped with local consumption amenities grew more quickly between 1977
and 1995. In their multivariate regression approach the presence of restaurants and concert
venues in the base year significantly explains later population growth. Whilst the number of art
museums is not significantly correlated with population growth, there is a negative association
with the number of movie theatres and bowling alleys per capita. Glaeser et al. (2001) explain
these results by the role education plays with respect to amenity appreciation/consumption, i.e
heterogenous preferences. A positive correlation between population growth and restaurants is
also reported for France (1975-1990).
By finding a positive bilateral correlation between the number of museums and US metro-
politan area population in 1990, Glaeser & Gottlieb (2006) provide descriptive evidence that
consumer amenities rely on high fixed costs and are therefore more likely to be found in bigger
cities. Making use of the DDB Needham Life Style Survey from 1998, they furthermore show
that city residents are significantly more likely to visit art museums, go to a bar, dine out,
go to the movies or pop/rock/classical concerts. Conversely, home entertainment is negatively
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correlated. Larger cities are hence not only endowed with a higher level of amenities, their
citizens also consume urban amenities more often. In a similar exercise, Borck (2007) assesses
the importance of various kinds of consumption amenities for Germany. Based on the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) 1993-2003, his estimates yield an increased probability of dining
out, going to the movies or a concert for people living in bigger cities. Introducing individual
fixed effects, estimates stay robust for going to the cinema and to concerts. Similar findings
for the US are reported by T. N. Clark (2004), who constructs an amenity index based on the
number of operas, “Starbucks” coffee shops, juice bars, brew pubs, museums and whole-food
stores as well as bicycle events. Their index is positively correlated with the change in popu-
lation between 1980 and 1990 as well as 1990-2000. Moreover, there is a positive association
between the number of high tech patents (1975-1995) and consumption amenities.
Large cities are not only equipped with a high number of restaurants and museums but are
often also home to big sports teams. Residents have the opportunity to visit home games and
identify themselves with the team. Following a compensating differential approach, Carlino
& Coulson (2004) estimate people’s indirect willingness to pay for having a professional NFL
franchise in their neighbourhood. Their fixed effects estimates (on a city level) indicate that
NFL franchise raises annual rents by about 8% in central cities. But not all local amenities
are bound to large cities. Golf courses are for instance rather located in less dense areas.
Investigating house transaction prices for a suburban area of Rancho Bernardo, California, Do
& Grudnitski (1995) estimate a golf course location premium of 7.6%.
With a particular focus on the amenity role of restaurants, Schiff (2013) investigates the
aforementioned hypothesis that localised service and product variety increases with city size.
He constructs indices for cuisine variety based on a sample of 127,000 restaurants across 726
US cities. He finds that in the top quartile by land area, a one standard deviation increase
in log population is correlated with a 57% rise in the number of unique cuisines. Moreover,
holding population constant, a one standard deviation decrease of land area (increase in dens-
ity) raises cuisine count by 10%. A positive relation between the number of restaurants and
population has also been found by Waldfogel (2008). He additionally provides evidence on
preference externalities, i.e., specific types of restaurants are more likely to be found in certain
neighbourhoods. For instance, Chinese neighbourhoods are characterised by a high density of
Chinese restaurants.
However, it is difficult to establish any causal relation between endogenous consumption
amenities and the location of firms and households. To overcome this problem, Falck et al.
(2011) propose an identification strategy based on a quasi-natural experiment in German his-
tory. Using proximity to baroque opera houses, they exploit the fact that opera houses were
historically mainly built due to prestigious reasons and do not symbolise economic power. Ac-
cording to their causal inference, cultural amenities explain the distribution of high human
capital employees between German city districts. A different approach to capturing the role
and the value of urban amenities is proposed by Ahlfeldt (2013). He exploits a novel dataset of
geo-tagged photos uploaded to online communities in order to capture “urbanity” - a composed
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measure of urban amenities. The definition of urbanity is therefore not restricted to localised
consumption goods but is also expected to capture aesthetics and the architectural beauty of
a city. His estimates for Berlin and London yield an indirect utility elasticity with respect to
urbanity of 1% and demonstrate the important role amenities play in cities.
Summing up, urban consumption amenities tend to have a positive effect on the location of
households. People move to amenity-rich areas and are willing to pay for the consumption of
local services. However, this group of amenities seems to be understudied, most probably due
to its endogenous nature.
2.3. Aesthetics and physical setting
When people think of a particular location, its physical setting or aesthetic appearance is
probably what comes first to mind: California is generally associated with a mild climate and
long beaches, New York with its skyline in Manhattan and Rome is known for its long history as
expressed by its historic building stock. Architectural design or climate conditions are therefore
often considered as a determining factor in the spatial allocation of households and firms. This
section reviews the recent literature on how (i) natural amenities and (ii) how pure beauty,
architectural design as well as heritage conservation are valued by people.
2.3.1. Natural amenities
Natural amenities, like the proximity to the nearest coast line, an elevated location or a mild
climate might be considered as positive natural amenities by households, depending on their
preferences. Applying a workhorse model in urban economics, Mahan et al. (2000) use hedonic
regression techniques to estimate the amenity value of wetlands in Portland, Oregon. They
find that property prices rise with increasing distance to the nearest wetland and prices go up
by US-$ 436 per 1,000 feet. Quite opposite empirical results are reported by Wu et al. (2004)
who find a positive price effect of being located closer to wetlands. Portland’s inhabitants are
moreover willing to pay higher house prices for locations with more open space and which are
closer to parks and lakes. Elevation is also positively correlated with house prices. Anderson
& West (2006) make further use of the hedonic price approach when examining the amenity
role of open space in the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. Their location fixed effect
estimates yield a positive amenity role of open spaces which is moreover higher in denser
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the valuation of proximity to open space depends on specific
neighbourhood characteristics. Neighbourhoods characterised by high incomes, high crime and
child rates value open spaces higher than average. Positive natural amenity values are also
found within a nationwide study of one million housing transactions for England between 1996
and 2008 (Gibbons et al., 2011). Gardens, green spaces, areas of water as well as broadleaved
woodland, coniferous woodland, enclosed farmland and freshwater and flood plain locations
raise house prices at a ward level. The Travel to Work Area (TTWA) fixed effect estimates
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show, moreover, that house prices are higher in proximity to rivers, National Parks as well as
National Trust sites.
Another strand of literature suggests that “people vote by their feet” (Tiebout, 1956). These
mainly regional economic analyses try to capture the demand of certain location attributes by
examining where people migrate to or what places experience the strongest growth in popu-
lation. Rappaport (2007) estimates partial correlation between population growth and local
climate variables on a US county level. He not only finds a positive correlation between the
daily maximum temperature in January and population growth but, amongst others, also a
positive climate association with growth in employment, number of elderly people and num-
ber of college graduates. Moreover, he observes a change in preferences over the last decades.
People are more likely to follow nice weather, an observation in line with the consumer city
idea. Similar empirical analyses have also been carried out for Europe. Using functional urban
areas for the EU-12 countries between 1980 and 2000, Cheshire & Magrini (2006) also find
that “weather matters”. However, they conclude that climate amenities only affect population
growth on a national scale but not between European countries. More empirical evidence for
Europe is provided by Rodríguez-Pose & Ketterer (2012). Instead of population growth they
use net migration on a NUTS1/NUTS2 level as dependent variable. Based on Hausman-Taylor
estimations they find that migrants have a preference for milder climates.
A similar preference for warm coastal areas but based on a different approach is also found by
Chen & Rosenthal (2008). Following the quality of life literature (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982;
Blomquist et al., 1988; Gyourko & Tracy, 1991), they first develop a set of quality of business
and of life indicators and then match them with US census information (1970-2000). According
to their estimates, young highly-qualified move to areas with a good business environment
whereas retirees move away from economic activity to high-amenity places in terms of nature
and beauty.
2.3.2. Beauty and architectural design
How architecture or a city’s “beauty” is perceived is a matter of taste and therefore not easy
to generalise and value. To solve this problem Florida et al. (2011) make use of information on
community satisfaction from a large-scale survey covering 28,000 people and 8,000 communities
in the US. They find a strong positive correlation between a ranking measure of community
satisfaction and physical setting and pure beauty.
Another approach to revealing residential preferences which is somehow similar to the use
of survey data is to focus on referenda for individual partly public building projects. Sports
stadia have become a very popular research subject in this regard. One example is the study
by Coates & Humphreys (2006), who investigate the outcome of the referenda held on the (re-
)construction of the Lambeau Field in Green Bay, Wisconsin (professional American football
stadium), the Compaq Center and on a newly proposed arena (both professional basketball
arenas) in Houston, Texas. Precincts in close distance to Lambeau Field (Green Bay) and
the newly proposed Basketball area in Houston cast a significantly larger share of positive
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votes, whereas proximity has no particular impact for the existing arena in Houston. Matching
the referendum data with Census tract information, Coates & Humphreys (2006) conclude for
Green Bay that urban precincts, precincts with a high share of renters and of white collar jobs
show stronger support for the stadium. In Houston, precincts characterised by a high number
of renters are conversely more likely to be against the basketball arenas, whereas a higher share
of blacks, college graduates and a higher median family income are positively correlated with
positive votes. Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2012) find contrasting results when exploiting the 2001
referendum on the Allianz Arena (professional football) in Munich, Germany. Making use of
a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model their estimates show that people living in close distance
to the new grounds on average oppose the construction whereas at the overall city level the
referendum was positive. They regard the results as being in line with the NIMBY (Not In My
Backyard) hypothesis.2 Dehring et al. (2008) extend the purely referendum-based approach
by additionally using data on house prices. They first estimate a hedonic price function with
variables capturing the proximity to the potentially new home stadium of NFL’s Dallas Cowboys
in Arlington, Texas. They particularly look at pre-referendum events in this step to capture
potential signalling effects on homeowners. In a second step they match the market signals
with the results from a 2004 referendum on the stadium. The authors provide evidence for the
homevoter hypothesis; support for the stadium rises by between 0.9% and 1.2% for every US-$
1,000 increase in house prices.
There are numerous purely hedonic analyses of sport facilities and arena architecture in par-
ticular. Feng & Humphreys (2008) for instance estimate a spatial lag model, using a contiguity
as well as a distance-based spatial weight matrix, to obtain residential willingness to pay for
major sport stadia. Their analysis is based on 10,000 transaction prices on family housing for
2000. They examine the price effect of two different facilities in Columbus, Ohio: the Nation-
wide Arena, which is home of NHL’s Blue Jackets, and the Crew Stadium, a major league
soccer (MLS) stadium. Their Spatial-2SLS approach with spatially lagged explanatory vari-
ables as instrumental variables (IV) yields that housing values increase by 1.75% for each 10%
decrease in distance to the facility. The total willingness to pay sums up to US-$ 222.54 millions
for the Nationwide Arena and US-$ 35.7 millions for the Crew Stadium. Ahlfeldt & Maennig
(2010a) also make use of hedonic regression techniques in their analysis of three multi-functional
sports arenas situated in the municipality of Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin, Germany; namely the
Max-Schmeling Arena and Velodrom/Swimming Arena. As the arenas were built as part of
the application for the Olympics 2000, special attention was paid to its architectural designs.
Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010a) find that the Velodrom has a significant positive effect on standard
land values which decreases with distance. Whilst the Max-Schmeling-Arena has more ambigu-
ous effects, the authors identify a total impact radius of three km for the Berlin sport arenas.
Difference-in-difference estimates carried out in a follow-up study (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2009)3
2A NIMBY attitude describes residential opposition to a proposed new development (e.g. an airport) in close
proximity to their homes. However, they often agree to the need for this new development, but not in their
neighbourhood (“backyard”).
3Even though the initially reviewed paper was published later, it was submitted earlier.
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also yield a positive land value growth but this is only regarded as a short-run novelty effect.
Similar price responses are also found for London’s 2012 Olympic stadium. Property prices
inside host boroughs rose by 2.1-3.3% after the announcement of the city’s successful bid to
host the mega event (Kavetsos, 2012). Based on year and location fixed effects price estimates
are about 5% higher in a three miles radius around the Olympic stadium. Also examining
external price effects of sports stadia in London but focusing on football, Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos
(2013) find large effects on surrounding property prices originating from the New Wembley and
Arsenal’s new Emirates Stadium. With an impact area of 3-5 km, their difference-in-difference
estimates are in range of the aforementioned studies. In particular they observe an increase in
prices of up to 15% in close proximity to the New Wembley. Property prices go up by 1.7% for
each distance decrease of 10% to the new Arsenal grounds.
Even though stadia provide a good example of iconic design, a large body of the literature tries
to investigate architectural amenity effects of functionally less specific buildings, often making
use of landmarks, price awarded or officially designated buildings. Professional expertise for
measuring architectural quality is used, for instance, by Vandell & Lane (1989) as well as by
Gat (1998). They both conclude that design impacts on the rents of office buildings in Boston
and Cambridge and in Tel Aviv, Israel, respectively. Moorhouse & Smith (1994) take another
approach and restrict their analysis to an arguably homogeneous neighbourhood in Boston’s
South End which is characterised by numerous Victorian style row houses. This set-up enables
them to estimate the premium of differentiating design features which range between 11 and
20% of the price. Ahlfeldt & Mastro (2012) follow a similar approach by restricting their case-
study to 24 residential buildings in Oak Park, Illinois designed by US architect Frank Lloyd
Wright. They estimate a price premium of 8.5% within a radius of 50 metres. Moreover, they
find that the premium decreases steeply with greater distance to Wright buildings and ranges
around 5% within 50-250 m. The effects become significantly weaker and eventually diminish
with even greater distance.
Cultural heritage is another example a location’s beauty and physical appearance. Heritage
designation has become a popular research subject, probably due its role as an important but
controversially discussed planning policy. Following the definition of the UK Planning Act 1990,
conservation areas are identified by a “special architectural or historic interest, the character
or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section 69). One of the early
studies which estimates the price effect of being located inside a historical district of Baltimore
was carried out by Ford (1989). She observes a positive correlation between listed transaction
prices for the years 1980-1985 and historic district location. A positive internal price effect has
also been found by Schaeffer & Millerick (1991) for the Chicago neighbourhoods of Beverly
Hills and Morgan Park. The effect seems, however, to depend on whether local or national
authorities implemented the designation. While nationally designated areas experience positive
price effects, local designation status is associated with decreasing prices. The authors explain
the different outcomes by the fact that national designators are more likely to identify buildings
or areas of a wider importance. In a study on Philadelphia’s CBD, Asabere et al. (1994) also
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find a negative impact of locally designated areas, looking at apartment sale prices between
1980 and 1991. They estimate a negative premium on apartment prices by as much as 24%.
In a similar study on owner occupied houses (1986-1990), Asabere & Huffman (1994) report,
however, a premium of 26% if houses where located in federally certified historic districts. These
findings stress the fact that the price effect might depend on the designator being in line with
Schaeffer & Millerick (1991).
There exists a long list of hedonic price analyses which mainly contribute to the previously
reviewed literature by expanding estimations to different cities and exploiting different price
datasets. Deodhar (2004) for example estimate the internal premium for Sidney’s upper north
shore exploiting property sales between 1999 and 2000. On average property prices experience
a premium of 12%. A comparable premium of 16% is is found for single-family residences in
San Diego (2000-2006). Narwold et al. (2008) note that the premium paid exceeds the pure
capitalisation due to tax savings, suggesting that built heritage generates an additional value.
In Abilene, Texas, the estimated internal heritage premium is 17.6%. House prices inside a
census tract moreover rise by 0.14% per additional designation (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001).
Examining a sample of nine cities in Texas, Leichenko et al. (2001) find significant price premia
ranging between 5 and 20%. A range of 14-23% is reported by Coulson & Lahr (2005) for
historic designation effects on property values in Memphis, Tennessee, for a period between
1998 and 2002.
More recent analyses are on the one hand not only interested in the internal but also in the
external effect of heritage designation. Houses in close proximity to preserved historic areas,
presumingly with a direct view, are expected to experience a price increase as they indirectly
benefit from the designation without being subject to any cost such as not being able to alter
their façades. On the other hand, recent urban economic heritage literatures tries to address
endogeneity concerns such as omitted variable biases. Noonan (2007), for instance, makes use of
repeat-sales for Chicago between 1990 and 1999. This approach enables him to take differences
in order to eliminate time-invariant characteristics which might be correlated with the variables
of interest. His SAR estimates yield an internal price effect of 2% for each additional landmark
inside a block. In a follow-up study, Noonan & Krupka (2011) introduce instrumental variables
which are defined as interactions of historic quality and neighbourhood demographics. They find
that standard OLS overestimates the effects, suggesting that districts have been systematically
selected into the designation program. Instrumented estimates are even negative while they
conclude that the overall policy effect for Chicago is close to zero. Noonan & Krupka (2011) also
investigate the external effect and create mutually exclusive distance rings around designated
areas. Their results suggest an external effect in close proximity. However, the ring estimates
might likely suffer from multi collinearity. There also exists a number of heritage studies for
Europe. Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010b) for instance focus on condominium apartment sales in
Berlin (2007). Computing a landmark density measure for neighbourhoods defined by an area
of 600 metres, they estimate a marginal price effect of 0.10% per landmark. They test for
external premia by separately including a distance measure to the closest landmark as well as
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a gravity-based accessibility indicator into the regression model. The distance bands yield an
external premium of 2.8% for apartments within 50 metres of a landmark. The effect diminishes
with greater distance and lies at around 1.4% for a distance bin of 50-100 metres. A steeply
declining external premium is also found for the Dutch city of Zaanstad. Exploiting a panel
of transaction data between 1985 and 2007 and estimating a SAR model, Lazrak et al. (2013)
find a premium of 0.28% within a 50-metre radius of listed heritage areas. On average, a house
sells for a price which is 26.4% higher if being located inside a conserved neighbourhood.
Koster et al. (2012) and van Duijn & Rouwendal (2013) furthermore try to investigate whether
heritage appreciation depends on socio-economic attributes. Following a semi-parametric re-
gression discontinuity approach, Koster et al. (2012) ask whether rich households sort them-
selves into amenity-rich city centres. Exploring a house sales database which covers approxim-
ately 75% of all owner-occupied housing transactions of the Netherlands between 2002-2009,
they find a price difference of 5% at the boundary. They moreover observe that richer, older
and higher qualified households have a higher willingness to pay for living inside a conservation
area. Similar results for the Netherlands are found by van Duijn & Rouwendal (2013). Their
residential sorting model accounts for the fact that residents are not only able to consume her-
itage in their own but also in neighbouring municipalities. They provide additional evidence on
residential sorting into designated neighbourhoods where the highly educated have the highest
marginal willingness to pay. Final simulation exercises indicate that the price of a standard
house in Amsterdam would decrease by 17% in the absence of cultural heritage, and by 8% in
Utrecht respectively. Finally, Ahlfeldt, Möller et al. (2013)4 examine the economics of heritage
conservation for England. They develop a theoretic model of the designation process in which
they postulate that the optimal level of designation is chosen to Pareto-maximize the welfare
of local owners. The implications of the model are twofold: An increase in historic preferences,
proxied by education, is expected to raise the likelihood of additional heritage designation. This
is tested and confirmed by IV Tobit estimations using UK census data between 1991 and 2011.
Secondly the model implies that new designations at the margin should not be associated with
significant house price capitalisation effects. Standard as well as spatial difference-in-difference
estimations of the benefits (externalities) and cost (restrictiveness) of heritage conservation to
local homeowners are in line with these expectations.
To sum up, recent literature has shown that people are well aware of their surroundings and
appreciate the amenity value of heritage, climate or architectural design. Most architectural
features not only have an internal but also an external effect where the range of the spill-overs
might vary quite strongly. New construction projects are evaluated and supported by home
owners if they expect an increase in house prices, following the home voter analysis. People
might however also be against projects in their close proximity as suggested by the NIMBY
literature. Spatial planning policies are therefore often introduced to solve coordination prob-
lems inherent to free markets. Recent literature, specifically looking into the role of heritage,
4The paper is part of this thesis and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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has found evidence for the availability of heterogeneous preferences with respect to heritage
appreciation, like the urban phenomena of gentrification.
2.4. Public services
A third type of urban amenities as categorised by Glaeser et al. (2001) is summarised under the
category of public services. This is obviously a very broadly defined category. The following
review is therefore restricted to schooling as well as crime - two amenities which are among the
most popular in applied urban economic research.
2.4.1. Schooling
The hedonic house price approach is also popular when it comes to the valuation of school
quality. Especially in countries where household location determines what school a pupil at-
tends (catchment-areas) the hedonic price approach provides a way of estimating the parent’s
willingness to pay for their children’s education. A lot of educational researchers have followed
this approach and improved and refined the methodology over time, moving from correlation
to causality. The median premium of most of these studies is about 4% and an inter-quartile
range of 4% whereas refined boundary discontinuity yields a median figure of 3.5% with an
inter-quartile range of 1.3% (Gibbons & Machin, 2008; Machin, 2011). According to Nguyen-
Hoang & Yinger (2011), the majority of the analyses were carried out for the United States (36),
followed by the United Kingdom (6), France (2) and Norway (2). The subsequent paragraphs
briefly review a selection of hedonic price regressions to assess the value of school quality.
Looking into the percentage of students reaching 9th grade proficiency in Ohio 2000/2001,
Brasington & Haurin (2006) observe a positive association between house prices and school
performance. Prices go up by 7.6% if school performance increases by one standard deviation.
Cheshire & Sheppard (2004) follow a traditional hedonic approach, attempting to capture as
many (un-)observables as possible by applying a wide range of neighbourhood and socio eco-
nomic controls. Their estimates yield a premium of 9.8% for a one standard deviation increase in
primary school test performance. L. Rosenthal (2003) follows an instrumental variable strategy
to establish a causal relation between house prices and school quality. Inspections by the Office
of Standards in Education are used as a source of exogeneity. Her estimates indicate a dwelling
price elasticity of 5% with respect to exam performance based on data for England between
1995 and 1998.
Figlio & Lucas (2004) generate a large panel dataset using repeat real estate transactions
between the mid-1980’s and 2002 for Florida. Exploiting the rich panel information and apply-
ing a wide range of fixed effects as well as neighbourhood-year interactions they detect a 10%
premium for schools which received an “A” as a grade in each year. Panel estimation tech-
niques to deal with endogeneity are also used by Clapp et al. (2008) who examine the relation
between property prices and school district attributes such as 8th grade math test scores for
Connecticut (1994-2004). Their estimate yield a 1.3 to 1.4% price increase for a positive one
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standard deviation change in math scores. Bogart & Cromwell (2000) make use of a school
redistriction in Shaker Heights, Ohio (1987). Their difference-in-difference estimates based on
transactions between 1983 and 1994 indicate that a disruption of neighbourhood schools lowers
house values by 9.9%.
Discontinuity designs using administrative boundaries have become a very popular tool in
the more recent literature. The idea is to compare households which are in close proximity to
each other and are hence assumed to be subject to the same observable and unobservable area
effects but at the same time are on two sides of an administrative boundary. This boundary
can, for example, be a school attendance zone which determines the treatment. Households
are assumed to differ only in terms of access to school quality as common neighbourhood
factors are eliminated. The boundary discontinuity approach has, amongst others, been used
by Fack & Grenet (2010) to establish a causal link between middle-school test results and
house prices. Looking into data for Paris (1997-2003), they find that a one standard deviation
increase in test performance leads to a rise in house prices by 2%. With 3.5%, the price
effect is found to be significantly stronger for high-school test results in the Australian Capital
Territory between 2003 and 2005 (Davidoff & Leigh, 2008). Similar results are also reported
for the London area (1996-2001) using the proportion of students reaching the target grade in
primary school English, science, and maths tests by Gibbons & Machin (2006) who extend the
discontinuity approach by using changes over time within geographical school clusters and by
instrumenting school performance with salient school characteristics. A one standard deviation
increase in performance causes house prices to rise by 3.8%. More positive causal links based
on the boundary discontinuity approach are found for Boston, Massachusetts (1993-1995) using
elementary math and reading scores (Black, 1999), for British primary schools relying on grade
data from maths, science, and English tests between 1996 and 1999 (Gibbons & Machin, 2003)
as well as for elementary schools in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, exploiting math and
reading scores between 1994 and 2001 (Kane et al., 2005). Machin & Salvanes (2007) make use
of a quasi-experimental change in education politics in Oslo 1997, which enables school choice
independent from living in a certain catchment area. Their discontinuity estimates yield a house
price premium of about 2-4% for a one standard deviation increase in average marks before the
reform. In a recent paper, Gibbons et al. (2013) introduce several methodological improvements
to the discontinuity approach like the matching of identical properties across boundaries, the
inclusion of spatial trends and boundary effects or the re-weighting of transactions that are
closest to district boundaries. They observe prices going up by about 3% in response to a one
standard deviation change in school average value-added based on age-7 to age-11 test scores
as well as to prior achievement using a sample covering the whole of England.
A slightly different focus is used in the study by Gibbons & Silva (2008) when looking into
the relation between urban density and school performance. Exploiting the compulsory switch
from Primary to Secondary Education and using census information for more than 1.2 million
pupils in England they find significant but small benefits on education in dense urban areas.
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The authors explain their results by higher competition and greater school choice in dense
urban areas.
2.4.2. Crime
One often-cited reason for the renewed interest in cities and urban resurgence is the drop in
crime rates over the last decades. Between the 1960’s and 1980’s New York City was character-
ised by historically high crime rates and workers in big cities had to be compensated for crime
disamenities by higher wages (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006). In fact, examining 127 US cities,
Cullen & Levitt (1999) find that one additional reported crime per capita reduces population
by 1%. Their analysis is based on data covering the 1970’s till the 1980’s. They address en-
dogeneity concerns by instrumenting city crime rates by lagged changes in the punitiveness of
state criminal justice system.
Crime rates are generally found to be higher in cities compared to smaller towns and rural
areas. Looking at the correlation between different types of crime and city population, Glaeser
& Sacerdote (1999) report an overall elasticity of about 0.16 where the elasticity for murder
is estimated to be twice as large (0.32). In their subsequent analysis, Glaeser & Sacerdote
(1999) try to understand what determines higher crime rates in cities. They argue that higher
pecuniary benefits, lower probabilities of arrest and recognition as well as the presence of more
female-headed households are among the most important factors in explaining high urban crime
rates.
Similar to school amenities, there is a long tradition in valuing the role of crime in urban
economics. A straightforward approach to measuring the costs of crime is pursued by Brand
& Price (2000), who sum up a crime-related-costs-reported-in-victimisation survey. Based on
the British Crime Survey, they derive average costs for different crimes like burglary (£2,300),
robbery (£5,000) or homicide (at least £1 million). These calculations ignore any psychological
costs not taking into account the fear of crime or its risk. This might be one of the reasons
why most analyses on assessing the costs of crime rely on hedonic house price estimations. In
contrast to schooling, where attendance-zones can be exploited in a boundary discontinuity
design, for crime analyses it is difficult to eliminate unobservable neighbourhood effects. Most
estimates can therefore not be interpreted as describing a causal link.
One of the early hedonic analyses was carried out by Thaler (1978) who examines crime
data from the Rochester Police Department in the state of New York of 1971. His estimates
yield a price reduction of 3% followed by a one standard deviation increase in property crime
rates. A negative relation is also found by Hellman & Naroff (1979). They estimate a house
price elasticity of -0.63 with respect to (total) crimes for the city of Boston, Massachusetts.
D. E. Clark & Cosgrove (1990) apply a two-stage hedonic model for public safety, making use
of the 1980 Public Use Microdata Sample for the US. A 10% increase in their public safety
index is associated with a rise in monthly rents by 1.3%, additionally providing evidence for the
expected disamenity character of crime. A positive relation between the number of crimes and
property prices have, against expectations, been found by Lynch & Rasmussen (2001) for data
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on Jacksonville, Florida (1994/95). They stress the importance of properly weighing a crime
measure used in the estimations. Their improved measure, where they weigh crime offences by
the cost of crime to victims, then yields a negative elasticity of -0.05. Bowes & Ihlanfeldt (2001)
investigate the effect of crime on house prices in the context of proximity to rail stations. They
regard crime as a negative underlying factor of locations close to rail stations due to a better
access to a neighbourhood for outsiders. Using sale prices of single-family homes in the City
of Atlanta and DeKalb County they observe a reduction in house prices by 3% per additional
crime per acre and year.
Schwartz et al. (2003) study the price effect of crime for New York City covering a period
ranging from 1976 to 1998. They first of all observe significant reductions in crime rates
over the years as initially stated. For New York City, murder rate fell by 69%, property
crime by 56% and violent crime by 53% between 1988 and 1998. They address the problems
arising from unobserved location effects by using repeat-sales, which enables them to difference
out any unobserved time-invariant neighbourhood characteristics. Their panel estimates yield
an elasticity of violent crimes of 0.15. Finally, Gibbons (2004) approaches the endogeneity
problem by estimating non-parametric models jointly with instrumental variable techniques. In
a standard fixed effect fashion he uses deviations from the local spatial average of the variable.
Instrumentation is built on the difference between spatially lagged values of crime rates, offences
reported on non-residential properties as well as alcohol consumption proxied by distance to
nearest public house or wine bar, depending on the specification. Gibbons (2004) estimates a
10% reduction in London house prices (1999/2000) for a one standard deviation increase crime
density (incidents per square kilometre). Moreover, high incidence burglary does not impact
on house prices, whereas small incidences like graffiti, vandalism or damage to property induce
a negative price effect. He explains the difference by house buyers not being able to directly
observe the first type of crime while vandalism might be a sign of an unstable neighbourhood.
The reviewed studies have shown that public amenities have a significant impact on the
surrounding neighbourhood. Particularly focusing on the positive amenity of good schooling
and the disamenity of crime, the value might differ over space and time. Overall, parents
are willing to pay a certain premium for good schooling which can be estimated from house
prices. Residents also value a safe neighbourhood and high crime rates are generally associated
with a negative premium. Similar to the local endowment of private goods and services, public
services are subject to notable endogeneity, challenging empirical researchers who seek to obtain
unbiased estimates.
2.5. Transportation
The disciplines of economic geography in general and urban economics in particular originate
from questions regarding the costs of moving goods; crops, as in von Thünen (1826) and
people, as in Alonso (1964); Mills (1967, 1969); Muth (1969). Glaeser et al. (2001) emphasise
the “speed” of urban transportation in their categorisation of urban amenities. In fact, the
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majority of transport studies examine the impact of reduced travel time due to new railroads
or new highways on house prices and population growth.5
Early hedonic price study estimates are usually based on comparisons between house prices
before and after a new line was constructed, being rather descriptive and far from causal in-
ference. Dewees (1976) for instance cross-sectionally estimates a hedonic price function using
property sales for Toronto in 1961 and 1971. His analysis focuses on a 13-mile-long stretch
where streetcar service was replaced by a new subway line. He finds an increase in the slope of
the price function which declines perpendicularly from the tracks and diminishes at around 1/3
mile from a station. Another early analysis of Toronto finds positive price effects, too, making
use of 385 housing transactions in 1978. Bajic (1983) estimates that households using the new
Spadina Subway Line save up to 34 hours in commuting time per year, an implied value of
US-$ 120. Reviewing twenty years of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) in San Fran-
cisco, Cervero & Landis (1995, 1997) generally find positive price effects: Locations close to a
BART station experience, on average, a premium of 12% in contrast to freeway junctions; the
premium diminishes by US-$ 2 per meter distance from a station. Bowes & Ihlanfeldt (2001),
who consider positive as well as negative underling factors of being closely located to a rail
transit station, find mixed results for their analysis of sales prices in the City of Atlanta and
DeKalb County. They observe negative effects in close proximity to stations which become pos-
itive at a distance of about 1/2 mile. Armstrong & Rodríguez (2006) distinguish between four
municipalities with commuter rail service access in Eastern Massachusetts and three municip-
alities without access. Their comparison relies on a total of 1,860 transactions of single-family
detached properties in 1992/1993 and yields a transport premium of 9.6-10.1%. Their spatial
hedonic price estimates further indicate a reduction in prices by 1.6% per additional minute of
travel time to a station.
The recent research focus has been on more carefully solving the identification problem, stat-
ing that infrastructure supply and demand are determined simultaneously: Planners have cer-
tain expectations and infrastructure is not only built based on past but also on future/expected
urban development. McMillen & McDonald (2004) exploit a large dataset of repeat sales
between 1983 and 1999 which enables them to differentiate out time-invariant characteristics.
Examining the effect of a new rapid line from downtown Chicago to Midway Airport, they
observe significant anticipation effects. The improved accessibility is already capitalised into
house prices six years prior to the official end of the construction works. House price gradients
with respect to proximity to the nearest station decrease from -4.2% per mile before 1987 to
a slope of -19.4% between 1991 and 1996, indicating the positive price effects induced by new
transport opportunities.
5The focus of this review is placed on railway- and highway transportation since it is intended to provide a
background for the rail-bound transport analyses carried out in Chapters 5 and 6. However, there exist a
long list of literature on other transport hubs such as airports (Feitelson et al., 1996; Carlsson et al., 2004;
J. Nelson, 2004; Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2007; Nitsch, 2009). See for instance Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2007) who
estimate a land value discount of 5-9% within a distance of 5 km along the air corridor of Berlin’s former
downtown airport Tempelhof due to noise pollution. Investigating the disamenity effect of noise using
voting data from a referendum on the closure of the same airport, where the closure is interpreted as natural
experiment, Nitsch (2009) finds that airport noise is surprisingly weak in explaining voting behaviour.
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Another attempt to deal with the simultaneity problem while predicting transport effects is to
directly assume exogeneity in a quasi-experimental setting and to use a difference-in-difference
estimator. Baum-Snow & Kahn (2000) investigate the expansion of urban transit for five
US cities between 1980 and 1990. Their difference-in-difference estimator yields an increases
in mean prices of US-$ 4,972 when moving from 3 km to 1 km with respect to distance to
nearest transit. Another prominent example, which moreover uses data on a fine spatial level,
is Gibbons & Machin (2005), who interpret the extension of London’s Jubilee Line and the
Docklands Light Railway during the 1990s as a quasi-experiment. Their difference-in-difference
approach yields a positive response of house prices to improved access and a reduction in travel
time in particular. House prices increase by 1-4% per 1 km reduction in proximity to stations,
depending on the specification. This translates into an upward shift of 7-20% in response to a
reduction in travel time by one standard deviation. Quasi-experiments have also been used by
Michaels (2008), observing a trade increase in rural US counties caused by the construction of
the Interstate Highway System, as well as by Ahlfeldt & Feddersen (2011) who find a positive
economic effect in two rural cities in Germany which were connected to the high speed railway
network. Their estimates yield a GDP elasticity with respect to market accessibility of 0.25-
0.30. The exogenous variation of the two latter studies is based on the assumption that the
rural locations were not connected on purpose but by accident, as the planners intended to
connect only major cities. Another paper which applies a difference-and-difference estimator
and moreover a similar dataset to the analysis carried out in Chapter 5 is Ahlfeldt et al.
(2011). Exploiting a highly disaggregated dataset for Berlin covering a period between 1881
and 1914, they use the inauguration of the city’s first metro line in 1902 as a quasi-experiment
to disentangle the positive accessibility effects from negative noise disamenities. Their hedonic
land value estimates yield an accessibility premium of 11% per km, and negative noise effect
which declines by 0.15% per additional decibel.
One strand of literature opened up by Baum-Snow (2007) follows an instrumental variable
approach using historic infrastructure plans to generate exogenous variation. By instrumenting
recent highway development using a 1947 national interstate highway plan, he establishes a
causal relation between the provision of new highways in the US and suburbanisation. Baum-
Snow (2007) concludes that the construction of a new highway which passes through a central
city depopulates the centre by 18%. Duranton & Turner (2011) extend the instrumenting lit-
erature, introducing plans of historical major rail roads (1898) and expedition routes between
1835 and 1850. They predict an increase in vehicle kilometres travelled (VKT) following the
provision of new roads. Duranton & Turner (2012) further find empirical evidence for a positive
population as well as a positive employment response caused by an increase in urban road stock
following a similar IV approach. These results are replicated for Spanish highways and cities
by Holl & Viladecans-Marsal (2011) and for Japan by Hsu & Zhang (2011). Baum-Snow et
al. (2012) carried out similar analyses by investigating decentralisation trends in China. They
particularly stress the importance of infrastructure in countries which are still developing and
invest highly into their infrastructure. They find population elasticities for radial highway
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construction comparable to those reported for the western hemisphere. A few of the afore-
mentioned studies also investigate the effect of improvements in the public transport network.
Baum-Snow et al. (2012) show that railroads have a significant effect on industry location in
China. Public transportation, however, has no effect on VTK in the US (Duranton & Turner,
2011) whereas urban population grows with a city’s stock of large buses (Duranton & Turner,
2012).
The quasi-experimental and the IV approach of circumventing the simultaneity problem
share a common idea: They both generate exogenous variation in the transport provision to
separate supply and demand. What follows is an investigation of the isolated supply side effect
of transport on the allocation of land use; a new line or road is built and the urban structure
adjusts to the new situation. So far, demand side driven reactions of transport infrastructure
have been largely ignored by economists. However, as initially argued, it is very likely that
planners take future urban development into account when planning new roads and lines, for
instance to respond to residential commuting needs. Firms could also request (lobby for)
a better access to workers and customers. There is very little literature on the demand-side
driven relation between transport and development. Levinson & Karamalaputi (2003) represent
an exception. Their analysis yields a positive effect of population on highway lane expansion
in Minnesota (1978-1998).
However, the process must neither be exclusively supply nor exclusively demand side driven
but could also work simultaneously. Levinson (2008) calls this joint process of infrastructure and
land development co-development. In this situation, residents and firms incorporate the changes
of the transport network in their location decision. At the same time rail extensions depend
on the location of economic agents. Levinson (2008) empirically tests for a co-development
process using a sample of 33 London boroughs for a time period between 1871 and 2001. He
first tests whether a change in the transport network Granger causes population to rise (fall)
in the periphery (CBD). In a rather ad-hoc approach, he then reverses the estimation equation
to see whether population affects station density, too. The analysis confirms the hypothesised
co-development process for London. In a follow-up study on the twin cities Minneapolis and
St. Paul, Xie & Levinson (2010) could, however, find only evidence for a supply side driven
relationship. Unfortunately, Levinson’s approach does not allow for a simultaneous adjustment
of transport and land development. If the two variables influence each other one should account
for simultaneous effects in order to obtain unbiased results as well as robust standard errors.
Cervero & Hansen (2002) apply a three-stage least square (3SLS) approach to simultaneously
estimate induced demand and induced supply effects. Applying and testing a wide range of
potential instruments, they eventually conclude that road supply has been both a cause of and
a reaction to vehicle miles traveled for a sample of 34 California urban counties (1976-1997).
Overall, the transport literature finds mostly positive effects of new projects on economic
activity, population growth or on house prices. For households and firms, geography and phys-
ical distance matter for transporting goods, for commuting as well as for market accessibility.
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Recent literature has tried to strengthen the causal link between the provision of transport and
economic activity, where the focus has been on a rather supply-side, unidirectional relation.
2.6. Firm location choice
Amenities might not only attract people but also determine the location of firms. So far, the
majority of firm location studies has concentrated on the production side and “hard” economic
factors like access to resources and consumers, localisation economies as well as tax levels,
economic activity and FDI (Guimarães et al., 2000; Kolko, 2001; List, 2001; Figueiredo et al.,
2002; Guimarães et al., 2003; Crozet et al., 2004; Holl, 2004; Isaksen, 2004; S. Rosenthal &
Strange, 2005; Devereux et al., 2007; Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008; Hong, 2009; Claussen et al.,
2010; Brülhart et al., 2012). However, firms, especially in the service sector, might be attracted
to the same type of urban amenities as households. At the end of the day, it is people who
work and run companies who themselves consider cities not only as a place of production but
of consumption (Glaeser et al., 2001).
The significant reduction in transport and hence shipping costs as well as an increase in the
economic importance of knowledge-based companies, with neither a capital- nor a land intensive
production, have made firms more flexible in deciding on where to manage their company and
where to produce and sell their products. Service firms, especially, are becoming increasingly
footloose thanks to portable computers and internet services. These firms and their employees
are theoretically able to live anywhere (Kotkin, 2000). As qualified labour becomes the most
important (and sole) input for service firms, these companies increasingly depend on the location
of their (potential) employees. This would imply that firms follow their workers and not the
other way around (Kolko, 1999). If service firms follow skilled labour, they act as amenity
maximisers when deciding where to locate. Gottlieb (1995) identifies two potential channels for
this relation. On the one hand, it is a company’s executive or an entrepreneur who maximises his
own utility with respect to urban amenities and moves his firm to an amenity-rich location. On
the other hand, workers might drive the firm location by either being irreplacable or accepting
lower wages as a compensation for living in a pleasant neighbourhood. In his subsequent
empirical analysis of questionnaires, Gottlieb (1995) finds that preference for amenities was
explicitly pronounced in high-technology firms. In a reduced form model where he regresses
employment in engineering and management services on classic firm location determinants and
a wide range of urban amenities he finds (descriptive) evidence for the amenity maximising firm
hypothesis (Gottlieb, 1995). A similar approach was followed by Kolko (1999) who restricts
his analysis to natural amenities as a source of exogenous variation. According to his results,
natural amenities like proximity to the nearest coast and climate variables do not significantly
predict the location of firms. An early study looking into the effect of architectural design
on office space in downtown Chicago is Hough & Kratz (1983). Architectural significance is
determined as being a historic landmark in the case of an older building and by being awarded
by the Chicago American Institute of Architects if it is a newer one. Hough & Kratz (1983)
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find a rent premium for “new” but not for “old” architecture. Examining the role of rather
endogenous amenities, N. Lee & Nathan (2010) make use of the 2007 London Annual Business
Survey to investigate the effect of cultural diversity on firm innovation. Even though their
cross-sectional estimates do not permit a causal interpretation, they conclude that culturally
driven amenities can become an important economic asset for a city.
Summing up, the link between urban amenities and firm location is highly understudied in
economics. Early analyses yield diverse results but generally consider amenities as an important
economic asset.
The literature review has shown that even though the consumer city idea was recently (re-)
vitalised by Glaeser et al. (2001) amenities have been studied for a long time. Early hedonic
regression analyses try to assess the value of architectural design, proximity to a transport
hub or the effect of high crime rates. The more recent development can be described by a
diversification in terms of research questions as well as by methodological improvements. In
particular, this review demonstrates the tendency in applied empirical work of moving from
pure correlations towards causal inference. The following chapters are intended to build on the
reviewed studies by investigating different aspects of the amenity role in the location decision
process of households and firms.
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3. Culturally clustered or in the cloud?
Location choice of internet firms in
Berlin
3.1. Motivation
In the past, manufacturing firm location was characterised by classic/first nature type location
factors like natural advantages, cheap land and labour, or later physical infrastructure. Today’s
knowledge-based economy, however, is based on the idea of generating and quickly spreading
innovation. IT companies for instance have neither a capital- nor a land intensive production.
They are highly footloose thanks to portable computers and wireless internet. Due to these
technological improvements as well as a significant reduction of travel and transport costs over
the last decades New Economy firms and its employees are theoretically able to live/work
anywhere (Kotkin, 2000). As qualified labour becomes the most important (and sole) input for
service firms these companies increasingly depend on the location of their (potential) employees.
This would imply that firms follow their workers and not the other way around (Kolko, 1999).
Highly qualified and “creative” individuals have a strong preference for a rich social and
cultural life (Florida, 2002). According to social science, these creative heads can be assigned
to a new social milieu which has evolved over the last years. They have been labeled “movers
and shakers” (“Experimentalisten”), the unconventional creative avant-garde, the new Bohemia
(Sinus Sociovision GmbH, 2011). Members of this milieu are very individualistic, digitally
networked and highly mobile in geographical as well as in mental scope. I consider this milieu
as the driver of a currently observable start-up boom in Berlin and expect them to be highly
attracted by a distinct provision of urban amenities.
As reviewed in Section 2.2, the provision of urban amenities like theatres, bars or clubs
involves high fixed costs and a critical mass is needed which is easier reached in dense urban
areas. Cities have therefore been more and more regarded as a place of consumption than of
production (Glaeser et al., 2001). Cities are not only endowed with a higher level of amenities,
their citizens also consume urban amenities more often (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006).
If service firms follow skilled labour those firms act as amenity-maximising agents when de-
ciding where to locate (Gottlieb, 1995). Amenities can therefore become an important economic
asset for a city. Even though the important role of amenities is highly accepted in the urban
economic literature, most amenities tested empirically do not explain the whole story. Quality
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of life indices based on compensating differentials implicitly control for amenities but do not
allow for the determination of distinct effects (Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2004; Chen & Rosenthal,
2008). Measures of local amenities like distance from a major coast and average annual pre-
cipitation (Kolko, 1999) or other climate amenities like July/January temperature (Glaeser et
al., 2010) have definitely the advantage of being purely exogenous but ignore the discussion on
urban consumption amenities. It is questionable whether these amenities are able to attract a
young footloose generation – the movers and shakers – founding and working for internet firms.
As economic conditions and technology change, society changes as well.
Measures which might be more appropriate are, for instance, the cuisine variety a location
offers (Schiff, 2013), or music nodes and clubs (Ahlfeldt, 2011a). However, since urban amenities
are man-made, they are highly endogenous. Estimates are therefore most likely subject to severe
omitted variable biases. This might be a reason why there are very few attempts to include
endogenous amenities in econometric analyses.
Motivated by this lack of empirical evidence, I contribute to the literature of firm location
and consumer cities by testing the amenity-oriented firm location hypothesis: Knowledge-based
service industries locate at urban amenity-rich places. In particular, I concentrate on local
service/consumption goods like restaurants, bars or theatres. Throughout the chapter I label
the composite of local consumption goods as cultural amenities.
I test the stated hypothesis empirically by looking at the rise of the internet industry in Ber-
lin over the last years. First of all, internet firms provide a perfect example of the knowledge-
based service sector which is highly footloose. Secondly, potential labourers as well as the
firms’ entrepreneurs can be characterised as relatively young, highly qualified and somehow
creative individuals who are expected to be attracted by urban/cultural amenities. Thirdly,
limiting the analysis to start-ups enables the assumption of taking the existing economic envir-
onment as given. The location choice is expected to be unconstrained by previous firm decisions
(S. Rosenthal & Strange, 2003). And finally and most importantly, I use the sudden fall of the
Berlin Wall as a source of exogenous variation. Nowadays, Berlin is globally known as having
an open, creative and artistic environment which is regarded as fertile ground for innovation.
A specific subculture has evolved in the aftermath of German reunification which still strongly
affects today’s cultural scene. The subcultural development originates from the open, chaotic
and tolerant environment after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The “wild east” with its political
vacuum and abandoned places became home to artists and creatives (Schwannhäußer, 2007).
I make use of this very particular subcultural development and use proximity to the former
Wall as well as squat density as instrumental variables for the presumably endogenous current
endowment of cultural amenities. The applied instruments are assumed to affect the location
of internet start-ups only indirectly via the cultural amenity channel conditional on a large set
of controls like land values or centrality. The exclusionary restriction is strengthened by the
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time dimension and the fact that the internet was not used commercially/by the general public
during the fall of the Iron Curtain but only became popular at the end of the 1990s.1
The next section (Section 3.2) provides an overview of the development of the internet in-
dustry in Berlin as well as the city’s cultural development. I state more reasons for using Berlin
as a case study. I also provide arguments in favour of an intra-urban analysis. Section 3.3
introduces a footloose start-up model to motivate the empirical strategy which is outlined in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides an overview of the data used, followed by the discussion of
the empirical results (Section 3.6). Previewing my results, I conclude in the final Section 3.7
that cultural amenities indeed affect the internet start-up location.
3.2. Internet industry in Berlin
Today, the “Nerd Revolution” (tip, 2011) describes the growing number of internet start-ups
founded not by business students but by computer developers. Berlin seems to provide a
hub function, at least in Germany, for this latest development, sometimes even compared to
Silicon Valley. There are more than 5,700 firms with over 50,000 employees working in the
IT and communication sector (Berlin Business Location Center, 2012b). A lot of international
investors, mainly venture capitalists and business angels, not only visit Berlin but move to
the city to financially support and collaborate with local start-ups. Moreover, experts predict
further growth of this fairly young sector and even expect that the next Facebook will come
from Berlin.
To get an idea of the movement’s origins this section sums up Berlin’s recent history with
respect to the main research questions and provides arguments in favour of an intra-urban
analysis.
3.2.1. (Sub-) Cultural rise after re-unification
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which had run through the heart of pre-WWII Berlin,
reshaped the city’s geography. Former border locations like West Berlin’s Kreuzberg as well as
today’s Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg in the East were all of a sudden in the new geographical
centre of the city, causing a re-newed interest in the historical CBD. Looking at rents, Ahlfeldt
et al. (2012), for instance, observe a re-emergence of the former rent gradient towards East
Berlin’s district of Mitte.
Due to the fall of the Iron Curtain Berlin’s population suddenly rose from 2.1 million (West)
or 1.3 million (East) in 1989 to 3.4 million. This implies a sudden increase in economic mass
and market size. Accessibility to a wide range of physical amenities (parks, water bodies),
social amenities (friends and family) and cultural amenities also experienced a strong rise. A
higher number of residents decreases the cost of provision of certain cultural and public goods.
1In fact, in 1993 the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign released Mosaic - the first browser which made the internet available for the general
public (Vetter et al., 1994).
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This is of special interest for service industries providing local non-tradable goods since they are
characterised by high consumer transport costs as well as by a required critical mass due to high
fixed costs (Schiff, 2013). Assuming that customer’s willingness to travel to e.g. restaurants is
described by a steep spatial decay (i.e. they are not willing travel far), these places will cluster
in central areas additionally allowing for a greater variety (Fujita, 1988; Glazer et al., 2003).
Due to its history and its renewed status as German capital2, Berlin is by definition a tourist
magnet. Tourists have an additional interest in services like restaurants, bars and theatres,
especially in the historic CBD. Hence, the reborn historical centre offers new potentials for
services due to the improved accessibility.
Owing to underinvestments of the local GDR government in historical built-up structure, a lot
of East Berlin buildings were abandoned, rents were low. Empty houses, the political vacuum
and the new tolerant, open environment drew in artists as well as squatters3 (e.g. in Prenzlauer
Berg or Mainzer Straße in Friedrichshain) and eventually students. Abandoned warehouses and
industry complexes provided free/open space for artists and cultural events. A lot of techno
music clubs were established in empty buildings. Night life was young and vivid. Curfew did not
exist (and still does not). This pioneering development has been increasingly commercialised
over the years: In the summer of 1999 the techno parade “Love Parade” attracted more than 1.5
million visitors. Electronic music clubs like Berghain located in the district of Friedrichshain
ranked as number one techno club in the world in 2009 (DJ Mag, 2009). Nowadays, the city
attracts easyjetters (Rapp, 2009) from all over Europe. However, this young, mobile and often
highly skilled generation do not always return to their home countries but stay in Berlin, settle
and look for jobs.
Amongst four universities, eleven technical colleges, a great number of research institutes,
Europe’s largest fibre glass network as well as a wide range of sector specific exhibitions (e.g.
Berlin Web Week, Droidcon, re:publica, Social Media Week etc.), it is the quality of life which
is an often quoted argument for start-ups locating in Berlin. As O’Leary, partner at the venture
capitalist Earlybird, puts it:
“There is no other place in the world where I can find such a bunch of creativity
and freedom.”
His company as well as fellow venture capital funds invested more than in 136 mio. Euros
during the first three quarters of 2012.
3.2.2. Berlin discovers the internet
By mid-1999 the German internet industry was lagging behind the US economy by five years
(McGrane, 2000). It was exactly in that year that the German internet economy kicked off after
the Samwer brothers sold their first German internet start-up to a US company. After having
experienced the work and management environment in Silicon Valley, in 1999 the three brothers
2On June 20th, 1991 the German Parliament decided to move the capital of reunified Germany from Bonn
back to Berlin.
3Who yet might be considered as the pioneers of today’s gentrification (Clay, 1979; Friedrichs, 2000).
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moved back to Cologne, Germany, and subsequently founded the online auction house alando.de
in a backyard in Berlin-Kreuzberg. Only six months later they sold the company for US-$43
million to eBay. This can be regarded as the start of the Berlin internet economy. From that
moment on Berlin transformed itself into Germany’s Mecca for young internet entrepreneurs.
Quickly, agglomeration economies came into play. From the very beginning, the Samwer
brothers tried to establish strong linkages within the Berlin founder community. Start-up
Lounges, weekly breakfast rounds and seminars were supposed to foster the exchange of ideas
and experience regarding the founding process. Following classic Marshallian externalities,
spillovers and a highly specialised labour market support the development of the local internet
industry. In a sector which is characterised by mainly young companies bearing a high risk
to failure, the exchange of experience is of even greater importance compared to “mature”
industries.
Additionally, the young sector was spurred by important financial as well as technological
developments: The introduction of the “Neuer Markt” (1997) - German equivalent to US
Nasdaq - made it easier for the new start-ups to raise capital from venture capitalists. Moreover,
internet became cheaper, faster and, with the introduction of Apple’s iBook in 1999, even
footloose. The iBook was the first portable computer with integrated wireless network (WiFi)
which not only allowed for saving costs on local cable network infrastructure but also from that
moment on programmers were able to work from anywhere. Companies like SoundCloud for
instance even started off in bars (Sankt Oberholz), enjoying the social environment and saving
on renting office space. Silicon Valley’s garages are Berlin’s bars.
According to the US technology magazine Wired (McGrane, 2000), the very first internet
start-ups settled in Berlin mainly for two reasons: (i) cheap rents in centrally located backyards,
and (ii) a cultural scenery and night life which was as vivid and unshaped as the entrepreneurs
themselves; both being the outcome of the reunification process.
During the past years an increasing number of internet start-ups settled in Berlin, making
the city the nation’s biggest home to internet firms. According to the online database provided
by the start-up network Gründerszene (2013), Berlin, with more than 504 internet start-ups,
is by far the sector’s most important city, followed by Hamburg (138) and Munich (146, see
also Figure 3.1 on page 28). Despite it’s leading position, it’s still Berlin where the Chamber of
Industry and Commerce (IHK) recognizes the strongest growth in innovative web firms. To sum
up, the birth of the internet economy does not look like being the result of an historic accident
(Krugman, 2010). Recent anecdotal evidence instead tells us that the initial firm births are
highly linked to Berlin’s rich endowment of very distinct cultural amenities. The first-movers
are then expected to be followed by new start-ups which on the one hand also want to benefit
from amenities and on the other hand from agglomeration economies of the newly created
internet cluster. Given the above described development, Berlin serves as a perfect city to
empirically test the stated firm amenity maximiser hypothesis.
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Figure 3.1.: Share of internet start-ups by city.
Notes: Data are extracted from Gründerszene (2013).
3.2.3. An intra-urban analysis
So far, most research on the determinants of firm location has been carried out on a regional or
metropolitan level. There are substantially fewer intra-urban analyses. An exception is repres-
ented by S. Rosenthal & Strange (2005) as well as Arzaghi & Henderson (2008), who both use
census tract level data from New York City. Within-city analyses, however, provide interesting
insights when it comes to the assessment of location factors. First of all, the availability of
highly disaggregated data on a city level implies a high geographic variation compared to an
analysis which is based on a country’s variation in regions or provinces, as this number is usually
comparably small. Secondly, there might be a lot of location factors which only affect locations
at a very close distance. Especially when thinking of cultural amenities, it is reasonable to
assume that their influence diminishes with a steep decay. Thirdly, using highly disaggreg-
ated data allows for including location fixed effects on a larger aggregation level to control for
unobservables. And finally, as the chapter’s empirical approach builds on a conditional logit
model, it must be ensured that the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives holds.
An entrepreneur must theoretically be able to take all locations for setting-up his firm into
consideration; a reasonable assumption in an intra-urban setting. After having made a case for
using Berlin for an intra-urban analysis, I present a model of a footloose start-up.
3.3. Footloose start-up model
This section introduces a model of a footloose start-up in order to derive an estimable equation.
It is based on the firm model introduced by Crozet et al. (2004), which has also been used by
Brülhart et al. (2012).
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The idea is to derive a profit function which describes a firm’s profitability depending on
its location. The firm location choice model assumes an investor setting up a new firm. The
founder then decides on a firm location given a set of alternatives. The profit function consists
of factors varying over location i and across sectors j. Quantity is set to be the strategic
variable of a representative firm. Suppose that consumer’s demand (=firm’s supply) relies on
a Cobb-Douglas utility function and is given by:
Qij =
αjm
γj
i
p
δj
ij
, (3.1)
with αj as the share of income spent on the particular good (of sector j), mi denotes the
(exogenous) income of the consumers at location i, γj is the income elasticity and δj the price
elasticity for sector j. The demand is satisfied by the firms at a price pij. This is a simplifying
assumption, since in the world of internet start-ups not only workers and firms are footloose
but also consumers, i.e. demand. Now suppose that firms have identical production costs when
producing in the same location; a reasonable assumption for internet industries. Following that
assumption, individual firms’ quantities will be equal.
Qij = Nijqij, (3.2)
where Nij is the number of firms on the market. Ignoring any taxes, a representative firm’s
profit function producing and selling at location i is given by:
piij = (pij − cij)qij, (3.3)
where cij is a unit production cost function. It is now possible to derive the total equilibrium
quantity Q∗ij as well as the equilibrium price p∗ij:4
Q∗ij = Nijqij =
αjm
γj
i
N
δj
ij
(
Nijδj − 1
cijδj
)δj
(3.4)
p∗ij =
Nijδj
Nijδj − 1cij (3.5)
The following profit function can be obtained when plugging in pij and qij:
piij =
αjm
γj
i
N
δj+1
ij
(
δj
Nijδj − 1cij
)(1−δj)
(3.6)
Assuming a price elasticity greater than one, δj > 1, profits increase with consumers’ expendit-
ure/market size and decrease with production costs and number of active firms/competition.
4See Crozet et al. (2004) for a more detailed derivation.
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Let firms be price takers on the input market and let the unit cost be defined as function
of the number of firms (Nij), wages (wij), which both vary over location and sector, location
variant rents (ri) and location invariant capital cost (k):
cij = N
−θNj
ij w
θwj
ij r
θrj
i k
θkj , (3.7)
where θNj , θwj , θrj and θkj denote the respective input shares. Unit costs rise with wages, office
rents and capital cost and fall with the number of other firms due to agglomeration economies.
The wage is determined by vector Ej, a composite of (unobservable) worker individual specific
characteristics like education, work experience etc., and a location variant amenity shifter Ai,
capturing the stock of cultural amenities surrounding location i. For simplicity, I assume that
Ej is location invariant and identical within sectors:5
wij = EjA−τji , with τj > 0, (3.8)
where τj describes how strongly amenities are capitalised into wages and varies across sector j.
Wages might decline with the endowment of amenities for two reasons: (i) workers (including
the entrepreneur) are willing to work at lower wages if they get compensated by amenities
(Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Blomquist et al., 1988; Gyourko & Tracy, 1991; Gottlieb, 1995),
and (ii) spill-overs due to face-to-face contact in bars, coffee shops etc.6 The latter idea is
closely related to Storper & Venables (2004) who consider the face-to-face contact as a key
element of urban concentration. Especially creative industries require the exchange of ideas
and information. Urban amenities like bars provide an external location to hold meetings. A
third-party location might be preferred due to a lack of office space (especially for young start-
ups), its neutral character or due to the preference for a more relaxed, creative, stimulating
environment. Substituting wages into the unit cost leaves us with:
cij = N
−θNj
ij (EjA
−τj
i )θ
w
j r
θrj
i k
θkj (3.9)
Plugging the unit cost into the maximised profit function and assuming a sufficiently large
number of firms yield the following expression:
piij = αjmγji N
θNj (δj−1)−2
ij r
θrj (1−δj)
i (EjA
−τj
i )θ
w
j (1−δj)kθ
k
j (1−δj) δj
δj − 1
1−δj
(3.10)
Log-linearizing the maximised profit function results in:
ln piij = lnαj + γj lnmi + (θNj (δj − 1)− 2) lnNij + θwj (1− δj) lnEj − τjθwj (1− δj) lnAi
+ θrj (1− δj) ln ri + θkj (1− δj) ln k + (1− δj) ln
δj
1− δj
(3.11)
5Admittedly a strong assumption but reasonable when taking into account the relatively high homogeneity of
the sector (all young, IT specialists etc.).
6The relation is more indirect where it is assumed that spill-overs boost worker productivity making labour
cheaper in relative terms.
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Assuming homogeneous sectors and mobile firms, profits are equal at every location, spatial
equilibrium then requires amenities to be capitalised into wages and rents. The location choice
is independent of any amenity endowment. Empirically, amenities and rents should have no
significant effect.
∂pii
∂Ai
= 0 (3.12)
However, assuming firm heterogeneity, especially with respect to amenity appreciation (τj > 0),
the results are expected to differ over sectors. Since I am particularly focussing on internet
start-ups the following key hypothesis can be formulated:
∂piij
∂Ai
> 0 (3.13)
A footloose start-up acts as amenity maximiser when deciding on a firm location if profits rise
with cultural amenities.
3.4. Empirical approach
3.4.1. General estimation approach
Based on the log-linearized version of the profit function developed in Section 3.3 the following
estimable equation can be formulated:
ln piij = β0 + β1i lnNij + β2i lnAi + β3i ln ri + β4i lnGi + β5j + ln vij (3.14)
Capital cost and income are dropped as both factors are spatially not restricted to the city of
Berlin. Potential consumers are web users all around the world, making it impossible to control
for their income. Employee characteristics Ej are also not included as regressors for the above
stated reasons. Gi stands for a number of controls which are going to be discussed in the data
section (Section 3.5). β5j are sector fixed effects, absorbing sector specific unobservables. The
equation can be estimated by a conditional logit model when the added stochastic term ln vij
is assumed to follow an i.i.d. extreme-value type 1 distribution. As I only test the firm model
for internet start-ups which all belong to the same sector, the estimable equation needs to be
slightly adopted, where sector fixed effects are absorbed by the constant and Ni denotes the
number of firms in all sectors.
ln pii = β0 + β1i lnNi + β2i lnAi + β3i ln ri + β4i lnGi + ln vi (3.15)
The conditional logit model serves as a well-established econometric framework when it comes
to the estimation of firm location decisions. It is based on McFadden’s (1974) random utility
maximisation which was adapted to a random profit maximisation problem by Carlton (1983).
Consider an investor or entrepreneur j who chooses a location i out of a set of spatial choices
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I for setting up a new firm. The profit piij the entrepreneur j derives at location i is composed
by a deterministic Uij and a stochastic term εij:
piij = Uij + εij (3.16)
Location i will be prefered over k if:
piij > piik, ∀k, k 6= i (3.17)
The probability that location i is chosen by the entrepreneur is given by:
Pij = Prob(piij > piik),∀k, k 6= i (3.18)
Assuming independently distributed error terms and additionally following a Weibull distribu-
tion results in the conditional logit formulation
Pij =
exp(Uij)∑K
k=1 exp(Uik)
, (3.19)
where the deterministic component Uij is assumed to be a linear combination of explanatory
variables.
In the past, conditional logit models could not consider the full set of location choices when
the set was large. To avoid cumbersome estimations Guimarães et al. (2000) used smaller choice
sets which were selected randomly. The size of choice sets increases with the fineness of the
spatial level, such as statistical blocks, as in this work. To be able to use all information and
allow for the replicability of the results, Guimarães et al. (2003) have shown that it is possible to
obtain equivalent coefficients for the conditional logit model when estimating it using a Poisson
count model. By assuming that each location decision is determined by a vector of choice-
specific attributes which are common to groups of individuals (or in this case of firms), the
log-likelihood function of the conditional logit model is identical to the Poisson log-likelihood
up to a constant. It is therefore possible to estimate the profit function using a Poisson model
with the number of firms in each location ni as dependent variable.
E(ni) = λi = exp(β0 + β1iNi + β2iAi + β3iri + β4iGi) (3.20)
The conditional logit model relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assump-
tion. This means that consistent estimates require the stochastic terms to be independent
across locations. The location decision between two alternatives is not allowed to change when
a third alternative location is added or changed. An entrepreneur must therefore theoretically
be able to compare all locations available in the choice set. The finer the spatial level, the
more alternatives there are, increasing the likelihood of violating the IAA. This is in line with
Figueiredo et al. (2002), who argue in their paper on location decisions of Portuguese entre-
preneurs that entrepreneurs choose firm locations close to where they live. They know the area
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better and finding a new location implies additional search costs. That is another reason for
investigating the location choice problem in an intra-city framework. I assume that within a
city an entrepreneur is able to compare all potential locations.
Another violation of the IIA assumption might occur when there are unobserved location
characteristics that are spatially correlated. I therefore include location fixed effects to control
for any spatially-fixed unobservables by adding a set of location dummies dv (Brülhart et al.,
2012).
As previously established, the above derived profit function can be estimated using a Poisson
model. The Poisson estimator, however, relies on the strong assumption that the conditional
mean equals the conditional variance, VAR(Y|X) = E(Y|X). In practice this assumption is
often violated and the data at hand suffer from overdispersion, i.e., the variance exceeds the
expected value. Very often there is also a larger number of zeros, as described by the Poisson
distribution. I therefore weaken the Poisson assumption and apply a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimator as originally suggested by McCullagh & Nelder (1989) and later
by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006).
A PPML estimator requires two specifications: the functional form of the conditional ex-
pectation E(Y|X) and of the conditional variance VAR(Y|X). The conditional mean is defined
as above (now plus voting precinct dummies dv):
E(ni | NiAiriGidv) = exp(β0 + β1iNi + β2iAi + β3iri + β4iGi + β5idv) (3.21)
Assuming the conditional variance to be proportional to the conditional mean, VAR(Y|X) ∝
E(Y|X), it is possible to estimate β˜ by solving the following set of first-order-conditions:
N∑
n=1
[ni − exp(β˜0 + β˜1iNi + β˜2iAi + β˜3iri
+β˜4iGi + β˜5idv)]NiAiriGidv = 0
(3.22)
β˜s are a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators and consistent when the condi-
tional mean is correctly specified. If the assumption about the proportional relation between
conditional expectation and variance is violated, the standard errors of the estimates are in-
efficient, whereas the estimated coefficients are not affected. All inference has therefore been
based on Eicker-White robust standard errors.
The way the weights have been defined, the PML estimator is numerically equal to the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. Therefore I obtain consistent estimates based
on a Poisson likelihood function without requiring the dependent variable to be made of integers
(Gourieroux et al., 1984). Building on large sample asymptotic, the PPML approach has been
proven to be efficient and robust (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011).
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3.4.2. Identification
The inclusion of cultural amenities in the empirical model raises obvious endogeneity concerns
mainly because their existence highly depends on demand from economic subjects. There are
two potential types of endogeneity. Firstly, estimates might suffer from a simultaneity bias. It
becomes difficult to disentangle whether cultural amenities attract firms or whether causality
runs the other way around. Secondly, the likelihood of unobservables in the error term which
affect both internet start-ups and amenities is very high. Therefore identification becomes
crucial.
The suggested identification strategy to deal with the risen endogeneity concerns is twofold.
First of all, I control for location fixed effects by adding a set of location dummies. Due
to the spatial scope of the expected unobservable fixed effects, the geographic bodies of the
location controls must be sufficiently fine. I use voting precincts from 2008 to control for fixed
effects. There are 1,201 precincts for 15,937 statistical blocks. Voting precincts are by definition
supposed to reflect homogeneity in terms of demographics (Berliner Parlament, 2008). They
have previously been used by Ahlfeldt (2013) as unit of analysis to represent a self-contained
neighbourhood. The voting precincts are therefore expected to soak up any unobservable fixed
effects. As there are only about 600 start-ups distributed over the whole of Berlin fixed effects
are restricted to voting precincts with at least five firms.
I secondly follow an instrumental variable strategy. I make use of the fall of the Berlin
Wall and interpret it as a quasi-natural experiment. The historic event was not foreseen by
any market players7 and can therefore be regarded as an exogenous shock (Redding & Sturm,
2008; Redding et al., 2011; Ahlfeldt et al., 2012). I exploit German reunification as the source
of exogenous variation from which I derive a set of instrumental variables. In particular and
most preferably, I use distance to the former Berlin Wall to instrument cultural amenities.
The idea is that proximity to the former border explains the spatial endowment of current
cultural amenities sufficiently well. Municipalities like Prenzlauer Berg, Mitte, Friedrichshain
and Kreuzberg which were originally located in the periphery of either East or West Berlin
all of a sudden became central locations experiencing a huge accessibility shock (Redding &
Sturm, 2008). There is ethnological evidence that a specific subculture has evolved in the
aftermath of German reunification, predominantly in the “wild east” with its political vacuum
and abandoned places (Schwannhäußer, 2007). Former border areas became home to artists,
creatives, students and squatters. Bars and clubs opened. The identifying assumption is
that proximity to the Wall has no direct effect on the location choice of internet start-ups,
only indirectly via the amenity channel. Identification is conditional on a large set of control
variables, where the inclusion of a historic CBD dummy as well as land values from 1992 are
of special importance. They control for the link between proximity to the Wall and today’s
cultural amenities neither being driven by centrality nor lower rents after re-unification. The
exclusionary restriction is backed-up by the time dimension and the fact that the internet was
7According to opinion polls, less than ten percent of the West German population expected the re-unification
(Herdegen, 1992).
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not used by the general public at the beginning of the 1990s. The IV PPML estimator then
solves the following first order condition (Tenreyro, 2007):
N∑
n=1
[
ni − exp(Yiβ¯)
]
zi = 0 (3.23)
For robustness reasons I suggest a second set of instruments which is admittedly weaker in
terms of the exclusionary restriction. Following the previous line of argumentation, I use the
location of (i) squatted buildings since 1987 as well as (ii) historical cultural amenities for
1998/1999 and (iii) for 1936 to instrument the current level of amenities. Firstly, squatters
reflect the immigration into the new, open, tolerant areas. Together with artists and students
they are considered to be the pioneers of the gentrification (Clay, 1979; Friedrichs, 2000). They
are the first ones to open (sub-)cultural bars and clubs. However, they develop the area for
themselves without any intentions of making the area a hip place which would drive up rents
in the long-run. Secondly, 1998/99 cultural amenities directly capture the young, open techno
scene. The idea is that today’s cultural life originates from a subculture which developed during
the 1990s provoked by German reunification. And finally, the historic amenities from 1936 are
motivated by the idea that there is some path dependency in the development of amusement
areas. Neighbourhoods which were known for their endowment of bars and for their nightlife
in 1936 are expected to be still equipped with urban amenities today. Even though I consider
this latter set of instrumental variables as weaker in terms of the exclusionary restriction, they
at least allow for circumventing simultaneity. Squatted houses and 1998/99 cultural amenities
are a result of the reunification years and no direct link to internet firms can be established.
By that time, the number of internet users was still very small; mobile computers and wireless
internet connection scarcely available.
While the exclusionary restriction is fairly reasonable in terms of the time dimension, one
might be worried about the spatial dimension. Potential concerns are that the Berlin Wall
only captures centrality or/and the distance measure is correlated with unobservables driving
the estimates. Moreover, one might question the randomness of the location of the wall. To
address these concerns I employ the instrumental strategy conditional on controls, whereas
centrality should in particular be captured by a dummy indicating whether a block lies inside
the historic CBD from 1933. Additionally, transport controls, an East Berlin dummy, spatial
trends and, above all, the aforementioned voting precinct fixed effects are expected to pick
up any remaining centrality forces determining firm location. I run a number of additional
robustness checks, where I compare distance from a block to the CBD (centrality) to cultural
amenities in terms of explaining start-up location.
Berlin’s distribution into four sectors after World War II was decided during the Conference
of Yalta held February 4-11, 1945. It is a result of negotiations between Roosevelt, Churchill
and Stalin. The sector’s border and hence the Berlin Wall followed old definitions of Gross
Berlin (1920). If East and West only wanted to split the city in half, the border would always
run through the centre and thus would always be correlated with centrality. If start-up location
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Figure 3.2.: Placebo Wall
Notes: The placebo Wall is indicated by the solid line, the dotted line marks the actual Berlin Wall.
was not determined via the amenity channel by the Wall but only by centrality or any other
unobservables correlated with the instrument, a placebo Wall which vertically cuts the city
in half should also give significant estimates. I therefore re-run the benchmark model using a
placebo Wall as indicated by Figure 3.2 on page 36. In alternative fixed effect specifications I use
an old district definition as well as municipality location fixed effects which both share the same
borders with the former Wall. As firm location is only explained by within district/municipality
variation a potential unobservable effect is additionally hindered.
To support the case that firms/sectors are heterogeneous and therefore rely on different sets
of location factors, I re-run the benchmark specification for a set of counter-factual service
firms. The idea is that cultural amenities more strongly drive the location of young, creative
web start-ups than of other knowledge-based service industries. These counter-factual models
can also be interpreted as additional robustness tests with respect to centrality or unobservables
which might be correlated with distance to Wall.
3.5. Data
3.5.1. Dependent variable
To determine the location factors of internet start-ups I use the number of web firms per
statistical housing block as dependent variable. The regressand’s count data character further
encourages the Poisson estimation approach. The statistical blocks are the unit of analysis.
The city is structured into 15,937 of these statistical housing blocks. The firm data originate
from two sources: As primary source, I extracted firm information of all firms listed in the
online database provided by Gründerszene (2013). Gründerszene is a magazine as well as an
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Figure 3.3.: Number of internet start-ups per founding year
Notes: Information on the founding year are only available for about 58% of the total sample.
online platform for the German web economy and its start-ups which was founded in 2006.8
The firm addresses were geocoded and processed in a geographic information system (GIS)
environment. As a second source, I used the Berlin start-up map which maps Berlin Web 2.0
start-ups. It is accessible via the Berlin Business Location Center (2012a), a public business
promoter and location marketing office owned by the state of Berlin. The data from the two
different sources were merged and double entries deleted. The sample represents a total of 600
internet start-ups listed in April 2013. 345 of these firms have information on their founding
date. As indicated by Figure 3.3 on page 37, first internet firms started settling in Berlin at
the end of the 1990’s, whereas the development took off around 2007.
3.5.2. Cultural amenities
Data on current cultural amenities were taken from OpenStreetMap (2013). It is argued that the
potential self-selection by uploading spatial data to OpenStreetMap reflects people’s perception
of their surroundings and, contrary to causing biases, reveals preferences. There might be a
bias, however, if web entrepreneurs themselves report amenities. This would further support the
application of an IV estimator. I take into account mainstream as well as subcultural amenities.
Cultural amenities include bars/pubs, cinemas, theatres, clubs, operas, beer gardens, cafés,
restaurants and art places.
Not the actual number of amenities is of people’s interest but the mass of cultural amenities
they are surrounded by. A potential amenity indicator should therefore be able to capture the
number of amenities within a certain proximity, whereas amenities nearby should get a stronger
8Even though there might be a number of already more mature firms, I follow the Gründerszene classification
and consider all firms listed as start-ups, and thus as a homogeneous group of young web bound firms.
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weight. Since the definition of the amenity measure already implies a certain assumption and
hence affects the results, I briefly discuss three different measures I use. First of all, I compute
kernel densities around each point representing a cultural amenity (Silverman, 1986), applying
a radius of 2 km. This radius goes back to Gibbons & Machin (2005) who predict a distance
of 2 km as being the maximum distance people are willing to walk to the nearest station and
has already been used in the context of urban amenities by Ahlfeldt, Möller et al. (2013). Even
though the density measure fulfills the above stated requirements, estimate interpretation is
rather abstract and not intuitive. I therefore secondly employ a gravity based accessibility
measure as suggested by (Fujita & Ogawa, 1982):
A(i) =
∑
l
Ale
−bd(i,l), i 6= l and dll = 13
√
Areai
pi
, (3.24)
where the access to cultural amenities in block i, A(i), is defined by the number of other
amenities at all other surrounding locations l spatially discounted by a decay parameter b
and d(i, l) a measure of distance between i and l. As public transport plays a major role in
moving people in big and dense cities, Euclidean distances only provide a rough estimation of
proximity to other firms. However, replicating the transport network places a strong weight on
the location of public transport stations, which most likely picks up correlated unobservables.
I therefore stick to the straight line distances between block centroids. Assuming that start-
ups are only attracted by amenities in their close neighbourhood, I apply a distance decay
parameter of two which is supposed to capture walking speed (Ahlfeldt, 2011b). For robustness
tests I thirdly create buffer rings of various radiuses around each block centroid and use the
number of amenities which fall inside a ring.
To sum up, each of the measures suggested comes with certain advantages and disadvantages.
The application of all three of them helps to get a better understanding of the forces at work.
Their application is hence regarded as a robustness check, controlling whether the estimates are
independent of the measure chosen. The distribution of internet start-ups (points) and density
of cultural amenities is illustrated by Figure 3.4 on page 39. Proximity to the Berlin Wall is
computed for every block centroid. I calculate straight line distances as well as a potentiality
measure similar to the access to cultural amenities, as indicated by equation (3.24). To mo-
tivate the first stage, illustrative evidence for today’s endowment of former border locations
with cultural amenities is given by Figure 3.5 on page 39, jointly showing the Berlin Wall and
access to cultural amenities. A similar map motivating the application of squat density as a
secondary instrument is shown in the appendix (Figure A.1 on page 126). For the second-
ary set of instruments I use historical cultural amenities of 1998/1999 and squatted houses
since 1987. Squatted buildings are taken from Hausbesetzungs Geschichte Berlin (2010). For
1998/99, mainstream bars, clubs, theatres and restaurants were extracted from Siebenhaar et
al. (1998), a guide book especially designed for young people on behalf of the state of Berlin.
A detailed and ethnological analysis of Berlin’s subculture and the origins of the Berlin techno
underground scene is provided by Schwannhäußer (2007). She refers to a website Verblichene
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Figure 3.4.: Distribution of start-ups and cultural amenities
Notes: Black dots denote the location of web start-ups based on Gründerszene (2013) and Berlin Business
Location Center (2012a). Red amenity clouds represent the amenity density measure with a radius of 2 km
(Silverman, 1986), with dark red indicating a high amenity density.
Figure 3.5.: Berlin Wall and access to cultural amenities
Notes: Black solid line denotes the Berlin Wall. Cultural amenities are aggregated at a statistical block level
using the accessibility measure from equation (3.24) with dark red indicating a high accessibility to amenities.
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Locations (1999) listing the locations of subcultural Berlin and its events before the gentri-
fication process kicked in. Another list of historical amenities from 1936 was compiled from
the guide book Baedeker (1936). The collection is significantly smaller and contains theatres,
operas, operettas, vaudevilles, cabarets and cinemas. The extracted data were geocoded and
processed as described above.
3.5.3. Control variables
According to the empirical specification (3.22) the number of internet start-ups is not only
determined by cultural amenities but also by the number of other firms inside a block, the rent
as well as a set of control variables. The number of firms is proxied by the total employment
inside a block (i.e. across all sectors). The variable can be considered to capture localised
general agglomeration/urbanization economies (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008) as a large number
of employees suggests a strong economic activity. The coefficient is expected to be positive if
localised agglomeration economies positively impact on internet firms. A negative coefficient
would reflect the competitive aspect of being closely located to other firms. As noted above,
internet firms offer online services and users are not required to be physically close. In con-
trast to oﬄine firms I do not control for any other market potentiality in the classic sense.
Anecdotal evidence sees low rents as one of the main drivers of the Berlin web 2.0 boom. I
use standard land values from 1992 per square metre as measured by the German committee
of valuation experts (Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte in Berlin, 1992). Data were
spatially smoothed using an inverse distance weighting. I particularly include data from 1992
to reflect the spatial pattern in land prices right after re-unification to make sure that the link
between instruments and amenities is not confounded with, e.g., lower prices in former border
regions. In an additional robustness specification, I replace 1992 land values by residential rent
data from 2010 (Immobilien Scout, 2012) to assess today’s role of rents for the location decision
of start-ups.
I additionally control for further location factors which might determine the location of
young internet firms. I control for the number of immigrants per block. Areas characterised
by migration are expected to attract young entrepreneurs as they are signal of cultural variety
and tolerance. Data come from the statistical office Berlin Brandenburg (Amt für Statistik
Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011a,b). Berlin is home of a large number of knowledge-creating and
–spreading institutions. Young start-ups are often founded as spin-offs of universities. I there-
fore expect a positive relation between firm location and proximity to universities and research
institutes. To test this I calculate Euclidean distances between all statistical blocks and re-
search institutes/universities in a GIS environment. Among cultural amenities, entrepreneurs
might also be attracted by natural amenities. Proximities to water bodies and green spaces are
therefore computed. Additionally, young founders might also have a need for exercising after
work. I hence control for the number sport facilities inside a block. These facilities include
gyms, outdoor sport fields, swimming baths, and tennis courts (Gelbe Seiten Deutschland,
2012; OpenStreetMap, 2013). Especially in a capital like Berlin, historical districts can be of
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special interest. I therefore include a dummy variable to see whether a firm is located inside the
historical CBD based on a definition from the historian Leyden (1933). Above all the dummy
is supposed to control for centrality. As initially stated, the former eastern part of Berlin has
especially attracted the movers and shakers, indicating a need to include a dummy variable
which indicates whether a firm is located in the former east. In a recent review on the spatial
concentration of entrepreneurship, Chatterji et al. (2013) note that entrepreneurship clusters
might evolve from urban revitalisation projects. After re-unification 22 renewal areas were
implemented to increase housing quality in Berlin. I therefore control for being located in one
of the areas by adding an urban renewal dummy. Data are gratefully provided by Ahlfeldt,
Maennig & Richter (2013), who test whether there are any positive housing externalities ori-
ginating from the planning instrument. Transport accessibility is generally another important
factor for the location of firms. For internet start-ups, however, transport serves more for
commuting than in terms of market accessibility, since the output is usually a service good
which is consumed or ordered “online”. I therefore control for accessibility to public transport
infrastructure by including kernel density measures of 2 km (Silverman, 1986) for bus, trams,
the underground and light rail network (BVG, 2006). Moreover, I control for the disamenity
effect of noise originating from trains, underground trains on overground tracks as well as tram
and street noise. The data are taken from maps published by the Berlin Senate Department for
Urban Development (2007) which indicates the level of noise on a highly disaggregated 10x10
meter grid. To control for spatial trends I also add X and Y coordinates to the estimation
model.
I note that there are numerous co-variates, such as the number of sport facilities or of
migrants inside a block which ignore any spatial relation to the surroundings. For example,
a block might very well be located inside a multi-cultural neighbourhood even though the
block’s number of migrants is low. However, the inclusion of various measures relying on the
same functional specification might cause multi-collinearity among regressors, which results
in biased estimation results (Thill & Kim, 2005). The benchmark specification was therefore
tested for multi-collinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF) (Kennedy, 2003).
3.5.4. Placebo firms
The selection of branches of other knowledge-based service industries is based on an overview
provided by Eickelpasch et al. (2009) who analyse development perspectives for the service
sector in eastern Germany. I hence rerun the benchmark model of the internet start-ups for
consultancies, lawyers, insurance companies, financial advisors, agencies, engineering offices,
publishers and architects. I consult the yellow pages for Berlin (Gelbe Seiten Deutschland,
2012) to obtain the postal addresses of all service firms. The data were processed in the same
manner as the start-up information. Exemplary, agencies as well as of financial advisories are
mapped jointly with cultural amenities in the appendix (Figure A.2 on page 126).
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3.6. Results
3.6.1. Internet start-ups
To test the implications of the footloose start-up model I begin the analysis by estimating the
regression model as outlined by equation (3.22). Table 3.1 on page 42 reports the key estimates
for five different specifications (see Table A.1 on page 128 for extended table).
I initially abstract from equation (3.22) by ignoring rents (from 1992) and other firms and
by only focusing on the the effect of cultural amenities on the location of internet start-ups
(column 1). I use the log of the amenities to facilitate the interpretation.9 The transformation
reduces the total number of observation by 87 to 15,850 remaining blocks. Cultural amenities
significantly (at a 1% level) influence the location choice of internet start-ups. In particular,
a 1% increase in amenity density raises the probability of a firm locating inside a block by
about 1.5%. Adding the employment and rent variable raises the attractive force of cultural
amenities only slightly (column 2). Employment positively affects the location of internet
start-ups, indicating the presence of localised agglomeration economies. In line with general
intuition, rents have a negative impact on the firm location.
Table 3.1.: Estimation results: Footloose start-up model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# start-up # start-up # start-up # start-up # start-up
log cult amen. 1.547*** 1.640*** 0.885*** 0.671*** 1.195***
(0.098) (0.118) (0.190) (0.157) (0.307)
employment 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -5E-5** -3E-5 -3E-5 -3E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
FE No No No Yes Yes
IV No No No No Yes
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERIDP 0.236
F (first) 1,775.682
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Instruments:
distance to Wall, squat density, OVERID (OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the over-
identification test (and its p-value).
To control for alternative explanations, I add a set of control variables in specification (3).
The likelihood of internet start-ups locating at a block due to the endowment with cultural
amenities is reduced to 0.9%. Moving on to the estimates of the additional set of controls,
migration positively affects the location of young web firms (see Table A.1 on page 128). This
is very much in line with the creative class defined by Florida (2002) being highly attracted
9I also estimate the non-logarithmised density of cultural amenities as a robustness test, see Section 3.6.2.
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by a tolerant surrounding. The migration effect stays robust in all specifications. As internet
start-ups are knowledge-based firms, exchange with research institutions might be important.
However, proximity to research institutes is positively correlated, i.e. the further away from
a research institute the more likely a start-up location, throughout all specifications except
the specification in column (3) where distance to research institutes is insignificant. A similar
negative relationship is found for proximity to universities. It was said that venture capitalists
move to Berlin as well and co-locate close to their recipients. This is found to be highly signi-
ficant. Estimates indicate that the probability of a start-up locating inside a block decreases
by between 0.2% and 0.3% per km distance from venture capitalists, depending on the specific-
ation. Of the two natural amenities, distance to nearest water bodies and to green space, only
the first one is significant and positively attracts web firms. The provision of sport facilities is
also found to positively affect firm location whereas exercising can be seen as a complement to
cultural amenities in terms of leisure consumption. One unfortunate drawback of the sports
measure is that it only takes into account the number of facilities inside a block due to the afore-
mentioned multi-collinearity concerns. The transport controls are mainly insignificant with a
few exceptions: Bus stops have a positive effect on firm location in specification (3). In the
more demanding specifications (4) and (5), light rail stations attract start-ups. Noise disamen-
ities have mixed effects. Noise originating from the underground running on overground tracks
and trams positively affect start-up location. More intuitively, noise caused by the light rail
system, trains and simple streets noise drive firms out. One explanation could be that trams
and the two underground lines U1 and U2, which run on overground tracks, make relatively
less noise than for instance normal trains. As indicated by the East Berlin dummy, new web
firms are more likely to start a business in the former East, as suspected earlier. Moreover,
start-ups are not particularly attracted by the historic CBD/centrality. There is no evidence
that urban renewal zones attract entrepreneurs either: Once the instruments are introduced,
the urban renewal dummy becomes insignificant. Additional controls for spatial trends (by
the X-/Y-Coordinates) are all insignificant. Column (4) introduces location fixed effects at the
voting precinct level. The cultural amenity coefficient decreases to 0.67. Finally, instruments
(proximity to wall, squat density) for the endogenous amenity variable are introduced in spe-
cification (5). Cultural amenities continue to have a positive impact on the location decision of
internet start-ups. A 1% increase in amenity density causes the likelihood of a firm location to
rise by 1.2% still with a significance level of 1%. The economic significance is slightly smaller
than in the baseline specification (1). The uninstrumented PPML estimates (3) and (4) are
biased downwards. There might for instance be a general unobservable conservative attitude
of people involved in the urban development process (planners, residents etc.) which slows
down the creation of amenities (loud bars and clubs) and young start-ups. This attitude would
underestimate the causal relationship between amenities and firm location and lead to an un-
derestimation of the real effect if not addressed properly. The control variables are in line with
general expectations indicating that start-ups are attracted by economic activity (employment,
proximity to capital), tolerant (migration) and pleasant locations (proximity to water, noise
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disamenities). I consider this last specification as the most demanding one and will refer to it
as benchmark model for the subsequent analysis.
Instrument validity relies on two requirements: (i) instruments need to be valid, i.e. uncorrel-
ated with the error term, and (ii) relevant in terms of prediction power, so they require a high
correlation with the endogenous regressors. The first requirement can generally not be tested.
However, when the model is overidentified and there are more instruments than endogenous
variables one can perform a test of overidentifying restrictions. As I instrument current cultural
amenities using two different instruments, I test the null hypothesis that the applied instru-
ments are jointly valid assuming that at least one instrument is exogenous. The computed
Hansen’s J statistic (OVERID) and its p-values (OVERIDP) do not reject the validity of the
instruments. The evaluation of an instrument’s strength is based on the F-statistic of the first
stage regression. Stock et al. (2002) argue that the F-statistic should be greater than ten for a
set of instruments to be relevant. The benchmark first-stage regression passes this threshold.
The full first-stage estimates are illustrated by Table A.2 on page 130, where column (1) refers to
the benchmark specification and the remaining columns belong to robustness checks discussed
in the next section.
3.6.2. Robustness
To ensure the robustness of the benchmark results I first test alternative start-up model spe-
cifications. I then test the amenity-maximiser hypothesis for eight alternative service sectors
and compare the outcomes to the benchmark estimates.
To address the concerns that proximity to Wall only reflects centrality or is correlated with
unobservables driving the results, I perform a few robustness exercises which are shown in Table
3.2 on page 45. The full table is in the appendix (Table A.3 on page 132). In column (1) I
control for centrality by including distance to CBD10 instead of the historic CBD dummy in the
uninstrumented PPML model. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include the centrality control
variable in the IV model due to reasons of convergence. Distance to CBD is insignificant and
the cultural amenity coefficient is almost identical to the estimates of the PPML model without
the distance to CBD variable (column (3) Table 3.1 on page 42). Specification (2) uses distance
to CBD and not to Wall as instrument. Centrality does not significantly attract web start-ups
via the amenity channel. Proximity to a placebo wall which cuts the city vertically in two
halves also yields insignificant estimates (column 3). Estimating the benchmark model with
alternative location fixed effects that share borders with the Berlin Wall provides, however, a
positive and significant amenity effect. Cultural amenities explain start-up location slightly
weaker than in the benchmark model when using district fixed effects (column 4) and slightly
stronger when using municipality fixed effects (column 5).
10Following standard practice for Berlin, I define the CBD to be at the intersection of Friedrich- and Leipziger-
straße (Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2011).
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Table 3.2.: Estimation results: Robustness exercises (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# start-ups # start-ups # start-ups # start-ups # start-ups
log cult dens 0.673*** 0.573 -0.644 1.121*** 1.507***
(0.160) (1.035) (1.446) (0.405) (0.459)
dist to CBD 0.007
(0.078)
employment 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 5E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -4E-5 -4E-5 -3E-5 -1E-5 -3E-5
(0.000) (0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE voting voting voting district municipality
IV1 dist to CBD placebo Wall dist Wall dist Wall
IV2 d. squat p. squat
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 0.000 0.000 1.360 0.002
OVERIDP 0.244 0.968
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OVERID
(OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the over-identification test (p-value).
To ensure that the results are not driven by the applied indicators I re-run the benchmark
specification using different measures of cultural amenity endowment and different instruments
(Table 3.3 on page 47, extended Table A.4 on page 135). In the first column I restrict the IV
estimation by only using proximity to Berlin Wall as an instrument. The amenity coefficient
is insignificant with fixed effects, probably because they soak up too much variation. Column
(1) illustrates the estimates without location dummies where amenities are significant at a
10% level. I then use the non-logarithmised density of current cultural amenities (column 2)
which allows me to run the model on the full sample of 15,937 statistical blocks. The amen-
ity density variable is highly significant and still positively affects the location choice of web
firms. In columns (3)-(5) I capture the stock of current cultural amenities by a gravity-based
potentiality measure with a distance decay of two which is supposed to capture walking speed
(as suggested by Ahlfeldt (2011b)). The inherent assumption is that entrepreneurs are only
attracted by amenities in their close neighbourhood. I first instrument current amenities using
the benchmark instruments distance to Berlin Wall and squat density (specification 3). I then
use distance to Wall and squat potentiality (specification 4) and both Berlin Wall and squat
potentiality (specification 5) as instrumental variables. The instrumented cultural amenity es-
timates are all positive and significant at the 1% level. Finally, I make use of the historical
cultural amenities. I create buffer rings of several distances around a block centroid and count
the number of cultural amenities that fall inside a ring. This follows Arzaghi & Henderson
(2008), who apply a similar indicator to capture the access to nearby advertising agencies as
agglomeration measure. I define five (column 6) and four (column 7) rings moving out in incre-
ments of 500 metres up to 2,000 metres whereas specification (6) has an additional ring of 250
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metres. The ring approach comes with the advantage of being intuitive to interpret. However,
the variables might quite likely suffer from unobservables fixed effects in the error terms despite
the use of voting precincts dummies and instruments. For data reasons, I am additionally only
able to use the supposedly weakest set of instruments, the count of historical cultural amenities
(1998/99) inside a ring. Moreover, the definition of the blocks is relatively heterogeneous com-
pared to the definition of New York City census tracts (Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008). There
might exist large blocks with the smallest buffer rings around the centroid still inside the block.
Estimates should therefore be interpreted with particular caution. Estimation results for the
two models are very similar. One additional cultural amenity in a ring between 500 and 1000
metres around a block centroid increases the probability of a firm location by 0.12%. In con-
trast, in the neighbouring ring (1000-1500m) the effect is negative and the likelihood decreases
by 0.06-0.07% and the increases by 0.05-0.06% again (1500-2000m) which might indicate the
presence of multi-collinearity. In the specification reported in column (8), I use a density meas-
ure of historical cultural amenities of 1936 as an instrument. Amenity estimates turn out to be
insignificant. This is most likely due to the fact that the sample of 1936 amenities is very small.
Column (9) makes use of the historic cultural amenities from 1998/99 again but this time as
a standard kernel density measure with a radius of 2 km. Jointly instrumenting contemporary
amenity density with the historic ones and proximity to Wall yields a positive amenity effect
on the location of web firms. Their likelihood of locating inside a particular housing block
increases by almost 1% if amenity density goes up by 1%. I eventually replace the 1992 land
values with rent data from 2010 (column 10). The rent coefficient stays insignificant where the
amenity effect is slightly larger than in the benchmark model.
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Table 3.3.: Estimation results: Robustness exercises (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups
cult amenity 1.570* 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.032** 0.031*** 0.019 0.000 1.600 0.987** 1.590***
(0.844) (0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (1.269) (0.377) (0.431)
ring 250m 0.019
(0.015)
ring 500m -0.007 2E-4
(0.011) (0.006)
ring 1000m 0.012*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.005)
ring 1500m -0.006** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.003)
ring 2000m 0.005** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
employment 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 4E-4*** 5E-4
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
land value -3E-5 -3E-5 -2E-5 -1E-5 -3E-5 -3E-5 -2E-5 -2E-5 -3E-5 0.056
1992/rent (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Rent 2010
FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cult (X) ln cult dens cult dens cult pot cult pot cult pot rings rings ln cult dens ln cult dens ln cult dens
IV1 dist Wall dist Wall dist Wall dist Wall p. Wall hist rings hist rings cult 1936 cult 1998 dist Wall
IV2 d. squat d. squat p. squat p. squat dist Wall d. squat
N 15850 15937 15937 15937 15937 15937 15937 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 0.000 5.526 6.942 7.049 3.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.043 0.012
OVERIDP 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.073 0.307 0.911
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OVERID (OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the overidentification test (and its
p-value). IVs: dens denotes a density measure, dist a Euclidean distance measure, pot a potentiality measure, rings the amenity rings. Cult stands for the the cul-
tural amenity to be instrumented. Column (10) includes rents from 2010 (Immobilien Scout, 2012) instead of 1992 land values.
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All instruments fulfill the overidentifying restrictions indicating their statistical validity. Re-
ferring to the first stage regressions (Table A.2 on page 130) all instruments are also sufficiently
strong. The instruments are all individually significant and have the expected coefficients. One
exception is shown in column (5), where distance to Wall is positively correlated to the gravity-
based cultural amenity measure, probably due to multi-collinearity. Interestingly, 1936 cultural
amenities are negatively correlated with today’s amenity endowment. This would imply that
amenity rich areas have changed over time and amenities moved to other locations within the
city. In fact, according to anecdotal evidence the entertainment industry was located more
in the Western area around Kurfürstendamm during the 1930s (Leyden, 1933). Moreover, as
stated before, the 1936 sample is very small and its application as an instrument not a very
good robustness test. Nonetheless, the overall results of the robustness checks using alternative
measures provide evidence for the attractive role cultural amenities play for the location choice
of internet start-ups. However, I consider none of the models to be as good as the benchmark
specification with respect to the identification.
3.6.3. Placebo firms
The work tries to establish an empirical link between cultural amenities and firm location. It
was argued that internet start-ups provide a perfect example for a footloose and knowledge-
based firm. However, there might be other service sectors affected by an area’s endowment
with cultural amenities. I therefore re-estimate the benchmark model using eight alternative
(placebo) service firms instead of the original internet start-ups. I assume that these firms face
no cost of moving and re-adjust their location when attracted by other places which offer a
better set of location factors. This, admittedly, is a simplifying assumption. However, compared
to manufacturing industries, the moving of service firms usually only involves the relocation of
office equipment. Moreover, it is important to note that the alternative service firms are (only)
used as a placebo test to establish further robustness. Estimates are reported in Table 3.4 on
page 49 (extended in Table A.5 on page 137).
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Table 3.4.: Estimation results: Placebo firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
architects consultancies engineering insurance law publisher finance agencies
log cult dens 0.110 0.567*** -0.187 -0.221 -0.147 0.234 -0.551* 0.836**
(0.196) (0.216) (0.336) (0.465) (0.176) (0.376) (0.320) (0.333)
employment 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -5E-6 1E-4*** 5E-5* 8E-5** 8E-5*** 6E-5* 1E-4*** 4E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 5.102 0.677 0.001 2.167 2.510 3.117 0.014 0.241
OVERIDP 0.024 0.410 0.974 0.141 0.113 0.077 0.906 0.624
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Instruments: distance to Wall, squat density, OVERID
(OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the overidentification test (and its p-value). There are at least ten law firms per vo-
ting precincts (instead of five).
49
3. Culturally clustered or in the cloud? Location choice of internet firms in Berlin
Cultural amenities now only have an effect on the location of three out of the eight industries.
In particular, cultural amenities only significantly determine the location of agencies as well
as consultancies. A 1% increase in density raises the probability of an agency locating at a
location by 0.84%, for consultancies the probability is 0.57%. The estimated probabilities are
smaller than for internet start-ups. In contrast, firms offering financial services experience on
average a negative effect and seem to get driven out by amenities. Their likelihood decreases by
0.55%.11 I cannot observe any statistically significant effects for architects, engineering offices,
law firms, publishers and insurance companies.
The interpretation of the remaining variables is limited as they are not at the centre of this re-
search. The majority of the coefficient estimates are comparable to the benchmark model using
internet start-ups as dependent variable. I therefore briefly report the most striking differences.
Land value estimates yield a diverse but rather positive effect on firm location (insignificant for
insurance companies, architects and agencies). Service firm location is generally independent of
the proximity to research institutions, an intuitive result considering the research un-intensity
of the firm selection. Law firms are the only type of service firms positively affected by prox-
imity to universities. Interestingly, sport facilities positively affect all firms except engineering
offices, whereas the picture of the transport role becomes rather mixed again. The importance
of light rail stations stands out and affects almost all firms except agencies. There is a signific-
ant tendency to locate in former East Berlin, except for insurance companies and publishers.
In contrast to web companies, the probability of locating inside an urban renewal area is higher
for all firms but publishers.
Finally turning to the validity of the instruments, six out of the eight model specifications
pass the test of overidentification. For architects as well as for publishers the null hypothesis of
joint instrument validity must be rejected. The overidentification test must to be interpreted
with care since it relies on the assumption that at least one instrument is exogenous. The test
therefore only serves as a rough indicator for the validity of the applied instruments. First-
stage regressions are reported in Table A.6 on page 139. Theoretically, the first stage regression
models for the latter eight service industries should be equivalent to the one for the internet
start-up model. Practically however, the inclusion of voting precinct dummies slightly varies
due to the distinct distribution of firms over the city. All F-statistics confirm the IVs’ relevance
for all models.
Complementing the main analysis of internet start-up location with the estimates for altern-
ative service industries allows us to draw the following conclusions: First of all, the comparison
serves as an additional robustness check in terms of the amenity effect being driven only by
centrality. If the amenity variable was highly correlated with centrality, one would expect ma-
ture and financially more potent service firms to outbid young internet start-ups in the centre.
Secondly, the results indicate that the endowment of an area with cultural amenities cannot
be regarded as a generalizable location determinant. The footloose start-up model as built
above cannot be applied to any economic sector. In fact, it is only internet start-ups as well as
11The positive effect of amenities on agencies and the negative one on financial advisories is also reflected by
Figure A.2 on page 126.
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agencies and thus rather creative industries which are positively affected by the cultural amen-
ities measure. The remaining firms conversely do not incorporate amenities into their location
choice. Companies in particular offering financial or juridical advice are even driven out by
amenities. These remaining service industries can be classified into rather conservative sectors.
The movers and shakers are more likely to be found among web firms and agencies than among
financial service firms. This first group is literally the “creative class” (Florida, 2002). Thirdly,
the inter-sectoral comparison provides evidence on the existence of an urban “buzz” (Storper
& Venables, 2004). Concentrated urban areas are characterised by a specific atmosphere (e.g.
originating from cultural amenities or tolerance) which only affects very specific industries.
Even if the applied instrumental variables were correlated with unobservables I was unable to
control for, there would be some urban forces which particularly attract creative firms.
3.7. Summary
It was argued that especially young, highly-qualified and creative individuals are attracted
by urban amenities. Knowledge-based service firms highly dependent on qualified labour are
therefore expected to act as amenity-maximising agents and to locate in amenity-rich areas.
I test this hypothesis by looking at the evolving internet start-up sector in Berlin which serves
an example of knowledge-based service firms. Following an instrumental variable approach
which makes use of the fall of the Berlin Wall as a quasi natural experiment, I try to fill the gap
of missing studies empirically assessing the role of urban amenities. It was shown that cultural
amenities positively impact on the location of start-ups; a one-percent increase in amenity
density raises the probability of a start-up location by about 1.2%. These results are proven to
be robust by estimating various specifications in terms of amenity measures and instruments
applied.
It was also shown that the results do not generally apply to all service types. Conservative
service sectors like law or financial firms are not found to be affected by an area’s endowment
with cultural amenities. It is more creative branches like agencies and, above all, internet firms
which act as amenity maximisers. The chapter therefore additionally provides evidence on
the existence of an urban “buzz” (Storper & Venables, 2004). Concentrated urban areas are
characterised by a specific atmosphere (e.g. originating from cultural amenities or tolerance)
which affects very specific industries and not others. I find that these affected industries are
closely related to the creative class.
Entrepreneurs are generally regarded as highly beneficial for a country’s economy, both by
economists as well as by politicians. They create new jobs, promote innovation and economic
growth. Especially the IT and software sector is considered to be a key sector with great
potentials. Hence, there are lot of different political initiatives to support entrepreneurs such
as providing cheap office space, developing cheap credit programs or offering workshops on how
to found a company. The results of this chapter enable a different perspective on how to promote
entrepreneurs. It was shown that cultural amenities play an important role in attracting start-
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ups. This suggests an implementation of cultural-political initiatives in economic policy. Even
though subcultural diversity might not be anticipated as economically beneficial in the short-
run, its destruction might, however, stop attracting footloose creative heads in the long-run.
Moreover, the results stand in contrast to artificially created science and technology parks in
the periphery. Even though these parks are equipped with appealing incentives like cheap rents
or access to the public transport network, it is not very likely that young innovative firms will
relocate to the periphery but stay in developed, central and amenity-rich areas.
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conservation areas 1
4.1. Motivation
One of the key motivations for a variety of spatial planning policies is how to solve coordination
problems inherent to free markets. Wherever non-traded positive or negative non-pecuniary
externalities exist, prices no longer provide efficient signals to market actors. In such a situation
individually rational decisions may be collectively irrational which implies that it is theoretically
possible to improve welfare by means of regulatory policies. Among such policies historic
preservation that aims at the protection of historic buildings with a particular aesthetic, cultural
or historic value, occupies a leading position in terms of the rigidity of the related regulations as
well as the complexity of related social and private costs and benefits. The policy is controversial
because the preservation of socially desirable buildings comes at the cost of restricting individual
property rights. On the one hand, the policy would not be equitable if individual owners bore
the cost of a presumed social welfare improvement. On the other hand, it can be argued that
by imposing binding standards the policy helps to overcome a coordination problem among
homeowners. Since owners can no longer “free ride” on the character of nearby buildings while
making inappropriate changes to their own properties the policy helps to solve a so-called
prisoner’s dilemma and eventually benefits the owners (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012).
With this contribution we provide a framework to empirically analyse the practice of preser-
vation policy and its impact on the utility of local homeowners. We develop a simple model
world in which we distinguish between a heritage effect, which can be internal or external, i.e.
the effect of the appearance of a historic building on the perceived value of the house itself
(internal) or nearby houses (external), and a policy effect, which results from the legal treat-
ment of the designation policy. We argue that with positive heritage effects, the policy benefits
the owners by removing uncertainty regarding the future of the neighborhood, i.e. the presence
of the heritage effect. These benefits are opposed by the costs of regulation (in the form of
development restrictions and maintenance obligations) so that the net effect of the policy effect
is ambiguous. Our theoretical framework predicts positive, but diminishing returns to desig-
nation. We consider the policy (locally) Pareto-efficient if the designation share is maximized
under the condition that the benefits of designation do not exceed the costs for any owner in
the neighbourhood.
1This chapter is mainly based on a revised version of Ahlfeldt, Möller et al. (2013)
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From the theoretical framework we derive two empirical specifications that allow us to test
the nature and (local) welfare impact of the preservation policy. Firstly, provided that the
planner behaves as an agent of the owners, new designation will result from increases in the
local preferences for heritage. Secondly, a Pareto-optimal designation policy implies that at the
margin, the costs and benefits of designation will offset each other, resulting in a zero impact
of designation on the value of designated properties. At all other locations in a neighbourhood
the effect will be positive. We test these implications using two different empirical approaches.
Firstly, we identify a causal effect of changes in neighbourhood composition, what we define as
gentrification, on the likelihood of designations using a tobit IV approach. Secondly, we use a
hybrid difference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) identification
strategy to estimate the causal effect of new designations on the market value of properties.
Our analysis is based on the whole of England, making use of 1 million property transactions
from 1995 to 2010 and of about 8,000 designated conservation areas, of which 915 have been
designated in the same observation period. We also make use of ward level education data from
the UK census for 1991, 2001, and 2011 in order to analyse the effect of changing neighbourhood
characteristics on the designation status. Previewing our results we find that that an increase
in the local share of residents holding a university or college degree leads to an expansion of the
designated area. The property price effect inside newly designated conservation areas turns out
not to be statistically distinguishable from zero. We find evidence that the effect just outside
the conservation area boundary is positive and significant. These results are in line with a
Pareto-optimal designation policy at the local neighbourhood level, which can thus be argued
to solve a coordination problem among homeowners (and landlords) within a neighbourhood.
We emphasize that it is not possible to conclude from these results that the policy is globally
Pareto-optimal since excessive historic preservation on a wide scale may lead to adverse welfare
impacts through supply restrictions as argued, for example, by Glaeser (2011).
Our analysis of the conservation area designation process adds to a growing body of liter-
ature on the political economy of housing markets, which implicitly or explicitly assumes that
property owners are able to influence political outcomes in their own interest (Ahlfeldt, 2011a;
Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2013; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner et al., 2001; Cellini et al., 2010;
Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a,b; Hilber & Mayer, 2009; Oates, 1969). We also contribute
to a literature investigating the costs and benefits of spatially targeted policies that aim at
improving neighbourhood quality (Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2011; Hilber &
Vermeulen, 2010; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010) as well as research that has looked into the value
amenities add to neighbourhoods and cities more generally (Ahlfeldt et al., 2012; Brueckner
et al., 1999; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2001). As reviewed in Section 2.3.2,
there is also a growing body of literature that has investigated property price effects of desig-
nation policies, mostly focused on the U.S. (Asabere et al., 1989, 1994; Asabere & Huffman,
1994; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Glaeser, 2011; Leichenko et al., 2001;
Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991). The key contribution of this study is
to provide insights into the political economy of conservation area designation and to examine
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whether the outcome is Pareto-efficient for local home-owners. We also make a number of more
specific, though still important contributions. Firstly, the theoretical framework we develop
lends a structure to the designation process that helps to interpret the existing evidence that
has typically been derived from ad-hoc empirical models. Secondly, our analysis of conservation
area effects on property prices is one of the few rigorous analysis of this kind available for Europe
(Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010b; Koster et al., 2012; Lazrak et al., 2013) and the first to analyse
England. It is unique in terms of size and spatial detail of the data set and special in its focus
on spatial modelling of heritage externalities. Thirdly, our differences-in-differences analysis of
designation effects on property prices is the only study along with Koster et al. (2012) that uses
a quasi-experimental research design to separate the policy effect of designation from correlated
location effects. It is unique in using particularly carefully selected control groups. Fourthly, we
make use of a novel combination of RDD and DD approaches to identify the policy effects on
outcome trends and discontinuities from quasi-experimental variation, which could be applied
more generally to program evaluations. Fifthly, we provide the first empirical analysis of the
determinants of heritage designation. More generally, we establish a novel connection between
the spatial outcome of a political bargaining process and one of the most striking contemporary
urban phenomena: gentrification.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next Section 4.2 introduces our theoretical
model of heritage designations and the institutional setting. Section 4.3 our empirical strategy.
A presentation and discussion of our empirical results is in Section 4.5. The last section sum-
marizes the main findings (Section 4.6).
4.2. Theory and context
4.2.1. Theoretical framework
We assume that a linear neighbourhood exists along a spatial dimension x on the interval
[0, 1]. Each parcel of land at point x is occupied by a housing structure which is endowed with
h(x) units of internal heritage. The aggregate of the distribution of internal heritage gives the
heritage character (external heritage) H of the neighbourhood at any point in time. Owners
care about their initial endowment of internal heritage h(x), which is under their full control,
and the long run external heritage, which may be damaged by their neighbours’ property
(re)developments. Such redevelopments occur in the long run with a probability of (1 − pi)
where 0 ≤ pi < 1 is the ‘preservation probability’ in the absence of conservation policies. The
effect of conservation areas is to increase the preservation probability to 1 for parcels of land
within their boundaries.2 Therefore, long-run external heritage depends on both the internal
heritage distribution and the level of designation.
2Our argument does not depend on the assumption of full preservation probability, only that preservation is
more likely inside conservation areas.
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Within the neighbourhood, the initial internal heritage monotonically decreases in x. The
theoretical argument does not depend on the functional form. For simplicity we assume h(x)
to be a linear function of the heritage endowment at the neighbourhood’s centre (h0):
h(x) = h0(1− x) (4.1)
One way to rationalize this distribution is to assume a neighbourhood that grew outwards from
its historical centre (at x = 0) until the neighbourhood limit (at x = 1) and an internal heritage
that strictly depends on the age of the housing unit.3
To protect the neighbourhood heritage, a planner can choose to designate a conservation
area that covers all locations in the neighbourhood from the historical centre up to a point
x = D and hence, a share 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 of the neighbourhood. Since heritage is monotonically
decreasing in x it is always rational to start designating at x = 0. By affecting the preservation
probability, the designation share D determines the external heritage amount to be expected
in the long run. The expected long-run external heritage derived from undesignated locations
(x > D) corresponds to the integral of the distribution of internal heritage multiplied by the
preservation probability,
∫ 1
D pih(x)d. This is added to the amount derived from designated
locations (x ≤ D), which is simply the integral of the internal heritage as the preservation
probability is equal to one,
∫D
0 h(x)d.
E[H | D] =
∫ D
0
h(x)dx+
∫ 1
D
pih(x)dx (4.2)
E[H | D] = h0(1− D2 )D +
pi
2h0(1−D)
2 (4.3)
The expected external heritage integral E[H | D] is indicated by the whole grey-shaded area
in Figure 4.1 on page 57. The expected amount of external heritage saved by the preservation
policy is illustrated as the black-dotted area Hˇ which denotes the difference in (expected)
external heritage between a scenario with no designation and a scenario with a designation
share D. This amount is:
Hˇ = h0(1− pi)(1− D2 )D (4.4)
As evident from the partial derivatives, the amount of external heritage saved by the policy
increases with designation share but at a decreasing rate:
∂Hˇ
∂D
= ∂E[H | D]
∂D
= h0(1−D)(1− pi) > 0 (4.5)
∂2Hˇ
∂D2
= ∂
2E[H | D]
∂D2
= −h0(1− pi) < 1 (4.6)
3Alternatively, x can simply be interpreted as the rank of a property in the heritage distribution.
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Figure 4.1.: Expected heritage distribution with partial designation
Notes: The function h(x) gives the internal heritage at each location in the neighbourhood. The expected
external heritage is equal to the grey-shaded area and is the integral of h(x) up to the designation share plus
the integral of pi times this h(x) from the designation share until the neighbourhood limit at x = 1. The stippled
area marked Hˇ is the amount of expected external heritage preserved by the policy.
The partial derivatives of Hˇ (which are the same as of H) with respect to D establish a central
stylized fact of our theory: There are diminishing returns to designation.
To link the distribution of heritage in the neighbourhood to the utility U of an individual
residing at x we define a utility function:
U(x) = A(x)XδL1−δ (4.7)
where X is a composite consumption good and L is housing space. The Cobb-Douglas form is
motivated by the empirical observation that housing expenditure shares tend to be relatively
constant across geographies and population groups (Davis & Ortalo-Magne, 2011). A(x) is a
composite amenities term:
A(x) = a(x)eφh(x)eγE[H|D]e−cD˜(x) (4.8)
where a is a further composite indicator of m non-heritage amenities,4 h(x) is the internal her-
itage endowment (i.e. heritage character of the specific housing unit), φ is the internal heritage
preference parameter, E[H | D] is external heritage (i.e. expected heritage of surrounding units,
which depends on the designation policy) and is conditional on designation share as defined
4Non-heritage amenities are given by: a = bΠmaρmm where the different amenity levels are denoted am and are
given a collective scaling factor b and individual parameters ρm.
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above, γ is the external heritage preference parameter, and c represents the costs of designation
policies, which arise from the development restrictions imposed inside conservation areas. The
cost to an individual is e−cD˜(x) and depends on the local designation status D˜(x), a binary
function of x, which takes the value of one if x ≤ D and zero otherwise.
We assume a social planner seeking a Pareto-efficient designation share, which in the model
implies maximizing the designation share (and the external heritage effects) on the condition
that by designation utility is not reduced at any location in the neighbourhood.
The positive marginal utility effect of designation at any location in the neighbourhood is
given by:
dU(x)
dD
= ∂U
∂E[H | D]
∂E[H | D]
∂D
= γU(x)h0(1− d)(1− pi) (4.9)
The negative utility effect to an owner of a property changing designation status from zero to
one is:
dU(x)
dD˜
= ∂U
∂D˜(x)
= −cU(x) (4.10)
By setting the social marginal benefit equal to the private marginal cost of an affected owner
the planner finds the Pareto-efficient designation share D∗ by solving for D:
D∗ = 1− c(1− pi)γh0 (4.11)
Based on the resulting efficiency condition we can derive some useful comparative statics (see
also Figure B.1 on page 142 in the Appendix). The (Pareto) optimal designation share is
greater when people have a greater taste for external heritage γ or where there is altogether
more heritage (determined by the heritage endowment at the neighbourhood centre h0, and
implicitly the age of the neighbourhood):
∂D∗
∂γ
> 0 (4.12)
∂D∗
∂h0
> 0 (4.13)
There is less optimal designation when the preservation probability pi (if left undesignated)
increases or if the cost of designation increases:
∂D∗
∂pi
< 0 (4.14)
∂D∗
∂c
< 0 (4.15)
These theoretical implications are in line with intuition and can be transformed into empirically
testable hypotheses in principle. However, the heritage at the neighbourhood centre h0, the
preservation probability pi and the costs to owners of conservation policies c are all difficult to
observe in reality. For that reason we will concentrate on testing the first comparative statics
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implication about taste for heritage (proxied by education level of the local population) in the
empirical section.
To develop a testable hypothesis on whether the efficiency condition is fulfilled, i.e. the
planner setsD = D∗, we incorporate capitalization effects in the next step. We first assume that
individuals maximize their utility defined above subject to a budget constraint: W = X+θ(x)L,
where θ(x) is a housing bid-rent. Furthermore we assume spatial equilibrium such that all
locations offer the same level of utility U¯ which we set equal to one:
U(x) = A(x)[δW ]δ[(1− δ)W
θ
]1−δ = U¯ = 1 (4.16)
This can be rearranged to give the spatial equilibrium bid-rents for a representative individual:
θ(x) = (1− δ)[δδWa(x)eϕh(x)eγE[H|D]e−cD˜(x)] 11−δ (4.17)
In keeping with intuition, the bid-rent increases in the expected external heritage, which de-
pends on the designation share D and the internal heritage endowment h(x) and decreases in
the designation cost, which is locally constrained to x ≤ D as defined above.
The spatial equilibrium condition can be used to derive the marginal effect of an increase in
designation share on rents in the neighbourhood. At all locations in the city a marginal increase
in designation share D triggers a positive effect on rent through an increase in expected external
heritage. At the margin, in addition, the change in designation status D˜ also creates a cost.
dθ(x)
dD
=

∂θ(x)
∂E[H|D]
∂E[H|D]
∂D
+ ∂θ(x)
∂D˜(x)dD˜(x) if x = D
∂θ(x)
∂E[H|D]
∂E[H|D]
∂D
if x 6= D (4.18)
Substituting in the Pareto optimal designation share D = D∗ derived above we get:
dθ(x)
dD
=

θ(x)
1−δ [γh0(1− 1 + c(1−pi)γh0 )(1− pi)− c] = 0 if x = D
θ(x)
1−δ [γh0(1− 1 + c(1−pi)γh0 )(1− pi)− c] =
θ(x)
1−δ if x 6= D
(4.19)
The two conditions directly translate into two testable hypotheses. If the designation process is
in reality Pareto optimal, we expect the marginal effect of designation on housing rents to be zero
at newly designated locations and to be positive at all other locations in the neighbourhood.
Likewise, an excessive or restrictive designation policy will be associated with negative or
positive marginal designation effects.
Assuming that the preservation probability (if undesignated) and the preservation costs are
held constant our theory predicts that, in equilibrium, (Pareto optimal) designations occur
as a result of an increase in the benefits associated with (external) heritage. Such increases
in benefits will occur mechanically over time if the internal (and thus the external) heritage
depends on housing age. The effective benefits will also increase as a result of neighbourhood
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turnover, if the in-migrating residents have larger heritage preferences than the incumbents.
Designation then becomes a collateral effect of ‘gentrification’. The older the conservation area,
the greater the accrued benefits of designation may be.
Contrary to the assumption in our theory there is evidence suggesting that heritage extern-
alities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010b; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012) or housing externalities more
generally (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010) decline quite steeply in distance. The implication is
that at the centre of a conservation area, where the effective external heritage is largest, the
marginal designation benefit will be larger than at the margin. We justify our simplified theory
on the grounds that most conservation areas are small in reality even compared to the narrow
scope of housing externalities. Moreover, we allow designation effects to vary in distance to the
conservation area boundary and provide estimates of designation effects at the boundary, the
critical point for Pareto-efficiency as the policy benefits are presumably at their lowest.
4.2.2. Institutional context
In England, the designation of conservation areas started in 1967 and continues today under
the provisions 69 and 70 of the Planning Act 1990 (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas).5
Conservation areas are those that have been identified as having “special architectural or historic
interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance” (Section
69). The Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 (PPG15) states that a conservation area “may
form groups of buildings, open spaces, trees, historic street patterns, village greens or features
of historic or archaeological interest. It is the character of the areas rather than individual
buildings that conservation areas seek to enhance”. Conservation areas are designated on the
grounds of local and regional criteria. After the designation, the Local Authority has more
control over minor developments and the demolition of buildings (Bortrill, 2005). However,
the protection an area receives when it is designated a conservation area is determined at the
national level to reflect the wider interests of society.
In 2011 there were around 9,800 conservation areas in England. Conservation areas vary
in character and size. Many have strong historical links, for example an architectural style
associated with a certain period. Besides these characteristics, designation is made based on
softer benefits said to have emanated from conservation area designation including: the creation
of a unique sense of place-based identity, encouraging community cohesion, and promoting
regeneration (HM Government, 2010). This ‘instrumentalisation’ of conservation policy, which
seeks to en-compass heritage values, economic values and public policy outcomes, has been
identified as a key shift in the English policy context (Pendlebury, 2009; Strange & Whitney,
2003). This is reflective of the notion of heritage not as a single definable entity, but as s
5However, the first legislation to protect the historic environment was enacted in 1882 when the Ancient
Monuments Protection Act was passed to protect a small number of designated ancient monuments. More
statutory measures came into force in the ensuing years, but it was the passage of the Ancient Monuments
Consolidation and Amendment Act in 1913 that set out a more comprehensive legislative framework for the
protection of ancient monuments.
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political, social, cultural and economic “bundle of processes” (Avrami et al., 2000, cited in
Pendlebury (2009) p. 7).
In combination with bottom-up schemes leading to designation (e.g. community-led designa-
tion), the complex heritage preservation agenda which pursues a multitude of objectives and
the institutional setting with responsibilities shared across several institutional layers creates
significant scope for organized interest groups like property owners to influence the outcome of
a political bargaining process.
4.3. Empirical strategy
4.3.1. Designation process
The first potentially testable implications of our theoretical model are the partial derivatives
(4.12) to (4.15). As mentioned in the theory section it is difficult to find feasible proxies for the
variables pi, c and h0. We therefore concentrate on testing the first of these conditions, i.e., the
‘taste’ for heritage γ has a positive effect on optimal designation share D∗ in a neighbourhood.
We adopt the common assertion that the demand for urban consumption amenities increases in
education and income (Brueckner et al., 1999; Carlino & Saiz, 2008; Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006;
Shapiro, 2006; van Duijn & Rouwendal, 2013). In particular, we assume that the preference for
heritage γn in a neighbourhood n is related to the share of people in the neighbourhood who
hold a higher education certificate (DEGi)6 with the following functional form:
γnt = DEGϑnte−εnt (4.20)
where ϑ > 0 such that the relationship is positive. Since the purpose of our empirical exercise
is to evaluate the causal impact of changes in heritage preferences on designation status - and
not the causal impact of education on heritage preference - it is sufficient to assume that ϑ
captures a correlation between education and heritage preferences. εnt is a random disturbance
term capturing determinants of heritage preferences that are not correlated with education.
Rearranging the Pareto-efficient designation share equation (4.11), substituting the education
degree proxy relationship and taking logs we arrive at the following empirical specification:
log (1−Dnt) = α− ϑ log (DEGnt)− ωn + εnt (4.21)
where α = log (1− pi)− log (c) and ωn = log (h0n) + ln (4.22)
The n subscripts correspond to the individual ‘neighbourhoods’ of our theoretical model and we
choose to represent these empirically as UK Census wards. Wards are the smallest geographical
areas that are comparable between 1991 and 2011 Censuses. Subscript t stands for time periods
6We also use income as a proxy for a subsample of our data set - results are reported in the appendix (Section
B.5.1).
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for which we use the Census years of 1991 and 2011. All idiosyncratic time-invariant location
components ln (location-specific determinants of designation not modelled in our theory) and
the unobserved heritage endowment h0n of a neighbourhood n as captured by ωn as well as
the preservation probability pi and the costs to owners of conservation policies are removed by
taking first-differences:
∆ log (1−Dn) = ∆α− ϑ∆ log (DEGn) + ∆εn (4.23)
Our estimation equation now depicts that a neighbourhood change reflected in a positive change
in (log) educational degree share causes the (logged) share of non-designated land on the left-
hand side to decrease. This is just another way of saying that a positive change in educational
degree leads to a higher designation share, although the transformation is non-linear. Note
that we implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium in the sense that all areas that should be
designated at t are in fact designated. To support the case, we estimate our model using a long
difference between 1991 and 2011, which is more than two decades after the start of the policy
and the initial wave of designations. Results for the smaller differences between 1991-2001, and
2001-2011 respectively, are reported in the appendix (Section B.5.1).
Equation (4.23) evidently follows from a stylized model world. In the empirical implement-
ation we add a number of covariates to control for alternative determinants of designation.
The on-going designation is then only determined by the local changes in preferences and the
steady aging of buildings and the effects on heritage, which are differentiated out. To control
for the contagion effects in designation we add the initial (1991) designation share. A num-
ber of variables are added to account for heterogeneity in the net benefits of designation and
abilities to express (collective) opinions in a political bargaining that may influence the desig-
nation decision. These include the initial (1991) degree share, the homeownership rate, and the
household size (both in initial shares and changes). We alter the baseline model in a number of
robustness checks to account for institutional heterogeneity at the TTWA level, neighbourhood
appreciation trends and, to the extent possible, the historic and physical quality of the housing
stock.
In practice, however, it is difficult to control for all determinants of designation that are
external to our model. One particular concern is that areas can be designated if the heritage
is threatened by poor maintenance in a declining neighbourhood. Such derelict is likely to be
negatively correlated with our explanatory variable and is unlikely to be fully captured by the
control variables we have at hand. At the same time, the policy itself could make it more likely
that educated people are attracted to designated areas due to a different valuation of uncertainty
(reverse causality). Since an OLS estimation of equation (4.23) can result in a significant bias in
either direction we make use of instrumental variables zn, which predict changes in education,
ρ(zn,∆ logDEGn) 6= 0, but must be conditionally uncorrelated with the differenced error term,
ρ(zn,∆εnt) = 0. We argue that rail station (in London additionally Tube station) density as
well as effective employment accessibility (both time-invariant in levels) are good predictors of
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neighbourhood gentrification (Florida, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2001).7 We also argue that it is
unlikely that these level variables directly impact on the likelihood of designation conditional
on the unobserved heritage endowment in the fixed effects ωn.
Another empirical concern is that, theoretically, a decrease in preferences for heritage must
provoke a reduction of the designated area. The abolishment of conservation areas, however, is
extremely rare in England (as in most institutional contexts) so our data is left-censored (we
do not observe increases in the share of non-designated land). We therefore take the model to
the data using a tobit approach:
Y ∗n = ∆α− ϑ∆ log (DEGn) + ∆εn, ∆εn~N(0, σ2) (4.24)
Yn =
 Y
∗
n , if Y ∗n = ∆ log (1−Dn) < 0
0, if Y ∗n ≥ 0
(4.25)
4.3.2. Pareto optimality
To test whether the designation share in practice is set at the (locally) Pareto-optimal level
(D∗) we estimate the effect of the event of designation on property prices within and surround-
ing conservation areas. In its essence our quasi-experimental methods are a derivative of the
established difference-in-differences (DD) methodology (Bertrand et al., 2004). We draw ele-
ments of the increasingly popular regression discontinuity designs (RDD) (Imbens & Lemieux,
2008), however, to relax the DD assumptions of homogeneous trends and a singular treatment
date to separate smooth variation (e.g. externalities) and discontinuities (e.g. policy zones) in
treatment effects from correlated unobservables.
Difference-in-differences
We define a group of 912 ‘treated’ conservation areas as those that were designated between
the years 1996 and 2010 to ensure we observe property transactions both before and after the
designation date. Our counterfactuals are established via various control groups of housing
units that are similar to the treated units but are themselves not treated. These control groups
are discussed in more detail in the results section and in the appendix (Section B.3.2).
Our baseline DD model takes the following form:
pit = βIIi + βEEi + βIPost(Ii × Postit) + βEPost(Ei × Postit) +X ′iµ+ fn + Yt + it (4.26)
7Our measure of effective employment accessibility aggregates employment in surrounding regions weighted by
distance. We use exponential distance weights that are popular in the theoretical (Fujita & Ogawa, 1982;
Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010) and empirical literature (Ahlfeldt et al., 2012; Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013) and
the decay parameter estimate provided by Ahlfeldt (in press). Transport infrastructure is captured by a
kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2 km which is considered to be the maximum
distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005).
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where pit is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property i in time period t, Ii is
a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation area, Ei
indicates observations external to the treated CA. While our standard models use a buffer area
of 500m we also experiment with various alternative spatial specifications. Postit is a dummy
variable indicating whether the transaction year t is equal to or greater than the designation
year, Xi is a vector of controls for property, neighbourhood and environmental characteristics,
fn is a set of n location fixed effects and Yt are year effects. The βIPost and βEPost parameters
give the difference-in-differences estimates of the designation effect on the properties within
and just outside a conservation area. We show in Section B.3.2 that βIPost is equal to the
net marginal policy (designation costs and benefits) effect while βEPost reflects the pure (albeit
spatially discounted) policy benefit.
Temporal regression discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD)
The standard DD specification (4.26) identifies the policy treatment effect under some arguably
restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the treatment and control groups follow the same trend before
and after the treatment. Secondly, the treatment occurs at a singular and a priori known
date and affects the level (and not the trend) of the outcome variable. These assumptions
are evidently violated if the outcome variable does not respond immediately to the treatment,
e.g., because of costly arbitrage, or in anticipation of the treatment, for example because of an
investment motive by buyers (Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013). In our case, a positive pre-trend can
also be associated with the gentrification that causes designation according to our theoretical
model, a reverse causality problem.
To address these limitations of the standard DD we refine the model to accommodate differ-
ences in trends across the treatment and the control group. We borrow the functional form from
the RDD literature where a (temporal) treatment effect is identified as an instant adjustment
- a discontinuity - conditional on higher order polynomial (pre- and post-) trends, which are
assumed to be unrelated to the treatment (Bento et al., 2010). In our regression discontinuity
design of differences (RDD-DD) we combine an RDD-type polynomial specification of trends
with the control group-based counterfactual from the DD. It is therefore possible to attribute
pre- and post-trends to the treatment as long as it is credible to assume that treatment and
control groups would have followed the same trend in the absence of the treatment. It is not-
able that even if this assumption is violated the RDD-DD (unlike the standard RDD) will at
least remove macro-economic shocks from the treatment effect by taking differences from the
control group. This improves identification so long as the control group remains unaffected by
the treatment. Our RDD-DD with linear trends takes the following form:
pit = βIIi + βIY D(Ii × Y Dit) + βEEi + βEY D(Ei × Y Dit) + βIPost(Ii × Postit)
+ βIPostY D(Ii × Postit × Y Dit) + βEPost(Ei × Postit)
+ βEPostY D(Ei × Postit × Y Dit) +X ′iµ+ fn + Yt + it
(4.27)
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where Y Dit is the number of years since the designation date, with the pre-designation years
having negative values. As in the RDD, the polynomial degree of the trend can be increased
subject to sufficient degrees of freedom. We make use of a quadratic trend specification and
evaluate the fit of the parametric polynomial function using a semi-parametric version of (4.27)
that replaces the Y Dit variables with full sets of years-since-designation effects (details in
Section B.3.2).
A significant ‘dis-in-diff’ parameter (βIPost or βEPost) can be entirely attributed to the treat-
ment even under the existence of complex relative trends that are unrelated to the treatment
or may even have caused the treatment as the comparison is made just before and just after the
treatment date. Under the assumption of homogeneous counterfactual trends the significant
pre-trend parameters (βIY D or βEY D) describe the anticipation effects. Significant post-trend
parameters (βIPostY D or βEPostY D) then indicate changes in relative trends after the treatment.
In conjunction, the ‘dis-in-diff’ and the pre- and post-trend parameters describe the full tem-
poral structure of the treatment effect. As a program evaluation tool that is applicable to a
variety of event studies, the RDD-DD thus naturally comes with a stronger test (dis-in-diff)
and a weaker test (trends) of whether there exists an effect of the treatment.
Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD)
In contrast to our theory, in reality there most likely exists a spatial decay to the heritage ex-
ternalities. This decay implies that the external heritage effect should be stronger at the centre
of the conservation area than at the boundaries. The policy benefit, which is a transformation
of the external heritage effect, should also be greater at the centre of the newly designated
conservation area. Likewise, the predicted positive policy effects just outside the boundary
should be decaying in distance to the conservation area (CA) boundary. At the CA boundary
there may be a discontinuity as the cost of the policy ends abruptly at the boundary, whereas
potential externalities decay smoothly across it. The combination of trends and discontinuities
potentially caused by the treatment resembles the temporal identification problem just de-
scribed and will be addressed by a similar combination of RDD and DD tools. Essentially, we
use the RDD tools to capture how the difference (before and after) in the differences (treatment
vs. control) of property prices varies along the (internal and external) distances from the CA
boundary. Unlike in the standard (spatial) RDD, unobserved time-invariant spatial effects can
be held constant due to the availability of spatiotemporal variation. In our spatial RDD-DD
model it is therefore possible to attribute spatial trends (with respect to distance to the CA
boundary) as well as a discontinuity (at the CA boundary) to the treatment provided that the
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spatial trends are uncorrelated with unobserved temporal trends. The spatial RDD-DD we
estimate takes the following form:8
pit = βITi + βID(Ti ×Di) + βIPost(Ti × Postit) + βIDPost(Ti ×Di × Postit)
+ βEOi + βOD(Oi ×Di) + βOPost(Oi × Postit) + βODPost(Oi ×Di × Postit)
+X ′iµ+ fn + Yt + it
(4.28)
whereDi is the distance from the property to the conservation area boundary (internal distances
are negative values), Oi indicates properties outside a treated conservation area and Ti indicates
the conservation area that is nearest to a property that is treated at any point of the study
period. In order to fully explore the extent of spatial externalities Oi indicates a larger area
outside CAs rather than just within 500 m as indicated by Ei in previous models. Specifically,
the empirical analysis uses properties within 1,400 m of the treated conservation area. As
with the temporal RDD-DD specification we also estimate an expanded model specification in
which we allow for quadratic distance trends and semi-nonparametric specifications replacing
the distance variable with some distance bin effects. The coefficient βIPost gives the intercept
of the internal effect (i.e. the internal effect at the boundary) and βIDPost estimates how this
changes with respect to internal distance. Jointly, these terms capture the net policy costs and
benefits of designation for internal treated areas. A zero βIPost coefficient would be reflective of
a zero effect at the boundary and would be in line with the optimality condition derived in the
theory section. A negative βIDPost would be in line with the existence of policy benefits (due
to increased preservation probability) that spillover with decay. The parameters βOPost and
βODPost allow for a spatial discontinuity treatment effect at the boundary and heterogeneity
in spatial trends inside and outside the treated areas. As with βIDPost, a jointly negative
βIDPost+βODPost would be in line with the decaying policy benefits external to the conservation
area. The discontinuity at the border is measured by the external intercept term βOPost. A
statistically positive estimate would indicate a cost to the policy. A jointly positive effect of
βIPost + βOPost would in turn indicate the existence of policy benefits.
4.4. Data
We have compiled two distinct data sets for the two stages of the empirical analysis. Both
data sets make use of data provided by English Heritage. These include a precise GIS map
of 8,167 conservation areas in England, the Conservation Areas Survey containing information
on community support and risk status (average condition, vulnerability and trajectory of a
conservation) and a complete register of listed buildings.
For the analysis of the determinants of designation we use UK census wards as a unit of
analysis. Shares of designated land within each Census ward are computed in a Geograph-
8In models with historical CAs as control groups the following terms are also included βCD(Ci×Di)+βECECi+
βECD(ECi ×Di), where Ci indicates internal to control CA and ECi external to control CA. This ensures
that spatial effects are estimated conditional on the spatial trends in control CA.
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ical Information Systems environment. Various ward level data on educational level, average
household size and homeownership status and vacancy rate were obtained from the UK Census.
Any changes in ward boundaries between the years were corrected for using the online conver-
sion tool GeoConvert. For robustness tests we also collected a measure of the ward’s average
income (Experian). The instrumental variables station density and employment potential are
regenerated data that stem from nomis (workplace employment) and the Ordinance Survey
(rail stations).
For the analysis of the capitalization effects of designation we use transactions data related to
mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data
for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for individual housing
units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics include floor space
(m2), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of
construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type
of heating. There is also some buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or
leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer. Importantly, the transaction data includes
the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates.
With this information it is possible within GIS to calculate distances to conservation area
borders and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside of these borders. Further-
more, it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (such as densities) for the
amenities and environmental characteristics such as National Parks, as well as natural features
like lakes, rivers and coastline. The postcode reference also allows a merger of transactions and
various household characteristics (median income and ethnic composition) from the UK census,
natural land cover and land use, various amenities such as access to employment opportunities,
cultural and entertainment establishments and school quality. A more detailed description of
all the data used is in the appendix (Section B.4).
4.5. Empirical results
4.5.1. Designation process
Table 4.1 on page 70 reports the results of our tobit model of the designation process defined
in equation (4.24). The non-instrumented baseline model is in column (1). As predicted by our
theory, increases in educational levels that are presumably correlated with heritage preferences
are associated with reductions in the share of non-designated land. More precisely, an increase
in the degree share by 1% is associated with a 0.12% reduction in the share of non-designated
land. This decrease corresponds to an 0.12% × (1 − D¯t−1)/D¯t−1 = 2.61% increase in the
share of designated land for a ward with the mean of the positive initial designation shares
D¯t−1 = 4.4%. The effect substantially increases once we instrument the change in degree share
using rail station density and employment potential (column 2). This increase is in line with
unobserved (positive) deterioration trends that a) increase the likelihood of designation and
b) are negatively correlated with changes in degree share. Introducing the instruments, the
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effect of a 1% increase in degree share on the share of non-designated land increases to 0.52%,
which for a ward with the mean initial designation share D¯t−1 corresponds to an increase in the
designated land share of about 11%. While we have argued that our estimates are supposed to
reflect a causal estimate of gentrification (proxied by degree shares) on designation probabilities
and not necessarily a causal effect of degree share on designation share, a parameter estimate of
ϑˆ = 0.52 is at least indicative of heritage preferences increasing relatively steeply in education.
In a series of robustness checks columns (3) to (5) of the same table provide variations of the
benchmark model (2). We add TTWA effects to control for unobserved institutional heterogen-
eity in column (3). Column (4) adds a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain
from ward-level regressions of log property prices on a time trend (and property controls, see
the appendix for details). In this specification we control for a potentially positive correlation
between owners’ risk aversion and the value of their properties - typically their largest assets.
This is a potentially important control since a larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a
policy that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighbourhood and, thus, potentially
increases the optimal designation share. It is a demanding control since positive price trends
are potentially endogenous to changes in neighbourhood composition and may thus absorb
some of the gentrification effect on designation. The price trends are indeed positively, though
not statistically significantly, associated with increases in the share of designate land. Adding
controls capturing vacancy trends and levels, the density of listed buildings and some risk and
vulnerability assessments from the Conservation Areas Survey tend to increase the education
effect (column 5).
Across all specifications we find that, besides positive changes in designation share, high initial
levels of degree shares are positively correlated with increases in the share of designated land.
While high initial and positive changes in homeownership rate, ceteris paribus, are associated
with less designation, it is notable that the (positive) impact of neighbourhood change on
designations shares (interaction term) is particularly large in high homeownership areas (see
column 6). This is in line with a political economy literature that suggests that homeowners
tend to form well-organized interest groups (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2013; Brunner & Sonstelie,
2003; Dehring et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a). Aside from the uninstrumented model (1), the
results in Table 4.1 suggest contagion effects in designation, i.e. designated land shares tend to
increase where shares were initially high.
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Table 4.1.: Designation process
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
∆ log non designation sharet
∆ log degree sharet(ϑ) -0.116*** -0.519*** -0.587*** -0.528*** -0.560*** -0.513***
(0.019) (0.061) (0.105) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
log degree sharet−1 -0.127*** -0.276*** -0.337*** -0.280*** -0.289*** -0.269***
(0.010) (0.024) (0.046) (0.024) -(0.025) (0.023)
log designation sharet−1 -0.004 -0.022* -0.027** -0.035*** -0.026* -0.025**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.033) (0.013)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.189*** 0.263*** 0.319*** 0.262*** 0.259*** 0.255***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.042) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028)
log homeownershipt−1 0.127*** 0.057*** 0.091*** 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.153***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.040)
∆ log aver. household 0.042 0.031 0.006 0.028 -0.009 0.047
sizet (0.037) (0.040) (0.046) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
log aver. household 0.073* -0.016 -0.122* -0.011 -0.075 -0.013
sizet−1 (0.046) (0.049) (0.066) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049)
log price trend -0.011
(0.021)
∆ log vacancy ratet -0.021***
(0.006)
log vacancy ratet−1 -0.022***
(0.010)
log listed building density 1E-4
(0.004)
aver. condition score -0.070***
(1 best, 4 worst) (0.019)
aver. vulnerability score -0.045***
(1 low, 8 high) (0.017)
aver. trajectory score (-2 im- 0.043
proving, +2 deteriorating) (0.036)69
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∆ log degree sharet× -0.201***
homeownershipt−1 (0.085)
Constant 0.013 0.052 0.231* 0.018 0.039 0.096**
(0.046) (0.048) (0.119) (0.067) (0.065) (0.051)
TTWA Effects No No Yes No No No
Chi2 350.753 634.960 368.036 475.892 354.198
ExogP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overid 0.017 0.100 0.073 0.009
OveridP 0.897 0.752 0.787 0.926
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965
Notes: ∆ log non designation sharet denotes the share of non designated land as defined by (4.23). See the data section
for a description of control variables. IVs are station density and employment potential in all models except model (1).
Model (4) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be computed due to insufficient
transactions. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects in (3). *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
Chi2 is the model Wald χ2 statistic, ExogP the p-value of the Wald exogeneity test, Overid (OveridP) denotes the test
of overidentifying restrictions and its p-value.
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Further robustness
Our IVs comfortably pass the typical statistical tests. They are overidentified, i.e. the instru-
ments are jointly valid assuming that at least one instrument is exogenous, and relevant in terms
of prediction power (see first stages in Table B.5 on page 157). We have also experimented with
four alternative sets of IVs. We have moreover split up the 1991–2011 long difference into two
shorter differences (1991–2001 and 2001–2011), used the change in income as a proxy for herit-
age preferences (for 2001–2011) and run the baseline model in OLS keeping only observations
with positive changes in shares of designated land. The results are presented in the appendix
(Section B.4) and support those discussed here.
4.5.2. Pareto optimality
Difference-in-Differences
Table 4.2 on page 73 shows the results from an estimation of the standard DD equation (4.26)
for different selections of control groups and fixed effects. Each model includes controls for
property, location, and neighbourhood characteristics, year effects and location fixed effects to
hold unobserved time-invariant effects constant. Column (1) is a naïve DD using the mean
price trend of all properties located beyond 500 m of a treated conservation area as a coun-
terfactual. Columns (2) to (7) provide more credible counterfactuals by restricting the control
group to properties that are presumably similar to the treated properties. Column (2), with
ward fixed effects, and (3), with nearest CA fixed effects, provide a spatial matching by restrict-
ing the sample to properties within 2 km of a treated CA, where many unobserved location
characteristics are likely to be similar. In column (4) we impose the additional restriction that
properties in the control group must fall within 500 m of the boundaries of a historically des-
ignated conservation area (before 1996), which increases the likelihood of unobserved property
characteristics being similar. While areas that are designated at any point in time are likely
to share many similarities, the diminishing returns to designation in our theoretical framework
also imply that heritage-richer areas should generally be designated first. To evaluate whether
the designation date of the treated conservation areas, relative to those on the control group,
influences the DD estimate, we define CA designated 1996–2002 as a treatment group and form
control groups based on CAs designated just before (1987–1994) or right after (2003–2010) in
columns (5) and (6). In column (7), finally, we use environmental, property and neighbour-
hood characteristics to estimate the propensity of being in a treated (1996–2010) CA over a
historical (<1996) CA. Then the treated CAs are matched to their ‘nearest-neighbour’, i.e. the
most similar non-treated CA, based on the estimated propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983). A fixed effect is defined for each treated CA and its nearest-neighbour control CA such
that the treatment effect is estimated by the direct comparison between the treated CA and
its nearest-neighbour.
We anticipate that the strength of the counterfactual increases as we match the treatment and
control group based on proximity (2 and 3), proximity and qualifying for designation (4, 5 and
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6) and qualifying for designation and a combination of various observable characteristics (7).
As the credibility of the counterfactual increases, the statistical significance of the treatment
effect tends to decrease. Benchmarked against the nationwide property price trend both the
internal effect (Inside × Post) and the external effect (Within 500 m × Post) are significant at
the 5% level. The magnitudes of these effects are of similar size, implying a 2.8% premium for
houses inside newly designated conservation areas and a 2.3% premium outside. The spatial
matching (2 and 3) renders the internal treatment effect insignificant (2 and 3). With further
refinements in the matching procedure the external effect also becomes insignificant. Table 4.2
results, thus, suggest that designation does not lead to significant property price adjustments.
Evidence is weak for positive (policy) spillovers to nearby areas.
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Table 4.2.: Conservation area premium – designation effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log property transaction price
Inside treated CA × 0.028*** 0.014 0.014 0.003 -0.024 -0.077 -0.003
Post designation (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.070) (0.111) (0.015)
Within 500 m buffer of 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.012 -0.005 -0.005
treated CA × Post des. (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.027) (0.022) (0.010)
Inside treated CA -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.062 0.029 -0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.057) (0.108) (0.021)
Within 500 m buffer of -0.010** -0.004 -0.011** -0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.002
treated CA (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.030) (0.023) (0.013)
Hedonic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward effects Yes Yes No No No No No
Nearest treated CA effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Matched CA effects No No No No No No Yes
Treatment group: 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2010
CAs designated
Control group Full England Within 2 km Within 2 km Within 500 m Within 500 m Within 500 m Within 500 m
sample of treated CA of treated CA of CA des- of CA des- of CA des- of pre-1996
ignated before ignated before ignated before CA matched
1996 & within 1987-95 & 2003-10 & on propen-
2 km of treated within 2 km of within 2 km of sity score
CA treated CA treated CA
R2 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909
AIC -587375 -156426 -130469 -67046 -5409 -8476 -41184
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 178k 21k 32k 133k
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects
for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Temporal RDD-DD
Table 4.3 on page 76 illustrates the results of the estimation of the (temporal) RDD-DD outlined
in equation (4.27). We present the results of a variety of models that feature linear (1–5)
and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control groups utilized in Table 4.3. One
important finding across these specifications is that the external (Within 500m × Post) ‘dis-in-
diff’ parameter estimate is significant in four of 10 specifications at the 5% level and in one half
of the specifications at the 10% level, whereas, the internal (Inside × Post) parameter is only
significant in one specification at the 10% level (column 8). This suggests primarily that there
exists a significant treatment effect exactly at the treatment date only for the external area.
This interpretation is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. Another finding
illustrated by Table 4.3 is the positive change in the internal price trend after a CA has been
designated (Inside treated CA × Post designation × Years designated). The change in trend,
which is significant at the 5% level in seven of the 10 models, may be regarded as evidence
for a cumulative internal effect of the designation policy. There is also a faster appreciation
in the external area post-designation that is significant in four of the 10 models. In short, the
temporal RDD-DD has confirmed that designation policy causes no immediate effect inside
the conservation area but shows instead that it increases the speed of price appreciation over
time. The RDD-DD has also uncovered that areas external to the conservation area receive an
immediate shift in prices at the designation date in line with our theoretical hypothesis.
Figure 4.2 on page 77 provides a graphical illustration of the predicted effect of being in the
treatment group over the control group against years-since-designation. A horizontal red line is
drawn at the mean of the pre-treatment effects in order to illustrate the differences between the
RDD-DD results and those of the standard DD. The positive impact of designation on (relative)
price trends suggested by the RDD-DD (black lines) is supported by the functionally more
flexible semi-parametric estimates for the ‘years-since-designation bins’ (grey dots).9 However,
the post-treatment effects are never statistically distinguished from the pre-period mean, which
is in line with the DD estimates.
Figure 4.3 on page 78 provides an analogical illustration for the external treatment effect,
i.e. the spillovers onto areas adjacent to the designated CAs. Again, the post-period estimates
do not deviate significantly from the pre-period mean. However, the top-left panel illustrates
a large discontinuity at the treatment date that is statistically significant in Table 4.3 on page
76. As with the internal effects, there is a positive trend shift post-designation.
9Confidence bands for the semi-parametric ‘bins’ model are presented in the appendix (Section B.5.2).
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Table 4.3.: Regression discontinuity design of differences between treatment and control (RDD-DD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log property transaction price
Inside treated CA × 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.027 -0.006 0.023 0.033 0.038* 0.036 0.020
Post designation (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Within 500m buffer of 0.006 0.013* 0.015** 0.020** -0.007 0.013 0.017** 0.022** 0.017 0.009
treated CA × Post des. (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Inside treated CA × 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007** -0.002 -0.010 -0.016* -0.019* -0.019* -0.020*
Years designated (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Inside treated CA × -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*
Years designated2 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inside treated CA × post 0.003 0.007** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008* 0.020 0.026** 0.032** 0.031** 0.031
designation × Years des. (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Inside treated CA × post 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
designation ×Years des.2 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Within 500m of treated 0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007* -0.004 -0.009
CA × Years des. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Within 500m of treated -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
CA ×Years des.2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Within 500m of treated CA × 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.011** 0.008 0.009
post des. × Years des. (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Within 500m of treated CA × 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001
post des. ×Years des.2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Hedonic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward effects Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
Nearest treated CA effects No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
Matched CA effects No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Control group as in (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (7)
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R2 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907 0.920 0.921 0.912 0.914 0.907
AIC -547688 -147818 -120160 -64425 -39321 -548078 -147839 -120191 -64467 -39329
Observation 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k 995k 277k 277k 164k 123k
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for
the areas inside and outside a conservation area. Observations dropped if years designated falls outside of range -10/+10 years. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Figure 4.2.: RDD-DD internal estimates
(a) Nearest treated CA (linear trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (4)
(b) Matched CA (linear trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (5)
(c) Nearest treated CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (9)
(d) Matched CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (10)
Note: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table 4.3 on page 76
and estimated using equation (4.27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using standard
errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken et al. (1991). The grey dots plot the point estimates
of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate regression described and presented in more detail
in the appendix (Section B.5.2). The horizontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.
Spatial RDD-DD
Table 4.4 on page 80 shows the results of the estimation of the (spatial) RDD-DD model
outlined in equation (4.28). As with the temporal RDD-DD, we present the results of a variety
of models that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control
groups utilized in Table 4.2. One interesting and consistent feature of Table 4.4 is that the
positive dis-continuity coefficient (Outside × Post) matches the expected (positive) sign under
the existence of a policy cost inside. However, the parameter is statistically insignificant in all
models.
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Figure 4.3.: RDD-DD external estimates
(a) Pre-1996 CA within 2 km (linear trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (4)
(b) Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (5)
(c) Pre-1996 CA within 2 km (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (9)
(d) Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.3, column (10)
Note: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table 4.3 on page 76
and estimated using equation (4.27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using standard
errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented Aiken et al. (1991). The grey dots plot the point estimates
of ‘years-since-designation bins’ effects obtained from separate regression described and presented in more detail
in the appendix (Section B.5.2). The horizontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.
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Table 4.4.: Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log property transaction price
Within 1.4km of treat. 0.027*** 0.014 0.012 0.008 -0.003 0.026** 0.014 0.012 0.008 -0.005
CA × post des. (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Within 1.4km of treat. CA × -0.057 -0.032 -0.030 -0.029 -0.070 -0.096 -0.046 -0.040 -0.040 -0.118
dist. to boundary × post des. (0.081) (0.075) (0.080) (0.077) (0.068) (0.156) (0.154) (0.162) (0.157) (0.143)
Within 1.4km of treat. CA × -0.059 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.099
dist. to boundary2× post des. (0.132) (0.131) (0.140) (0.136) (0.130)
Outside treated CA × 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.016
post design. (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Outside treated CA × dist. 0.039 0.016 0.013 0.011 0.046 0.064 0.014 0.013 0.004 0.080
to boundary × post des. (0.081) (0.075) (0.080) (0.078) (0.069) (0.157) (0.155) (0.163) (0.159) (0.145)
Outside treated CA × dist. 0.070 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.109
to boundary2× post des. (0.133) (0.132) (0.140) (0.136) (0.130)
Hedonic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward effects Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No
Nearest treated CA effects No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
Matched CA effects No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Control group Full Eng- Within Within Within Within Full Eng- Within Within Within Within
land 2 km of 2 km of 1.4 km of 1.4 km land 2 km of 2 km of 1.4 km of 1.4 km
sample treated treated CA de- pre-1996 sample treated treated CA de- pre-1996
CA CA signated CA CA CA signated CA
before matched before matched
1996 & on pro- 1996 & on pro-
within pensity within pensity
2km of score 2km of score
treaded treaded
CA CA79
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R2 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.905 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.914 0.921
AIC -587538 -156448 -130478 -118076 -101076 -587533 -156444 -130478 -118074 -587538
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 281k 327k 1,088k 302k 302k 281k 327k
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Figure 4.4.: RDD-DD spatial treatment effects
(a) Pre-1996 CA within 2 km (linear trends)
Tab. 4.4, column (4)
(b) Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)
Tab. 4.4, column (5)
(c) Pre-1996 CA within 2 km (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.4, column (9)
(d) Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4.4, column (10)
Note: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Table 4.4 on page 80
and estimated using equation (4.28). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using standard
errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken et al. (1991).
We have argued that the model predictions for capitalization effects under a (locally) efficient
designation policy and a spatial decay in heritage externalities hold at the conservation area
boundary, i.e. we expect a zero effect just inside and a positive effect just outside the boundary.
Figure 4.4 on page 81 illustrates the joint effect of the parametric estimates reported in Table
4.4 on page 80 at varying (internal and external) distances from the CA boundary. With the
control group of historical CAs within 2 km of the treatment CA (left panels) we find a positive
capitalization effect just inside and outside the boundary, which is in line with the baseline DD
result in Table 4.2 on page 73, column (4). Moreover, the treatment effect increases toward
the centre for the CA and decreases in external distance to the boundary until it becomes
zero at around 700 m. This distance is in line with existing evidence on a relatively steep
decay in heritage and housing externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010b; Lazrak et al., 2013;
Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010). However, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero at
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almost all distances. The single exception is a significant (at 5% level) 1.6% effect just outside
the CA in the quadratic model. While the effect is only significant within 100 m of the CA,
this is precisely where we expect a positive effect in a world with spatial decay in heritage
(housing) externalities. In the context of the model the lower and not statistically significant
effect just inside the CA indicates the presence of a cost that compensates for some of the
benefits associated with designation.
With the control group of matched CAs (right panels) the treatment effect just inside the
CA boundary is remarkably close to zero. The joint effect just outside the boundary is positive,
although not statistically significant. Briefly summarized, the spatial RDD-DD model suggests
that across the treated CAs owners - at least on average - are not harmed by designation. There
is some evidence that owners just outside a conservation area receive some benefit.
4.6. Summary
Historic preservation policies are among the most restrictive planning policies used to overcome
coordination problems in the housing market internationally. These policies aim at increasing
social welfare at the cost of constraining individual property rights. From the perspective of
owners of properties in conservation areas, the policy may help to solve a collective action
problem, preventing owners from free riding on the heritage character of nearby buildings while
inappropriately altering their own property. If property owners value the heritage character of
nearby buildings and can influence the designation process they will seek out a (local) level of
designation where the marginal costs of designation equate the marginal benefits. An increase
in the marginal benefit of designation will lead to an increase in designation activity. If the
policy is Pareto-efficient, additional designations in a neighbourhood will not lead to an adverse
impact on those being designated.
We provide evidence that is supportive of this scenario using two empirical approaches that
follow from a simple model of (locally) efficient conservation area designation. First, we present
a neighbourhood level IV tobit analysis that reveals a positive impact of an increase in degree
share, which is presumably (positively) correlated with heritage preferences, on the share of
designated land. Gentrification, by increasing the value of neighbourhood stability to local own-
ers, can cause designation. Second, we combine the strengths of difference-in-differences (DD)
and regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to estimate the capitalization effect of designation
on newly designated areas as well as spillovers to adjacent areas. This RDD-DD methodology
qualifies more generally as a useful tool for program evaluations where a treatment is suspec-
ted to lead to an impact on (spatial or temporal) trends and discontinuities. Within newly
designated conservation areas we find no significant short-run effects of designation and some
evidence for positive capitalization effects in the long run. There is some evidence for positive
spillovers onto properties just outside.
These results are in line with a Pareto-efficient designation policy, at least from the perspect-
ive of the local owners. Either, the policy is deliberately Pareto-maximizing local owner welfare
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or, as suggested in the literature on the political economy of housing markets, homeowners are
able to successfully influence the outcome of local policies in their interest. In any case, it is
important to note that our results do not imply that the policy is necessarily welfare-enhancing
on a wider geographic scale. Depending on the excessiveness of the policy and the general
restrictiveness of the planning system, historic preservation may constrain housing supply and
generate welfare losses. The net-welfare effect to a wider housing market area is an interesting
and important question that we leave to future research.
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5.1. Motivation
As reviewed in Section 2.5, infrastructure and especially mass transit play a major role in
economics and especially in urban economics. Transport induces welfare effects due to increased
accessibility and reduced shipping costs and impacts on the location of households and firms.
Estimating the impact of transport infrastructure is, however, not entirely straightforward since
the relation between transport and economic activity is plagued by a notorious simultaneity
problem. While the view that an ease of access to other locations within a region should have a
positive impact on the attractiveness of a location is unchallenged, it is also hard to believe that
the allocation of transport is completely random. Due to the demand required to recover large
investment costs, new infrastructure is more likely to connect economically successful places.
Recent research has approached this problem by only focusing on the uni-directional effect of
transport provision, building causal inference on quasi-experimental and instrumental variable
strategies.
However, it is very difficult to address the simultaneity problem entirely with conventional
models. It is challenging to assess to which extent the reverse causation is an empirically
relevant phenomenon because instruments for this direction are particularly difficult to find.
Moreover, it is a priori unclear whether the planner responds to economic activity broadly
defined – and reflected in land values – or absolute demand from potential passengers – reflected
in population. Effectively, the relation can be described by a complex structure of various
endogenous variables whose mutual causal links are difficult to model with the standard tool
sets of causal inference. Theory offers some guidance on the potential directions and temporal
sequence of the dependencies, but ultimately fails in producing predictions that would allow
us to describe the whole dynamic process by a causal relationship of X on Y . A method
that is well established to explore the structure of mutually related endogenous variables is the
structural vector auto regression (SVAR) model. Commonly used in macroeconomics where
isolated shocks are hard to observe and models consist of many endogenous variables, VAR
models have become a well-established method to describe complex dynamic relations. The
method can be adopted to incorporate spatial information in a Panel VAR (PVAR), where the
regions form a cross-sectional dimension. This method is proposed as an informative tool to go
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beyond the state of knowledge that has been achieved in the transport economics literature on
the uni-directional effects of transport on land (or property) value.
Unfortunately, as with most applications of empirical methods, the benefits do not come
without costs. Causality in a narrow sense is an issue, and while the PVAR strength is to
model the simultaneous relationships of the most important variables conditional on each other,
it is vulnerable to variables that belong to the (unknown) full model, but are omitted from
the analysis. Also it is difficult to parameterize the strength of the (mutual) dependencies
analysed. Acknowledging the strength and weaknesses, I believe that the novel application
of the established PVAR method to a well-known estimation problem has the potential to
complement existing uni-directional causal research by providing a better picture of the general
dynamics.
In line with the macroeconomic approach, a dynamic study area is required characterised
by a battery of shocks. These criteria can typically be found in massively growing developing
countries and their metropolises. However, reliable data for a spatially fine level and a suffi-
ciently long time period is difficult to find for these cities. I therefore look into the history of a
by now developed city and employ a unique historic dataset for Berlin between 1881 and 1935
for the analysis. This period is characterised by great infrastructure projects as well as a strong
growth in population, which enables me to empirically address the research question. I try to
fill a gap of studies fully exploiting changes in the transport infrastructure, most probably due
to a scarcity of projects, as noted by Gibbons & Machin (2008). In line with Baum-Snow et al.
(2012) I argue that the analysis of public infrastructure during that time is of special interest
as the city was industrialising, economically developing and characterised by huge transport in-
vestments somehow comparable to the process developing countries experience today. Moreover
automobiles can largely be ignored as transport mode.
The analysis follows a twofold approach: Firstly, I estimate the interaction between popu-
lation and transport. Secondly, the analysis is extended by looking into the relation between
land values and transport. I separately estimate the empirical model for a core and a peripheral
sample in order to allow for potential outbidding. The estimates suggest a simultaneous relation
between transport and urban development. Planners, however, follow only economic activity
but not residents. I find evidence for an outbidding of residents due to transport innovations.
The results are proven robust to price anticipation effects.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next Section 5.2 provides a
historical overview of the Berlin transport sector. This is followed by an introduction of our
historical dataset in Section 5.3 as well as of the PVAR methodology in Section 5.4. In Section
5.5, the empirical findings of the benchmark models as well as of additional robustness tests are
reported and interpreted. Section 5.6 briefly summarizes and comments on the main findings.
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5.2. Historical background
The public rail network in Berlin is made up of two different modes, namely a rapid transit
system (“S-Bahn”) and the underground (“U-Bahn”). This section provides a brief overview
of its historical development.
5.2.1. S-Bahn
Berlin’s rapid transit system as it is known today is a result of combining various suburban
lines (“Vorortsbahn”), the original city line (“Stadtbahn”) and the circular line (“Ringbahn”)
in 1930. Therefore, there are various reasons and purposes why, where and how the S-Bahn
was developed over the years (Klünner, 1985; Gottwaldt, 1994; Kiebert, 2004, 2008).
The suburban lines connected Berlin with surrounding cities and its suburbs. Especially the
early lines originate from long-distance connections to major cities like Potsdam (“Stammbahn”
1838), Hamburg (“Hamburger Bahn” 1846) or Dresden (“Dresdner Bahn” 1887). Initially, the
long-distance lines had to share their tracks with the new upcoming suburban lines. In 1891
a new tariff system for local mass transit was introduced, pushing up the passenger numbers
by about 30% and the suburban lines increasingly started to run on their own tracks. The
majority of these lines were developed by public companies and planned by the government.
For instance, the “Ostbahn”, which was intended to go through the Prussian regions of Pom-
mern and East Prussia, was built in order to develop the periphery along the tracks. The
“Görlizer Bahn” (1866/67) or the “Wetzlarer Bahn” (also “Canon Train”), linking Berlin with
Metz at the French border, were planned by the military in order to move troops more rap-
idly. Later on, new lines were directly built for local mass transit in order to improve access
from the periphery, like the North-South connection (1934-39). However, private developers
like J.A.W. Carsten, who financed the station “Lichterfelde” (1868) in order to sell his newly
established country estates in that area, intervened in the expansion of the S-Bahn network
as well. The electronics company Siemens further financially supported the exploitation of the
section between Fürstenbrunn and Siemensstadt (1905) in order to improve the commuting
situation for its workers. Moreover, Spindler Brothers, who ran a laundry and drying factory
in Köpenick at the Eastern border of the city, were strongly in favour of building a transport
line between Schöneweide and Spindlersfelde (1891). Hence, the suburban lines were driven by
both public and private interests.
The city line went from Stralau-Rummelsburg to Westkreuz, Halensee and was built in 1882.
This East-West connection running through the historical city centre was planned to decongest
the traffic between Berlin’s terminal stations. The tracks were mainly built on land owned by
the government and the project was carried out publicly.
The first sections of the circular line Moabit-Gesundbrunnen-Potsdamer-Ringbahnhof and
Moabit-Charlottenburg-(Westend)-Grunewald-Tempelhof were opened in 1881, and 1882 re-
spectively. The circular line was financed by the state of Prussia but run by the Niederschlesisch-
Märkische Eisenbahn, a public company owned by Prussia. The idea behind the circular line
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was to connect radian lines extending from the centre with each other and the important ter-
minal stations. Various parts of the new line were built on undeveloped land and thus outside
the city border. Or, as Elkins & Hofmeister (1988) state: “The actual position of the ring
line was a compromise between the desire to maximise utilization by being as close as possible
to the core of the city and the desire to minimize land-acquisition costs by avoiding areas of
existing urban development” (p. 114).
Like the circular line, many other lines of the light rail system were extended into undeveloped
areas, connecting Berlin with other villages. Only the East-West and North-South connections
went through the city centre. New villages were founded close to the new lines, such as “Gli-
enicke an der Nordbahn”. Companies like AEG or Borsigwerke in Tegel built new factories in
close proximity to the new stations (e.g. “Kremmener Bahn”). Even though a few rapid transit
lines were developed at the request of the private sector, most of the lines were developed by the
public sector. In the 1880s the majority of the long-distance lines, which were closely related to
the rise of the suburban lines, were nationalised. However, most of the nationalised lines were
still run independently. They had their own management as well as their own trains/coaches.
From 1920 on, all lines were eventually nationalised under the “Reichseisenbahn”.
5.2.2. U-Bahn
The underground was developed about a third of a century later than the rapid transit system.
The first line was opened in 1902 and went from Stralauer Tor (later Warschauer Brücke) to
Potsdamer Platz and then to Zoo. The first underground was constructed on elevated tracks
since the Berlin government was afraid of damaging its newly installed drainage system. The
project was pushed forward by the company “Siemens & Halske”, which as far back as 1891
proposed a densely linked network, connecting the historic city centre to its surrounding mu-
nicipalities. The new line was eventually developed by the “Hochbahngesellschaft” a company
jointly founded by Siemens & Halske and Deutsche Bank as the main funder. While the line’s
Eastern section to Nollendorf Platz was built on viaducts, the city of Charlottenburg success-
fully negotiated the tracks to run under ground when passing though its territory. Not obscuring
the view of the prominent church “Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche” was one of Charlotten-
burg’s reasons for the changed routing. In the West (Westend), the line was extended into an
undeveloped area where Deutsche Bank owned land. Driven by financial speculations the bank
was expecting rising land rents due to improved access. As a result of the newly established
connection, Western Charlottenburg turned into an attractive business area. The extension
of the first underground line leading into central Berlin was initially hampered by the tram
operator “Große-Berliner-Straßenbahn” being afraid of losing its monopolistic role in that area.
Despite the concerns, the line eventually went via Mohrenstraße and Spittelmarkt through the
city centre (Gottwaldt, 1994).
Especially the municipalities in the South West had great interest in developing their un-
developed land. They competed for wealthy citizens by turning it into attractive residen-
tial areas. The underground played a crucial role in developing these areas. The city of
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Schöneberg (“Schöneberger Linie” 1910) even planned and financed its own line between Nol-
lendorfplatz and Hauptstraße (today Innsbrucker Platz) in order to develop its Western ter-
ritory. As the “Hochbahngesellschaft” did not expect any profits from the new line it was
completely planned as a public enterprise. The area through which Schöneberger Linie ran
changed significantly. Individually designed stations were built at prominent squares. A sim-
ilar approach was followed by the villages of Wilmersdorf and Dahlem. Newly planned country
estates and academic institutes were supposed to benefit from improved access by construct-
ing the “Wilmersdorf-Dahlemer U-Bahn” (1913). The line was divided into three sections
regarding ownership: While the section between Wittenbergplatz and Nürnberger Platz be-
longed to the Hochbahngesellschaft, Nürnberger Platz-Breitenbachplatz was owned by the city
of Wilmersdorf and Breitenbachpatz-Thielplatz by Domäne Dahlem. The line was extended to
the lake “Krumme Lanke” in 1929. This extension was mainly financed by the land speculator
and private developer Adolf Sommerfeld in order to connect his newly established residential
quarters in Dahlem. Moreover, he wanted to improve the access to the surrounding woods,
establishing them as recreational areas (Kurpjuweit & Meyer-Kronthaler, 2009).
In contrast to the S-Bahn network, Berlin’s underground was intended to serve local mass
transit from the beginning. The lines were extended into more central areas. Moreover, the net-
work was developed later than the rapid transit system; the technology was superior, allowing
for an underground system, and planners as well as investors had already gained experience by
evaluating the effects of the S-Bahn. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rise of the U-Bahn
was mainly driven by the idea of developing new land in close proximity to the historical core
(especially in the South West). Public as well as private planners competed for wealthy citizens
and increasing land rents.
Summing up, even though the link between transport and land development is not completely
clear when analysing the history of Berlin’s transport system, the majority of the projects and
newly constructed lines seemed to lead the development in an area and not the other way
around.
5.3. Data
This section provides a brief overview of the historic data used in the main analysis. The
data differ in time as well as in spatial coverage and level of detail. Since spatial aggrega-
tion/disaggregation might result in a loss of information or biased estimates (modifiable area
unit problem, MAUP) I decided to work with distinct panels. I end up with three samples:
(i) I estimate the interaction between transport and population at a municipality (“Ortsteile”)
level of 93 municipalities using data for every five years from 1870 to 1935 (14 time periods),
(ii) the relation between transport and land values is estimated on a block level covering 2,481
blocks of an inner sample of historical land value maps between 1881 and 1914 (7 time periods),
as well as on (iii) a grid square level (length of 150 m, 12,596 grid squares) making use of the
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full extent of the historical sources which are further explained in the next paragraphs (see also
Table 5.1 on page 90).1
Table 5.1.: Twofold approach - three samples
Panel Development indicator Unit of analysis Spatial coverage Time period
1 Population Municipality Gross Berlin 1870-1935
2 Land values Historical city block Inner Müller sample 1881-1914
3 Land values Grid (150 m) Müller sample 1881-1914
Table 5.2.: Number of stations
Year S-Bahn U-Bahn Total
1870 18 0 18
1875 31 0 31
1880 55 0 55
1885 64 0 64
1890 65 0 65
1895 88 0 88
1900 96 0 96
1905 103 15 118
1910 109 28 137
1915 109 46 155
1920 112 46 158
1925 113 60 173
1930 120 94 214
1935 127 94 221
To compute rail densities, the historic transport network of Berlin has been reconstructed
for the entire observation period (1870-1935/36) in a geographic information system (GIS)
environment (Schomacker, 2009; Mauruszat, 2010; Straschewski, 2011). Similar to Levinson
(2008) and in line with the density measures used in the previous analyses, station densities for
the combined network are computed using a kernel with a radius of 2 km (Silverman, 1986).
By choosing this radius I follow Gibbons & Machin (2005) who estimate a distance of 2 km
as the maximum distance people are willing to walk to the nearest station. By definition, the
density measure reflects the degree of network concentration. It is high in areas which are
characterised by a high number of stations in close distance, and low vice versa. The measure
does not, however, incorporate the number of lines which run through a station, the travel
time/speed and the frequency for which I do not have data for either. I compute a joint station
density since the two rail systems cannot be regarded as substitutes for each other: The rapid
1To address any concerns regarding the modifiable area unit problem, the grid sample approach has additionally
been carried out for a 300 m grid sample (Appendix Section C.2).
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Figure 5.1.: Combined rail network in 1870, 1900 and 1935
Notes: The lines indicate the combined rail network, i.e. the rapid transit system and the underground lines
that were added up to each respective year.
transit system was developed earlier and originates from inter-city connections. Conversely,
the underground was built as public transport mode from the very beginning and runs through
more central areas.
Figure 5.1 on page 91 and Figure 5.2 on page 92 provide an overview of the development of
the total rail network during the observation period. In 1870, there existed only seven lines
connecting surrounding cities with Berlin, whereby each line had its own terminus station. The
lines did not reach the very centre of the city and only a few stations were built along the tracks.
Turning to 1935, one can observe a massive development of the transport network. By that
time, the circular line as well as the East-West and North-South connections were merged with
the suburban lines. From 1902 onwards, underground tracks were added to the rail network.
One can also observe the strong growth in accessibility of the South West up to 1935. The total
number of stations increased from 18 in 1870 to 221 in 1935 (see also Table 5.2 on page 90).
The population data for Berlin refer to 93 municipalities (“Ortsteile”) as they were structured
in 1935. The data were collected from the Statistical Yearbook of Berlin (Statistisches Amt
der Stadt Berlin, 1920) and Leyden (1933) and aggregated to the municipality level. The
observation area covers the entire Greater Berlin. Between 1870 and 1935 population grew
strongly from more than 900,000 up to about 4,200,000 inhabitants. Figure 5.3 on page 93
illustrates the population density over the observation period. Apart from a general increase
for the whole of Berlin, a slight decentralisation pattern becomes visible.
The technician Gustav Müller (1881-1914) produced maps of land values at the plot level for
Berlin between 1881 and 1914. The historical maps were georeferenced in a GIS environment
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Figure 5.2.: Rail station density on municipality level
(a) 1870 (b) 1890
(c) 1910 (d) 1935
(e) Legend
Notes: Station densities were computed using a kernel radius of 2 km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman,
1986).
and land values were extracted for seven time periods at a plot level.2 The values were aggreg-
ated at the 1910 block level for inner Berlin. Figure 5.4 on page 94 illustrates the development
of the land values in Reichsmark between 1890 and 1914. I additionally aggregated the com-
plete coverage of the historical maps at a grid square level, where each grid square has a length
of 150 m, i.e. an area of 0.0225 square km (Figure 5.5 on page 96). There are several rather
technical advantages of using grid squares. First of all, they do not imply a density bias. That
means if for instance an area was made up of a high number of smaller blocks, this specific
2The land value data were extracted for 1881, 1890, 1896, 1900, 1904, 1910 and 1914. Data for 1885 are
unfortunately not available.
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Figure 5.3.: Population density on municipality level
(a) 1870 (b) 1890
(c) 1910 (d) 1935
(e) Legend
Notes: Population are extracted from Statistisches Amt der Stadt Berlin (1920) and Leyden (1933).
area would be weighted more strongly in the econometric analysis due to the higher number
of observations. Furthermore, the grid approach yields a balanced panel over space and time.
However, one cannot deny the fact that grids provide only an abstract picture of reality. One
also needs to pay attention to not generating too many artificial observations when creating
the variables/distributing the available spatial information on the grid squares. The size of the
grid squares is chosen to represent an average sized housing block. The Müller maps were used
previously by Ahlfeldt & Wendland (2011); Ahlfeldt et al. (2011); Ahlfeldt & Wendland (2013).
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Figure 5.4.: Land values on block level in 1890 and 1914
(a) 1890 (b) Legend
(c) 1914
Notes: Land values (in Reichsmark) were extracted from Müller (1881-1914).
In the analysis, I distinguish between a core and peripheral region to capture the presumably
distinct behaviour of economic agents in the city. The idea is explained in greater detail in the
next section. I follow the definition of “Berlin City” introduced by Leyden (1933) to determine
the boundaries of the core.3
Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 provide the summary statistics for the different samples.
Table 5.3.: Municipality sample summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
railDens overall 0.211 0.354 0 1.995 N=1302
between 0.268 0 0.834 n=93
within 0.233 -0.503 1.372 T=14
3Throughout this and throughout the next chapter the terms core and CBD are used synonymously.
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population overall 29743.77 56296.1 0 354.684 N=1302
between 47686.4 0 216.328.3 n=93
within 30298.21 -146107.2 221449.6 T=14
Table 5.4.: Block sample summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
railDens overall 0.389 0.247 0 1.248 N=15034
between 0.145 0 0.735 n=2486
within 0.207 -0.209 1.096 T=6.047
land value overall 159.523 239.052 0 2348 N=15034
between 199.025 0 1502.143 n=2486
within 117.688 -1043.33 1522.384 T=6.047
Table 5.5.: Grid (150m) sample summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
railDens overall 0.219 0.251 0 1.769 N=88172
between 0.193 0 0.856 n=12596
within 0.160 -0.529 1.272 T=7
land value overall 81.839 159.151 1 2180 N=52254
between 118.221 1 1665.429 n=12596
within 65.084 -1103.589 1335.422 T=4.15
5.4. Methodology
Panel vector autoregression is an adaption of the vector autoregression (VAR) methodology
(Sims, 1980). A VAR model consists of a system of equations which are estimated simultan-
eously. Each variable in this system is explained by its own lags and lagged values of the other
variables (Gravier-Rymaszewska, 2012). VARs have become very popular in applied empirical
research mainly because they treat all variables as being endogenous and independent and allow
for a simultaneous determination. Causality is allowed to run in any direction, from transport
to urban development and from urban development to transport infrastructure (Drakos & Kon-
stantinou, 2011). Since the observation period does not allow for any identification relying on
the idea of natural experiments but is characterised by a battery of shocks - such as in a more
macroeconomic set-up - the PVAR approach allows for setting up a model with only a small
set of assumptions in order to interpret the impact of transport/development shocks.
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Figure 5.5.: Land values on grid level (in Reichsmark) in 1890 and 1914
(a) 1890
(b) 1914
Notes: Land values (in Reichsmark) were extracted from Müller (1881-1914).
The panel VAR incorporates spatial information by using municipalities as a cross-sectional
dimension. Exploiting rich panel data sets, PVARs extend the standard VARs model by al-
lowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Even short panels improve asymptotic results
as the sampling properties do not depend on the number of time-series observations but on
cross-sectional observations (Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1999).
96
5.4. Methodology
PVARs are still more popular in macro- than in microeconomic research. They have for in-
stance been applied in analyses of monetary policy and investment behaviour (Love & Zicchino,
2006; Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach, 2008), the supply of development aid (Osei et al., 2005;
M’Amanja & Morrissey, 2006; Gillanders, 2011; Gravier-Rymaszewska, 2012) or security eco-
nomics (Drakos & Konstantinou, 2011). An extensive overview of PVAR models used in mac-
roeconomics and finance is provided by Canova & Ciccarelli (2013). In urban economics PVARs
are not yet in common use. Exceptions are Miller & Peng (2006) who look, for example, into
US housing price volatility as well as C.-I. Lee (2007), who investigates the question of whether
the provision of public rental housing crowds out private investment. However, to the author’s
knowledge this is the first work applying PVAR techniques in an intra-urban context.
Building on Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Canova & Ciccarelli (2004) the PVAR is specified
as follows:
yi,t = A0ai,t +M1yi,t−1 + ...+Mpyi,t−p + ui,t,
(i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T )
(5.1)
ui,t = µi + vt + εi,t (5.2)
where yi,t is a κx1 vector of κ panel data variables, the M ’s are κxκ coefficient matrices of the
lagged variables yi,t, p denotes the number of lags and ai,t is a vector of deterministic terms
(linear trend, dummy or a constant) with the associated parameter matrix A0. The unobserved
individual effect µi, the time fixed effect vt and the disturbance term εi,t jointly compose the
error process ut. It is assumed that ut has zero mean, i.e. E(ut) = 0, independent ut’s and a
time invariant covariance matrix. As the panels are rather short (due to the availability of the
historic data) lag length p is a priori determined to be one.
I begin by estimating the reduced form VARs using system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
Writing the reduced form as a system of single equations gives the following equations: For the
municipality sample equations (5.3) and (5.4) and for the block/grid samples equations (5.5)
and (5.6) where the error process is defined as above:
Ri,t = δ1 + β11Popi,t−1 + β12Ri,t−1 + u1i,t (5.3)
Popi,t = δ2 + β21Popi,t−1 + β22Ri,t−1 + u2i,t (5.4)
Rj,t = ϑ1 + α11LVj,t−1 + α12Rj,t−1 + u1j,t (5.5)
LVj,t = ϑ2 + α21LVj,t−1 + α22Rj,t−1 + u2j,t (5.6)
with Ri,t denoting rail station density in municipality i (statistical block/grid square j) at time
t, Pop population and LV land values.
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After having estimated the unknown parameters of the reduced form and computed the
moving average representation of the VAR model (Wold decomposition), the impulse response
functions (IRF) can be derived. The IRFs indicate how a variable reacts to a unit innovation
in the disturbance term in period t holding all shocks constant. In particular, I am interested
in the reaction of urban development to transport shocks and vice versa. The importance of
that particular shock is determined by decomposing the variance. However, the IRFs do not
allow for a structural interpretation since the models have not been identified. The variables
only respond to the reduced form disturbances but not to the structural innovations. One
therefore needs to isolate the shocks in the IRF by orthogonalising the residuals. The identifying
restriction imposes a recursive ordering of causality (Choleski decomposition): The earlier a
variable appears in the system the more exogenous it presumably is.
I adopt the identifying restriction (recursive order) by assuming that (i) transport is not
affected by a contemporaneous population shock, whereas population is subject to contempor-
aneous rail shocks, and for the secondary set of panels that (ii) transport is not affected by a
contemporaneous shock in land values, whereas land values responds to contemporaneous rail
shocks. The idea is that new stations are subject to physical constraints/“time-to-build effects”
(Love & Zicchino, 2006; Kilian, 2011) and do no instantly respond to population or land value
shocks. There might also be information delays (Inoue et al., 2009) which impose a reaction
time of one period in the system. In contrast, population and land values are assumed to react
instantaneously to contemporaneous transport shocks. Assuming that markets incorporate all
realizations of relevant outcomes (weak form efficient market hypothesis), prices in particular
are expected to adjust immediately to transport shocks. Moreover, the construction of new
lines is usually made public in advance so that residents/firms have time to adjust their loc-
ation according to their preference for accessibility. A stricter interpretation of the (strong)
efficient market hypothesis would even imply that prices adjust directly after the construction
of a new line has been announced. Investors anticipate a future rise in land values and the
values increase even before the station has officially been inaugurated. To control for anticip-
ation effects I re-estimate the model using announced station density instead of actual station
density.
The estimation model controls for individual heterogeneity by including individual fixed ef-
fects µi. Applying standard mean-differencing procedures, however, generates biased estimates.
This is because the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to the auto-correlated
dependent variables (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998).
I therefore use forward-mean-differencing (also Helmert transformation) to eliminate the fixed
effects. This way it is possible to remove the mean of all future observations available for
each municipality/block-time pair.4 The Helmert transformation preserves the orthogonality
between the variables and their lags which is essential for the use of lags as instruments in the
system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995).5 I time-demean the series by subtracting
4See also Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1999), p. 257 f. for details.
5I adopt the Stata routines pvar and helm by Inessa Love who developed the programs for her paper Love
& Zicchino (2006). The original programs are available at http://go.worldbank.org/E96NEWM7L0.
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the mean of each variable computed for each spatial unit-year pair. This final transformation
controls for time fixed effects ϑt. The PVAR is estimated in logs. Since I look at the relative
effects (log differences), it does not matter whether population enters in levels or densities.
The analysis of the impulse response functions requires an estimate of their confidence bands.
Standard errors for the IRFs are obtained by Monte Carlo simulations: I generate random draws
of the VAR coefficients and recalculate the impulse responses using the estimated covariance
matrix of the errors and the estimated coefficients. Repeating this procedure several times
allows for the generation of 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution. These percentiles are
then used as confidence intervals for the IRFs (Love & Zicchino, 2006).
The empirical analysis follows a twofold approach: Firstly, I look into the interaction between
population and transport, secondly between land values and transport. However, this approach
only explains how people/land values react to changes in the transport network. These results
would hardly allow us to derive any adjustments in the actual land use pattern, i.e. it is not
possible to draw any insights on how firms react and whether, for instance, an outbidding
of residents occurs. Since I am unfortunately not in the possession of historic firm data, an
alternative strategy is required. I distinguish between a core region and the periphery as defined
by Leyden (1933) and estimate the model for the two spatial samples separately. Assuming
that businesses strongly depend on agglomeration economies in order to use land productively,
they will pay a higher price for land than residents would do. They are therefore expected to
outbid residents in the core who face a trade-off between commuting and space consumption.
Overall, residents value centrality not as much as firms do, use land less productively and are
thus only able and willing to pay a lower price. Therefore the relationship between land rents
and transport development indicates how intense land is actually used. This argument could
also work in a reverse way (simultaneity).
Panel VAR estimations require stationary variables since non-stationary data lead to incon-
sistent estimates. There are a number of unit root tests, like Levin et al. (2002); Im et al.
(2003) etc., which test for stationarity. However, most of these tests are designed for long
macroeconomic panels whereas this dataset is a rather short microeconomic one (N large, T
small). I therefore apply a modified Fisher type test which combines the test results of testing
each panel individually for a unit-root based on a Philipps-Perron test. As suggested by Choi
(2001) for a large number of cross-sectional observations, I use the modified version of the
inverse χ2 transformation in order to test the null hypothesis of all panels having a unit root.
All aforementioned tests are first generation tests which assume cross-sectional independence,
i.e. being independently and identically distributed across individuals. But particularly when
working with spatial data this assumption is likely to be violated. Ignoring the problem of
cross-sectional dependence could result in biased test statistics. I therefore additionally ap-
ply the second generation Pesaran (2007) test, which allows for some form of cross-sectional
dependence.
Unit root test as well as regression results are reported and discussed in the next section.
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5.5. Empirical results
5.5.1. Main results
The analysis begins with the unit root tests. The test results are given by Table 5.6 on page
100. I run the individual unit root tests of the modified Fisher type test as Philipps-Perron test
(Phillips & Perron, 1988). The inverse χ2 transformed test statistic (Choi, 2001) rejects the
null hypothesis of all panels being non-stationary at a significance level of 1%. Hence, assuming
cross-section independence the tests yield stationary series.
The Pesaran (2007) unit root test, to control for potential cross-section dependence, rejects
the null hypothesis of the series being non-stationary, I(1), for population and rail station
density of the municipality-level dataset at a 1% level. Unfortunately, the land value samples
are too short to perform a Pesaran unit root test. However, according to Sarafidis & Robertson
(2009) the bias caused by potential cross-section dependence can be reduced when the series are
time-demeaned prior to the estimation. I therefore expect the variables of the city block and
grid datasets to sufficiently fulfil the stationarity requirements, too, as the PVAR is estimated
using time-demeaned and forward-mean-differed series.
Table 5.6.: Panel unit root tests (separate samples)
Panel Variable Phillips-Perron (Choi 2001) Pesaran (2007)
1 pop test statistic 3.099*** -4.552***
p-value 0.001 0.000
railDens test statistic 87.988*** -4.646***
p-value 0.000 0.000
2 LV test statistic 197.555*** –
p-value 0.000 –
railDens test statistic 183.268*** –
p-value 0.000 –
3 LV test statistic – –
p-value – –
railDens test statistic 114.779*** –
p-value 0.000 –
Notes: (1) Variables shown are logarithmised, time-demeaned and Helmert transformed, (2) standard
error in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Interpretation is restricted to the identified impulse response functions. The reduced form
estimates are reported in the appendix (Section C.1). The IRFs are illustrated jointly with
5% confidence bands generated by Monte Carlo simulations in Figure 5.6 on page 101 for the
total sample, Figure 5.7 on page 102 for the core, and Figure 5.8 on page 103 for the periphery
subsample respectively. The top three graphs in each figure show the often investigated response
of economic activity to transport shocks which represents the rather conventional supply-side
driven perspective. Each column stands for a different panel, the municipality panel on the left
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hand side, followed by the block and grid panel (on the right hand side). The bottom graphs
illustrate the reverse transport response.
Figure 5.6.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR model and total sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
Beginning the analysis with the reaction to transport innovations for the total sample (Figure
5.6), one can observe a positive population response (top left), as well as a positive land value
response to transport shocks (for both, the block and the grid sample). A one standard deviation
increase in rail station density raises population relatively constantly over time by about 0.04
standard deviations in each period, and land values by about 0.05 respectively in the initial
periods. The cumulative response over six periods in standard deviations is about 0.3 for
the population response and between 0.08 and 0.3 for the land value response (see also the
cumulative IRF which are presented in Section C.3 in the appendix). The land value response
declines more quickly than the population one and is generally stronger for the block sample
compared to the grid sample (top right). This might be due to the fact that the historic block
samples only covers an inner sample of the city with a higher share of central areas and is
thus slightly biased by centrality. Generally, the response to transport improvement is very
much in line with expectations and the literature. Moving on to the reverse relation and the
question whether transport also follows economic activity, the bottom left IRF in Figure 5.6
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Figure 5.7.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR model and core sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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Figure 5.8.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR model and periphery sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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indicates a negative but insignificant reaction. Conversely, new infrastructure is attracted by
high-valued areas as transport reacts positively to land values (bottom middle and left). The
estimates for the block and the grid sample are, moreover, very similar. Assuming that land is
used efficiently, a positive response to land value and a negative response to population can be
interpreted as (an unconditional) positive transport reaction to commercial activity or firms.
Based on this interpretation, planners therefore do not follow residents but only firms.
To further exploit this this idea, the Berlin sample is split into two geographic subsamples for
the core and the periphery. Population now responds negatively in the core (top left in Figure
5.7) but positively in the periphery (Figure 5.8). This can be interpreted as the outbidding
of residents in central areas by firms as a results of a land use intensification triggered by the
transport shock. Land value response is positive for the block sample, with the effect being
immediate in the core and slightly lagged in the periphery. Land value response is also positive
for the grid sample estimates but only in the periphery. In the core, transport has a negative
effect on land values which is significant from period one onwards but small in magnitudes. As
for the total sample, transport planners do not follow residents, neither in the core nor in the
periphery. They are, however, attracted by economic activity expressed by high land values.
This effect is particularly strong in the core, where a one stand deviation increase in land values
raises station density by up to 0.12 stand deviations (second period) which accumulates up to
0.5 standard deviations over all six periods.
Overall, there is indeed evidence for a simultaneously determined relationship between urban
development and transport. In fact, transport planners only follow businesses but they do not
follow residents. An isolated focus on the supply-side driven relation of how transport affects
urban development hence ignores important effects. Moreover, once can observe an outbidding
of residents by businesses in response to transport shocks which is in line with traditional
models.
In a next step, the variance decompositions (Table 5.7 on page 105) try to explain what shocks
are most important in explaining a variable through time. Population hardly explains variation
in rail station density two periods (about 10 years) ahead in the total sample, whereas transport
explains about 0.6% of the population variation. Looking at the subsamples, explanation power
is much higher in the core for both models. Here, station density explains about 5.3% of
the population variation and about 0.8% in the periphery. The variance decomposition yields
significantly smaller explanation power for the reverse relation. Overall the relationship between
transport development and population is much stronger in the CBD than in the periphery.
Table 5.7.: Variance decompositions
Panel Municipality Block Grid
pop railDens LV railDens LV railDens
Total pop 0.994 0.006 LV 0.976 0.024 0.997 0.003
railDens 0.000 1.000 railDens 0.007 0.993 0.008 0.992
Core pop 0.947 0.053 LV 0.914 0.086 0.997 0.003
railDens 0.004 0.996 railDens 0.106 0.894 0.025 0.975
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Periphery pop 0.992 0.008 LV 0.978 0.022 0.996 0.004
railDens 0.000 1.000 railDens 0.008 0.992 0.012 0.988
Notes: Percent of variation in the row variable explained by column variable (2 periods ahead).
The variance decomposition of the city block sample generally yields higher variations in
terms of explanation power (also the number of observations is greater). Transport explains
about 2.4% of variation in land values two periods ahead whereas it is only 0.7% for the
reverse relation. Explanation power is significantly higher in the core again. In central areas
almost 10.6% of transport variation is explained, conversely the explanation power is 8.6%.
Interestingly, by explanation power, the relation is rather demand-side driven in the core and
rather supply-side driven in the periphery. Finally, looking at the variance decomposition of
the grid level data, variation is smaller in magnitudes but generally similar to the block sample.
The explanation power is also higher in the core again. Overall, the variance decompositions
reflect the simultaneity between transport and development.
5.5.2. Robustness
As stated earlier, one might be worried about price anticipation effects. Information might enter
the market in advance and prices adjust directly after the construction of a new line has been
announced. Investors anticipate a future rise in land values and the values increase even before
the station has been officially inaugurated. To control for anticipation effects, I re-estimate the
land value PVAR model using announced station density instead of actual station density.
The anticipation approach requires a careful collection of all announcement dates for each
station constructed during the observation period. I use the first construction year for stations
for which I do not find any information on the announcement date.6
I re-run the unit root tests for the updated land value sample. Like the other variables,
announced station density, AnRailDens, is generally stationary when being time-demeaned
and Helmert transformed (see Table 5.8 on page 106). However, only the Phillips-Perron test
consistently rejects the null hypothesis of having a unit root for all panels, but not the Pesaran
test. The following analysis, however, ignores any potential problems resulting from cross-
dependence and treats the series as being stationary, relying only on the Phillips-Perron test.
Table 5.8.: Panel unit root tests (anticiptation model)
Panel Variable Phillips-Perron (Choi 2001) Pesaran (2007)
1 AnRailDens test statistic 41.515*** -4.104***
p-value 0.000 1.000
2 AnRailDens test statistic 183.278*** –
p-value 0.000 –
6Research on the announcement dates of new stations is based on: Dudczak & Dudczak (2012); Kurpjuweit
& Meyer-Kronthaler (2009); Mauruszat (2010); Loop (2012); Luisenstädtischer Bildungsverein e.V. (2012);
Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt (2012); Straschewski (2011).
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3 AnRailDens test statistic 354.749*** –
p-value 0.000 –
Notes: (1) Variables shown are logarithmised, time-demeaned and Helmert transformed, (2) standard error
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The impulse response functions of the anticipation PVAR models are shown in Figure 5.9 on
page 107 for the total sample, Figure 5.10 on page 108 for the core and Figure 5.11 on page 109
for the periphery, the reduced VAR estimates are reported in the appendix. Using announced
station density instead of the actual construction year does not severely change the overall
findings. Most IRFs are in line with the ones reported earlier. The following interpretation
therefore only highlights major differences.
Residential response to shock is only significant in the spatial subsamples (top left graphs).
Residents negatively respond to the announcement of rail stations in the core and positively
in the periphery. The IRF of the periphery sample moreover suggest that residents do not
anticipate transport improvements. In contrast to the main models, announced station density,
i.e. forward-looking planners, do now significantly respond to shocks in population. Transport
reacts positively in the total as well as in the peripheral sample and negatively in the core one
(bottom left graphs). This supports the tendencies presumed in the main models that planners
follow economic activity in the core and, based on the magnitude of the shocks, less strongly
follow residents in the periphery.
Block samples estimates of the anticipation model are very similar to the main model estim-
ates except in core areas where announced station density’s response to land values is insignific-
ant for the anticipation model (bottom middle graph in Figure 5.10 on page 108). Estimating
the anticipation model for the grid sample yields comparable results, too. In contrast to the
main grid model, announced station density responds, however, negatively to land value shocks
(bottom right graph in Figure 5.10 on page 108).
It is important to note that the idea of this robustness exercise is to control for price anti-
cipation effects and thus motivated from a supply side driven perspective. Is there any price or
population reaction due to the announcement of constructing new stations? The reverse rela-
tion of how station announcement responds to changes in land values/population is, however,
less intuitive and mainly reported for completeness.
Overall, the anticipation models are mostly in line with our main models, rejecting any
worries that the results are driven by anticipation effects.
The variance decomposition of the price anticipation models is also mainly in line with the
standard model (Table 5.9 on page 110). However, transport explains population in the core,
as well as land values in all spatial grid samples comparably well two periods ahead, indicating
that anticipation is at work. Nonetheless anticipation effects are not strong enough to drive
our results.
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Figure 5.9.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR anticipation model and total sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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Figure 5.10.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR anticipation model and core sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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Figure 5.11.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR anticipation model and periphery sample
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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Table 5.9.: Variance decompositions (anticipation model)
Panel Municipality Block Grid
pop railDens LV railDens LV railDens
Total pop 0.999 0.001 LV 0.966 0.034 0.992 0.008
railDens 0.002 0.998 railDens 0.009 0.991 0.006 0.994
Core pop 0.865 0.135 LV 0.982 0.018 0.952 0.048
railDens 0.019 0.981 railDens 0.001 0.999 0.009 0.991
Periphery pop 0.998 0.002 LV 0.957 0.043 0.985 0.015
railDens 0.009 0.991 railDens 0.012 0.098 0.007 0.993
Notes: Percent of variation in the row variable explained by column variable (2 periods ahead).
To address any multiple areal unit problem (MAUP) concerns, the raw land value and trans-
port data have alternatively been aggregated to grid squares with a length of 300 m instead of
150 m. The reduced form estimates and the IRF are shown in the appendix (Section C.2) and
reject any MAUP concerns.
I finally control for different land use types to make up for the lack of firm data in interpreting
adjustments in the land use pattern due to transport innovations. Land use data and results
are explained and interpreted in greater detail in Section C.4. The distinction by land use is
in line with the outbidding of residents.
5.6. Summary
This chapter was intended to provide a new and purely empirical perspective on the chicken-
and-egg-problem of transport economics. It was argued that despite conventional models’
power in establishing causality, they lack of a demand side driven and hence a more complete,
simultaneous perspective. Most analyses focus only on the uni-directional supply side driven
effect of transport on an adjustment of prices and people. The reverse relation from urban
development/economic activity to the attraction of new transport links is, however, highly
understudied. Therefore, a method which is well suited to explore the structure of mutually
related endogenous variables was proposed. In particular, I run a panel VAR analysis using
municipality, block and grid level data for land values, population and rail stations. The models
were estimated for historic Berlin between 1881 and 1935, a dynamic period characterised by
a battery of shocks.
I find empirical evidence that the relation between urban development and transport is not
uni-directional but highly simultaneous. In fact, transport planners follow economic activity
in core areas but tend to ignore residential development. In line with traditional models, the
estimates suggest an outbidding of residents by firms due to transport improvements.
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Chicago – a Panel VAR analysis
6.1. Motivation
The previous chapter highlighted the important role of transport amenities for urban develop-
ment. Moreover, it was said that there is a lack of studies which incorporate the simultaneous
determination of transport facilities and economic activity. In this chapter I extend the previ-
ously carried out empirical analysis of the Berlin rail sector by applying a similar methodology
for the city of Chicago, Illinois. The motivation for this extension is two-fold: First of all, it can
be interpreted as an additional robustness test. Similar results for Chicago would back-up the
Berlin findings and could further support the applicability of the earlier Panel VAR approach.
Secondly, extending the empirical investigation to Chicago results in a unified comparative ana-
lysis of this question which provides significant benefits over individual case studies. Previous
studies into the question have all employed different methodologies and the results may differ
for this reason and not due to the fundamental processes at hand. A consistent approach would
ensure that differences in results reflect real differences in situations.
In particular, I look into the interaction between Chicago’s ‘L’ (=Elevated) train and popu-
lation for a period of 100 years, ranging from 1910 to 2010. Applying a similar PVAR approach
as in the previous chapter, also distinguishing between a core and a periphery, yields results
similar to those found for Berlin. Again, rail developers do not follow people but presumingly
economic activity. Moreover residents are driven out of core areas and move to the periphery
(outbidding).
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 provides a brief introduction to the history of
Chicago’s famous ‘L’. Section 6.3 introduces the data which will be used for the analysis carried
out in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5 sums up the insights gained from the analysis and
compares them to the results described in the previous chapter.
6.2. Historic background
Chicago was officially founded in 1833.1 Only four years later it was granted city rights and
the City of Chicago was incorporated. The former village near Fort Dearborn quickly became
1For a more comprehensive summary of the history of Chicago see Pierce (1937, 1940); Andreas (1975);
Grossman et al. (2004); Emmett (2012) and Cudahy (1982); Young (1998); Borzo (2007); Chicago“L”.org
(2013a) for the evolution of the ‘L’ in particular.
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the fastest growing city in the world. Population grew from about 4,000 in the 1830’s up to
almost 1.1 million people in 1890 (Borzo, 2007). This massive growth was accompanied by a
rapid expansion of the city border, stressing the need for mass transportation. Horse-drawn
omnibuses were introduced in 1850, horse-drawn streetcars followed in 1859. Many attempts
were made to introduce a (heavy) rapid transit line, with the first attempt failing in 1869. It
took an additional 23 years until the first rapid transit line opened in 1892 (Chicago“L”.org,
2013a). This was the birth of Chicago’s ‘L’, which got its nickname from the all-elevated
beginnings of the transport system (Chicago Transit Authority, 2013).
The first line (1892) was constructed and operated by the Chicago and South Side Rapid
Transit Railroad Company. The so-called South Side ‘L’ went from a terminal at Congress
Street to 39th Street. The route followed a straight line of 3.6 miles and ran through a com-
pletely city-owned alley. The Chicago citizens quickly adopted to the new means of intra-urban
travel and public demand required an extension of the new line. The tracks were extended to
Jackson Park, where the World’s Colombian Exposition was held during the summer of 1893.
Additional branches were opened subsequently: The Englewood Elevated Railroad Company
made the Englewood neighboorhood accessible in 1905, the Normal Park Branch was built to
serve a growing real estate development (1907), similar to the Kenwood Branch (1907) which
was characterised by a massive residential development between 1905 and 1915, when the old
housing stock was replaced by new apartment buildings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
early lines were constructed to respond to residential development, often in conjunction with
great public events like the World’s Colombian Exposition. Commuter demand is said to be
responsible for the Stock Yard Branch which opened in 1908. The line went to “Packingtown”
to transport “the vast quantity of workers to and from their south side homes” (Chicago“L”.org,
2013a). The aforementioned branches jointly made up the South Side Elevated.
The Lake Street Elevated opened for service in 1893. It initially went from 52nd Avenue to
Market & Madison. The franchise was owned by Michael C. McDonald (“King Mike”), whose
main motive for developing new branches was to make a fortune via land speculations. His
‘L’ line served many factories along the track and became an important transport mode for
workers to commute to their jobs. The Metropolitan Westside Elevated (1895) was the first
branch serving a steadily growing population in the west. It was moreover the first ‘L’ to use
electric traction technology. The franchise initially connected Franklin Street Terminal with
Garfield Park, Douglas Park and Logan Square, splitting into three lines at Marshfield Avenue.
The line was extended to Oak Park and to Garfield Park in 1913.
The early ‘L’ lines had one drawback: They did not share a joint terminal in the CBD
but all ended outside the city centre.2 The Union Loop (or just Loop) was supposed to solve
this problem by connecting the early three ‘L’ lines. The first part of the Loop opened in
1895 (Lake Street ‘L’) and the first full circuit journey around the CBD could be made in
1897. It took about 25 minutes to circle through the Union Loop’s twelve stations. Initially,
companies along the planned route needed to be persuaded since they were worried that rail
2This is similar to the origins of Berlin’s rapid transit system, which was a result of terminus stations connecting
Berlin with other major cities.
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disamenities could have a negative effect on their business. They were quickly proven wrong and
ridership numbers rose rapidly together with their market potential. The Loop provided new
opportunities to residents; the CBD was suddenly made accessible for commuting or shopping
trips.
The fourth ‘L’, the North Western Elevated, started operations in 1900. After initial prob-
lems the line connected Wilson Avenue with the Loop. By 1907 the growing Ravenswood
neighbourhood was linked to the system by a new branch line. Ridership numbers went up to
10,000 per day already within the first two months. The original four ‘L’s radiated from the
city centre via the Loop into surrounding residential neighbourhoods, industrial as well as farm
land being the backbone of Chicago’s ‘L’. But the system got further extended and in 1919 it
was possible to go from downtown Chicago to Milwaukee.
Different attempts were made over the years to unify the various ‘L’ companies. The con-
sortium Chicago Surface Lines (1913) was replaced by the Chicago Rapid Transit Company
(CRT) in 1924, which completely consolidated all ‘L’ lines. The CRT experienced the ‘L”s
historic peak in terms of rail service in the early 1930s, with 5,306 scheduled trains serving
627,157 passengers per day. The network consisted of 227 stations and a total track length
of 227.49 miles (363.98 km). However, as far back as the 1940’s Chicago’s ‘L’ faced numerous
difficulties. The CRT was no longer profitable as a private company and became public in 1945.
The newly formed Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) took over business. The Elevates Lines’
biggest problem was the increasing competition from the automobile. The CRT failed to in-
tegrate the former private (sometimes parallelly running) lines, to close down old traffic routes
or to convert them to bus operations, to adjust routes with respect to traffic-usage and to set
fares which would allow the generation of funds for reinvestments and necessary modifications.
The new CTA’s focus was on the repayment of debts and interests, which made important
re-investments difficult. However, the CTA was facing the problem that 50% of its revenue
had to originate from fare boxes. Another problem rose from the construction of the Congress
Expressway (later Eisenhower Expressway) which was the first expressway within city borders
and which provided a new and fast way of commuting into the city centre by car. The new
organisation mainly responded to the rising problems by closing down stations and lines. By
1960, about one fourth of the rapid transit system had been abandoned.
In 1964, a new project, the Skokie Swift, was supposed to revitalise the ‘L’ and deal with the
increasing car competition. The demonstration project was jointly carried out by the federal
government and the mass transit agency. The Skokie Swift’s main intention was to complement
car usage. The new line was built in proximity to the Edens Expressway, space was reserved for
Park’n’Ride as well as Kiss’n’Ride and rail stations were connected by buses. The Skokie line
was, moreover the fastest rapid transit in the world by the time. The new line was a success since
it responded to the demand for good rapid transit service in the suburbs. This “prototype” was
emulated by the Dan Ryan Line (1969), built in the centre of the new Dan Ryan Expressway,
connecting the South Side with the West Side of the city as well as the suburbs of Oak Park.
The line started on the 95th and joined the Loop at 18th Street. It facilitated the commuting of
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low-income households from the city centre to the suburbs (reverse commuting). The Kennedy
Expressway (1970) was an extension of the Milwaukee Line to Jefferson Park. In 1984, the lines
got further extended to O’Hare Airport. This was the first extension into new territory for more
than fifty years. Against the planners’ expectations not only airport workers but also airline
passengers were using the new service. The new rapid transit lead urban development and
new office parks and retail outlets located in proximity to the line.3 Despite the adjustments,
ridership significantly declined over the 1970s and CTA failed to cover operating costs. The
number of commuters strongly decreased due to the outmigration of people and jobs. In 1973,
the Regional Transit Authority was created as overseer and included representatives of the
surrounding counties. However, the CTA continued its downward trend during the 1980s.
Several raises in fares which were intended to cover the ‘L”s operating costs drove away more
riders. In the 1990s the CTA tried to reinvent itself. Changes like the reconfiguration of the
North-South and West-South Routes (1993) as well as the introduction of color instead of name
codes were supposed to make the service more attractive to customers. The Orange line was
built between the Loop and Midway Airport based on the good O’Hare experience. The new
line was inaugurated in 1993. In 1997, a private consulting company proposed further cuts via
changes in services. After its implementation, CTA was eventually able to cover its costs again.
Ridership numbers eventually increased again over the last years. In the fourth quarter of
2012, an average number of 728,800 riders were taking the ‘L’. The CTA manages America’s
third biggest heavy rail systems in terms of ridership. Only the Washington Metro Area TA
(901,300) and the MTA New York City Transit counted more passengers (8,373,100) (Dickens,
2013). Today’s ‘L’ system consists of 144 stations which are distributed over a network of
about 242.2 miles (387.52 km) of track. There are eight rapid transit routes which run elevated
above ground, in tubes and subway tunnels as well as in expressway medians (Chicago Transit
Authority, 2013).
Overall, anecdotal evidence suggests that Chicago rail developers had similar motives to
those of their counterparts in Berlin. New rapid transit lines were constructed to connect
residential areas, to provide commuting opportunities to industrial areas and for reasons of
financial speculation. In contrast to the period investigated in Berlin, this analysis covers long
periods of decline where the ‘L’ was facing strong competition with the automobile and its
expressways. However, as with Berlin, the historic review does not uncover the link between
transport and urban development and further empirical investigations will therefore be carried
out in the subsequent sections.
6.3. Data
The empirical analysis of the interaction between transport and development is based on US
census tract data for Chicago. The tract definition of 1990 is used as the baseline geography. It
has the highest number of individual census tracts (i.e. 1,352) and covers the largest geographical
3O’Hare Airport’s role as a new and important employment centre for Chicago has also been investigated and
empirically confirmed by McMillen (1996).
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area facilitating the (dis-)aggregation of the data for the other years. Overall, the panel covers
eleven time periods (every ten years) between 1910 and 2010. Transport data for the ‘L’ network
are provided by the City of Chicago (Chicago Transit Authority, 2012) and by Chicago“L”.org
(2013b). The evolution of the number of stations is illustrated by Figure 6.1 on page 115. One
can clearly see the rapid transit system’s peak in 1930/1940, as mentioned in the history review.
The number of stations drastically declines from 230 (1940) down to 135 in 1960. During the
last fifty years the number of ‘L’ stations has been roughly stable at around 150 stops.
Figure 6.1.: Number ‘L’ stations
As in the transport analysis of Berlin (Chapter 5), I compute station densities for the ‘L’
stations using a kernel with a radius of 2 km (Silverman, 1986) reflecting the maximal walking
distance (Gibbons & Machin, 2005). Figure 6.2 on page 120 provides an overview of the
development of the rail network during the observation period. The four years are chosen to
reflect the beginning and the end of the period as well as it’s bust and boom periods in terms
of the number of stations. One can clearly observe the network’s extension until 1940 followed
by it’s decline and stabilisation process.
Population data come from the National Historical Geographic Information System database
(Minnesota Population Center, 2011, NHGIS) and are depicted for a selection of years in Figure
6.3 on page 121. Between 1910 and 2010 the number of inhabitants of the study area rises from
2.2 to almost 5.2 million. The figure clearly describes a strong decentralisation pattern, where
the historic city centre becomes depopulated over the years. Population density declines in
central and rises in peripheral areas. Moreover, there seems to be a tendency of residents to
move north.
In the analysis I distinguish between the CBD as defined by City of Chicago (2010) and the
periphery to capture the presumably distinct behaviour of economic agents in the city.4 An
overview of the study area as well as the definition of the CBD is given in the appendix (Figure
D.1 on page 184). Summary statistics of the panel data are shown in Table 6.1 on page 116.
The next section briefly reviews the empirical approach and discusses its results.
4As in the previous chapter, core and CBD are used synonymously.
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Table 6.1.: Census tract summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
L Dens overall 0.321 0.777 0 10.676 N=14872
between 0.718 0 8.791 n=1352
within 0.298 -1.883 3.991 T=11
population overall 3233.668 2708.459 0 21726.000 N=14872
between 1665.356 27.450 12567.520 n=1352
within 2136.400 -6366.936 20861.150 T=11
Notes: LDens denotes the density of “L” stations.
6.4. Empirical analysis
6.4.1. Empirical approach
The subsequent analysis follows the empirical strategy as outlined in Section 5.4 and builds
on the estimation of a Panel VAR as defined by equation (5.1). Translating the reduced form
VAR into a system of single equations with a lag length a priori determined to be one yields:
Li,t = δ1 + β11Popi,t−1 + β12Li,t−1 + µi + vt + 1i,t (6.1)
Popi,t = δ2 + β21Popi,t−1 + β22Li,t−1 + µi + vt + 2i,t (6.2)
with Li,t denoting Elevated line station density in census tract i at time t and Pop denoting
population.
I control for individual fixed effects (µi) via Helmert transforming the data as well as for
period effects (vt), which are removed by time demeaning. Since all variables are in logs and
identification comes from variation over time a transformation into density becomes empiric-
ally obsolete. The estimation of the reduced form VAR is followed by a Wold decomposition
to derive the impulse response functions (IRF). For a structural interpretations a recursive
correlation scheme (Cholesky decomposition) needs to be assumed. Identification builds on the
assumption that transport is not affected by a contemporaneous population shock due to phys-
ical constraints (time-to-build) but only responds with a one period lag. Population, however,
is subject to contemporaneous rail shocks and allowed to respond immediately.
The analysis is initially carried our for the total sample and then separately for the CBD
as well as for the periphery. The idea is to disentangle residential and firm behaviour in the
absence of explicit firm data. This approach has also been followed by Levinson (2008); Xie
& Levinson (2010) as well as in Chapter 5. Because the estimations require the series to be
stationary, a modified Fisher type unit root test based on a Philipps-Perron test (Choi, 2001;
Phillips & Perron, 1988) precedes the PVAR estimations. Test as well as estimation results are
presented in the next section.
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6.4.2. Results
The results of the unit root test are shown in Table 6.2 on page 117. Population data fulfil the
stationary requirements and the inverse χ2 transformed test statistic rejects the null hypothesis
of all panels being non-stationary at a 1% significance level. Unfortunately, the ‘L’ system
covers only a smaller part of the city (see again Figure D.1 on page 184) such that the majority
of the census tracts is characterised by an excess of zeros. This makes a unit root testing of the
‘L’ density variable virtually impossible. However, to get a rough indication for the presence
of stationarity, I restrict the unit root test for the transport variable for a sample which has a
density of at least 0.14, i.e. 25% of the density distribution. This subsample estimate rejects
the null hypothesis of all panels containing a unit root at a 1% level. In contrast to the analysis
of Berlin, I cannot control for cross-sectional dependence. I therefore need to rely on the
assumption that the time-demeaning and forward-mean-differentiation sufficiently eliminates
any unit root.
Table 6.2.: Panel unit root tests
Variable Phillips-Perron (Choi 2001)
pop test statistic 286.336***
p-value 0.000
L Dens test statistic 9.8762***
p-value 0.000
Notes: (1) Variables shown are logarithmised, time-demeaned and Helmert transformed,
(2) LDens testing is reduced to a subsample which at least has a density value that is
equivalent to 25% of the density distribution due to an excess of zeros, (3) standard
error in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The interpretation of the empirical results is restricted to the impulse response functions and
the variance decomposition. Reduced form estimates are moved to the appendix (Table D.1
on page 183). Figure 6.4 on page 122 illustrates the IRFs with 5% confidence bands generated
by Monte Carlo simulations.5 The impulse responses for the total sample are given by the
graphs on the left-hand side. Population positively follows transport shocks over time (top left)
whilst transport planners respond negatively to population shocks (bottom left). However, the
estimated rail IRFs are statistically insignificant as shown by the confidence intervals. These
initial results suggest a clearly supply-side driven relation between transport and development,
where only population responds to transport improvements. This view is strengthened by the
cumulated impulse response which is about 0.23 standard deviations for the population response
and only -0.026 for the transport sector (cumulative IRFs are presented in Section D.3 in the
appendix).
5The IRFs shown in the main text share a common Y-axis to make the responses comparable. Alternatively
see Figure D.2 on page 185 where the IRFs have individual Y-axes.
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Moving on to the geographic subsamples, impulse responses of ‘L’ station density to popu-
lation shocks in the core (bottom middle) as well as in the periphery (bottom right) turn out
to be insignificant. There are, however, significant population reactions. Residents seem to
get driven out of the CBD due to transport improvements. A one standard deviation increase
in station density leads to a population decline of about 0.1 standard deviations in the initial
periods. The effect declines over time (note that a period denotes one decade, i.e. 10 years) and
seems to converge back to zero (top middle). Cumulated over all six periods, the population
response is -0.6 standard deviations (see Figure D.4 on page 186). In the periphery, popula-
tion responds positively to shocks in the ‘L’ system. A one standard deviation increase in rail
station density raises population by 0.06 standard deviations in the second period (top right,
accumulated response of 0.3 standard deviations). Overall, people seem to follow transport but
transport does not responds to residents. Moreover, the negative population response in the
CBD and positive one in the periphery suggest an outbidding of residents by firms. The vari-
ance decomposition in Table 6.3 on page 118 confirms the earlier presumed weak demand-side
driven link between transport and population: Population does not explain ‘L’ station density
variation two periods ahead for any of the samples. Conversely, transport has the strongest
explanation power in the periphery, explaining about 2.5% of the future variation while it is
only 0.2% in the core. Overall, the variance decomposition yields relatively weak links between
the location of residents and of the ‘L’ network. This might be due to the fact that the ‘L’
system only covers a smaller part of Chicago, being the potential transport mode of only a
minority of residents.
Table 6.3.: Variance decompositions
pop L Dens
Total pop 0.992 0.008
L Dens 0.000 1.000
Core pop 0.997 0.003
L Dens 0.000 1.000
Periphery pop 0.975 0.025
L Dens 0.000 1.000
Notes: Percent of variation in the row variable explained
by column variable (2 periods ahead).
To conclude, the interaction between the Elevated network and population development in
Chicago is not simultaneous but supply side driven. People follow transport but planners
extend/reduce the rapid transit network independent of people. In line with urban economic
literature transport innovations lead to a decentralisation of residential activity, most probably
because residents are outbid by firms in the CBD (land use densification).
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The second chapter studying transport was motivated by the idea of extending the Panel VAR
analysis previously carried out on Berlin to a second city. Applying the same methodology, but
for the city of Chicago, Illinois, the investigation not only provides an additional robustness
test but also allows for a comparison of the two cities.
First of all, the estimates for Chicago are mainly in line with the results for Berlin. Both cities
are characterised by a presumed outbidding of residents by firms due to transport improvements:
Population declines by 0.1 standard deviations in Chicago and by about 0.06 in Berlin following
a one standard deviation increase in rail station density in the core. In the periphery, the
transport shocks lead to increases in population which are comparable between the two cities
in terms of their magnitudes (both between 0.05 and 0.06 standard deviations). The similar
reactions are quite astonishing when taking into account the different historical development
of the (public) transport system in the two cities. While the rapid transit as well as the
underground system have always played an important role for residents in Berlin and moreover
been crucial for the development of the city, Chicago’s ‘L’ faced severe competition from intra-
urban expressways and the automobile resulting in a decline of the system. Moreover the
study periods are quite different; the investigation of Berlin is restricted to the early years
of massive transit until 1935 while the analysis of the US city makes use of a temporally
larger sample. Despite all these facts, the long-run relation between population and transport
describes comparable patterns.
Only restricting the analysis to population, transport planners in Berlin as well as in Chicago
do not responds to urban development and do not follow residents. The provision of transport
is rather supply-side driven with people responding to new commuting opportunities. The
inclusion of land values in the study of Berlin, however, yields positive transport responses.
Chapter 5 therefore concludes that planners only follow economic activity in core areas but
tend to ignore residential development. Based on the comparable interaction of transport and
population in the two cities, which moreover originates from a consistent investigation approach,
one might infer that transport planners in Chicago also only follow firms but ignore residential
needs.
The two transport studies carried out in this work both provide comparable results for the
spatial allocation of transport, households and indirectly firms/commercial activity. By apply-
ing a consistent empirical investigation approach to another study area, the work leaves the
domain of individual case studies and moves towards a unified comparative analysis. Imple-
menting a consistent method across a large number of cities would eventually help to provide
a categorical answer to transport questions and would facilitate the derivation of more general
policy implications.
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Figure 6.2.: ‘L’ station density on census tracts
(a) 1910 (b) 1940
(c) 1960 (d) 2010
(e) Legend
Notes: Transport data come from Chicago Transit Authority (2012) and Chicago“L”.org (2013b).
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Figure 6.3.: Population density on census tracts
(a) 1910 (b) 1940
(c) 1960 (d) 2010
(e) Legend
Notes: Population are extracted from Minnesota Population Center (2011).
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Figure 6.4.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR model
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
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This dissertation’s goal is to elaborate on the consumer city idea by investigating different
aspects of the role of urban amenities in the location decision of households and firms. In the
following, the main findings of the empirical analyses are summarised. I also highlight key
contributions and limitations which leave room for future research.
The first analysis, which is carried out in Chapter 3, explains firm location by an area’s
endowment with localised consumption amenities. Berlin internet start-ups are found to be
attracted by cultural amenities: An increase in the amenity density by 1% causes an increase
in the probability of a young web firm to locate in a block by 1.2%. The positive impact remains
significant across a number of robustness checks, testing for alternative explanations such as
centrality and for the validity of the applied instrumental variables. Moreover, according to
robustness specifications using placebo firms, it is indeed creative firms like agencies (probability
increase of 0.84% as a response to a 1% rise in amenity density) and consultancies (with an
increased probability of 0.57%) which are attracted by cultural amenities, whilst traditional
service industries such as financial advisories (-0.55%) respond negatively. I contribute to an
understudied field of research by being the first to explain firm location with highly endogenous
urban amenities. It is shown that cultural amenities, a city’s diversity and tolerance play an
important role in attracting start-ups. It is therefore not very likely that young innovative
firms will (re-)locate at (to) artificially created science parks in the periphery but will stay in
more central and amenity-rich areas. Due to data availability this analysis is limited to cross-
sectional estimation techniques. Time-variation would allow for estimating the start-up model
in differences differentiating out time invariant unobservables and also for investigating the
dynamics of the amenity effect. This could also enable us to disentangle potential agglomeration
effects from the amenity effects. Moreover, it would be interesting not just to distinguish
between service sectors but also between types of amenities. This is left for further research.
The analysis in Chapter 4 is centered around heritage as an example for aesthetic amenities.
The key contribution is to provide insights into the political economy of conservation area
designation. It is shown that the outcome is Pareto-efficient for local home-owners based on
the following findings: An increase in preferences for historic character, proxied by the local
share of residents holding a university degree, leads to an increase in the designated share of
land area. Moreover, the property price effect inside newly designated conservation areas is
not statistically distinguishable from zero, whereas the effect just outside the conservation area
is positive and significant. Conservation area designation is therefore interpreted as solving
a coordination problem among homeowners (and landlords) within a neighbourhood, i.e. the
policy is Pareto-optimal at the local level. However, the analysis does not allow for conclusions
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regarding any global welfare effects. Future research must therefore depart from the localised
mobility assumption and needs to consider potential supply restrictions due to the heritage
preservation.
The idea of the two transport analyses carried out in Chapter 5 for Berlin and Chapter 6
for Chicago is to propose and apply a new methodology borrowed from macroeconomics which
allows for the simultaneous estimation of transport and urban development. The intention
is not to reject existing uni-directional causal inference but to complement and provide an
alternative view on the link between transport and economic activity. The Panel VAR estimates
indeed suggest that the above stated relation is not uni-directional but simultaneous. In fact,
concluding from the land value analysis of Berlin, transport planners follow economic activity
in core areas but tend to ignore residential development. In line with traditional models, the
estimates for both Berlin and Chicago suggest an outbidding of residents in the CBD by firms
due to transport improvements. Future research could follow up on the comparative study idea
and extend the analysis to additional cities. Moreover, an extension to a multi variable VAR
would allow for the estimation of conditional effects over time.
To conclude, the elaboration of the consumer city idea and the analysis of various different
aspects makes clear that amenities are important when explaining how households and firms act
in space, where they locate and why. The spatial allocation of people and firms can therefore
be explained by more than just economic activity. Potential determinants are as manifold
as the aspects one can study. Novel and improved empirical methods, an increase in the
availability of spatial data (such as open data triggered by the availability of GPS devices), as
well as improved data analysis and management software (like GIS) provide valuable research
opportunities which help us to understand where we live and why we live there.
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This appendix complements Chapter 3. Section A.1 provides additional information on the data
used. The full tables of the empirical analyses providing all coefficient estimates are presented
in Section A.2.
A.1. Data
To motivate the first stage of the secondary instrument used in the analysis in the main text,
squat density, Figure A.1 jointly maps the location of squatted houses, represented by the black
dots, and the kernel density measure of cultural amenities. As reviewed in Section 3.2.1, a lot
of abandoned buildings in proximity to the Berlin Wall and above all in the former Eastern
part were squatted during the 1990s. There is a high number of squats (black dots) in the
districts of Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain as well as Kreuzberg, whereas there are very
few squatted houses in the proximity to Kurfürstendamm. The squats in the east are visually
correlated with the red amenity clouds, strengthening the applicability of squat density as an
instrument for cultural amenities.
Figure A.2 on page 126 shows the location of agencies (white dots) as well as financial
advisories (black dots) jointly mapped with amenity density. Generally, the two service firms,
which are used as placebos to test the robustness of the footloose start-up model, are distributed
more equally over the city compared to internet start-ups (Figure 3.3 on page 37). Both
exemplary sectors seem to be slightly clustered around Kurfürstendamm in the South West.
Additionally, agencies are clustered in the northern red amenity cloud around Mitte/Prenzlauer
Berg. Overall, visual inference suggests that agencies are more likely be affected by the cultural
amenity distribution than financial advisories.
A.2. Empirical results
This section complements the estimation results from Section 3.6 by showing the full regression
tables, i.e. including all control variables. Table A.1 on page 128 reports the estimates of the
main models, starting with an uninstrumented baseline specification in column (1) and ending
with the benchmark specification in column (5). The respective first stage regressions for the
benchmark as well as for the remaining IV robustness models are given by Table A.2 on page
130. To address the concerns that proximity to Wall only reflects centrality or is correlated with
unobservables driving the results, Table A.3 on page 132 presents the results of a first set of
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Figure A.1.: Distribution of squatted houses and cultural amenities.
Notes: Black dots denote the location of squatted houses extracted from Hausbesetzungs Geschichte Berlin
(2010). Red amenity clouds represent the amenity density measure with a radius of 2 km (Silverman, 1986),
with dark red indicating a high amenity density.
Figure A.2.: Distribution of placebo firms and cultural amenities.
Notes: White dots denote the location of agencies and black dots of financial advisories respectively, both
extracted from Gelbe Seiten Deutschland (2012). Red amenity clouds represent the amenity density measure
with a radius of 2 km (Silverman, 1986), with dark red indicating a high amenity density.
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robustness exercises. In a second set of robustness tests, I verify the validity of the measures and
indicators used in the analysis and experiment with alternative instrumental variables. Results
are shown in Table A.4 on page 135. The estimates using the placebo firms are eventually
reported in Table A.5 on page 137 with their respective first stage results in Table A.6 on page
139.
Table A.1.: Estimation results: Footloose start-up model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# start-up # start-up # start-up # start-up # start-up
log cult dens 1.547*** 1.640*** 0.885*** 0.671*** 1.195***
(0.098) (0.118) (0.190) (0.157) (0.307)
employment 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -5E-5** -3E-5 -3E-5 -3E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
migrants 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
dist research inst 0.024 0.166* 0.269**
(0.115) (0.101) (0.115)
dist university 0.209** 0.176** 0.203**
(0.097) (0.084) (0.095)
dist VC -0.284*** -0.291*** -0.215***
(0.079) (0.074) (0.080)
dist to water -0.512*** -0.392*** -0.384***
(0.119) (0.109) (0.110)
dist to green space 0.593 0.655 0.654*
(0.458) (0.425) (0.359)
sport 0.209*** 0.191*** 0.208***
(0.073) (0.064) (0.061)
bus dens 0.100** -0.006 -0.035
(0.042) (0.040) (0.045)
light rail dens 0.316 0.721* 0.790*
(0.509) (0.432) (0.427)
undergr. dens -0.350 0.216 -0.086
(0.223) (0.264) (0.283)
tram dens 0.010 -0.034 -0.128
(0.073) (0.068) (0.087)
U/tram noise 0.015*** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
train noise -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.035***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
street noise -0.021** -0.021** -0.019**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
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East Berlin 1.457*** 0.896*** 1.114***
(0.402) (0.302) (0.386)
historic CBD 0.076 0.019 0.081
(0.284) (0.283) (0.247)
urban renewal 0.314 0.370* 0.296
(0.234) (0.204) (0.211)
x coord -0.013 0.047 0.021
(0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
y coord -0.017 -0.037 -0.036
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Constant -8.026*** -8.315*** -3.143** -3.856*** -5.024***
(0.370) (0.427) (1.311) (1.261) (1.492)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
FE No No No Yes Yes
IV No No No No Yes
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 1.407
OVERIDP 0.236
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Instruments:
distance to Wall, squat density, OVERID (OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the over-
identification test (and its p-value).
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Table A.2.: Estimation results: Footloose start-up model - first stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log cult dens log cult dens cult dens cult pot cult pot cult pot log cult dens
dist wall -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.062*** -0.163*** 0.239***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.032) (0.039)
pot squats 1.317*** 1.195***
(0.029) (0.029)
pot wall 0.460***
(0.059)
cult1936 -0.523***
(0.031)
squat density 0.115*** 8.025*** 11.759***
(0.007) (0.083) (0.129)
employment -3E-5* -3E-5** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -2E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent 3E-5*** 3E-5*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 9E-5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
migrants 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
dist research inst -0.054*** -0.057*** 0.105** -0.025 -0.331*** -0.267*** -0.052***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.046) (0.071) (0.082) (0.082) (0.004)
dist university 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.390*** 0.562*** 0.788*** 0.802*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.066) (0.078) (0.078) (0.003)
dist VC -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.436*** -0.723*** -0.144** -0.166*** -0.073***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.050) (0.064) (0.064) (0.003)
dist to water -0.101*** -0.109*** -0.289*** -0.414*** -0.513*** -0.469*** -0.117***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.056) (0.087) (0.101) (0.101) (0.005)
dist to green space -0.157*** -0.170*** 1.780*** 3.011*** 1.839*** 1.593*** -0.146***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.219) (0.341) (0.395) (0.393) (0.018)
sport 0.021** 0.018* -0.275** -0.401** -0.365* -0.329 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.117) (0.182) (0.211) (0.211) (0.010)129
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bus dens 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.039 0.206*** 0.040 0.109***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.028) (0.043) (0.050) (0.049) (0.002)
light rail dens 1.268*** 1.242*** 3.610*** 5.578*** -0.125 0.436 1.157***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.449) (0.698) (0.811) (0.810) (0.037)
undergr dens 1.070*** 1.134*** 21.365*** 30.483*** 28.238*** 28.907*** 1.245***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.249) (0.387) (0.481) (0.486) (0.021)
tram dens 0.276*** 0.311*** 0.929*** 0.526*** 2.118*** 2.112*** 0.321***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.069) (0.107) (0.123) (0.123) (0.005)
U/tram noise 0.001** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.053*** -0.048*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000)
train noise 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.049*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.001)
street noise -0.002** -0.002*** -0.112*** -0.145*** -0.256*** -0.251*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001)
East Berlin -0.598*** -0.602*** 2.710*** 4.118*** 4.668*** 5.201*** -0.621***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.310) (0.482) (0.560) (0.548) (0.025)
historic CBD -0.326*** -0.212*** -6.896*** -9.114*** -7.478*** -8.853*** -0.072*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.459) (0.713) (0.841) (0.861) (0.037)
urban renewal 0.047 0.159*** 3.031*** 7.596*** 14.857*** 15.235*** 0.157***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.420) (0.653) (0.749) (0.751) (0.034)
x coord 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010 0.038 -0.209*** -0.267*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.028) (0.034) (0.032) (0.001)
y coord -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.163*** -0.221*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.001)
Constant 1.008*** 0.994*** 2.125*** 3.708*** 3.803** 8.637*** 0.397***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.822) (1.270) (1.478) (1.244) (0.056)
F 1775.682 1772.545 2617.249 2440.989 1735.954 1738.901 1786.564
R2 0.851 0.849 0.894 0.887 0.848 0.848 0.850
N 15850 15850 15937 15937 15937 15937 15850
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.3.: Estimation results: Robustness exercises (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# start-ups # start-ups # start-ups # start-ups # start-ups
log cult dens 0.673*** 0.573 -0.644 1.121*** 1.507***
(0.160) (1.035) (1.446) (0.405) (0.459)
dist to CBD 0.007
(0.078)
employment 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 4E-4*** 5E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -4E-5 -4E-5 -3E-5 -1E-5 -3E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
migrants 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
dist research inst 0.164 0.144 -0.191 0.058 0.095
(0.105) (0.255) (0.503) (0.130) (0.143)
dist university 0.177** 0.172* 0.112 0.265** 0.228
(0.084) (0.094) (0.146) (0.112) (0.139)
dist VC -0.297*** -0.308 -0.559 -0.110 -0.092
(0.093) (0.194) (0.344) (0.097) (0.098)
dist to water -0.393*** -0.391*** -0.328* -0.495*** -0.628***
(0.111) (0.105) (0.172) (0.141) (0.154)
dist to green space 0.648 0.655* 0.352 0.567 0.665
(0.437) (0.375) (1.449) (0.469) (0.460)
sport 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.172*** 0.217*** 0.225***
(0.063) (0.065) (0.060) (0.076) (0.077)
bus dens -0.006 -0.001 0.082 0.114** 0.076
(0.040) (0.067) (0.161) (0.057) (0.063)
light rail dens 0.727* 0.709 0.566 0.238 0.483
(0.440) (0.457) (0.538) (0.626) (0.464)
undergr dens 0.221 0.268 0.873 -0.619* -0.550*
(0.278) (0.610) (0.622) (0.338) (0.316)
tram dens -0.035 -0.018 0.182 -0.019 -0.105
(0.068) (0.184) (0.279) (0.092) (0.093)
U/tram noise 0.010** 0.010** 0.012* 0.009** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
train noise -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.055***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
street noise -0.020** -0.021** -0.027** -0.018** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
East Berlin 0.890*** 0.864* 0.495 1.791*** 0.816*
(0.308) (0.513) (0.544) (0.580) (0.428)
historic CBD 0.019 0.003 -0.263 0.001 0.188
(0.283) (0.294) (0.466) (0.319) (0.387)
urban renewal 0.372* 0.387 0.620 0.415 0.199
(0.203) (0.264) (0.381) (0.269) (0.221)
x coord 0.050 0.053 0.137 0.021 -0.012
(0.045) (0.068) (0.130) (0.050) (0.042)
y coord -0.035 -0.037 -0.055 0.044 -0.053
(0.032) (0.027) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047)
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Constant -3.981** -3.635 -1.196 -8.042*** -4.372**
(1.755) (2.578) (2.829) (2.232) (1.707)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE voting voting voting district municipality
IV1 dist to CBD placebo Wall dist Wall dist Wall
IV2 d. squat p. squat
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 0.000 0.000 1.360 0.002
OVERIDP 0.244 0.968
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OVERID
(OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the over-identification test (p-value).
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Table A.4.: Estimation results: Robustness exercises (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups start-ups
cult amenity 1.570* 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.032** 0.031*** 0.019 0.000 1.600 0.987** 1.590***
(0.844) (0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (1.269) (0.377) (0.431)
ring 250m 0.019
(0.015)
ring 500m -0.007 2E-4
(0.011) (0.006)
ring 1000m 0.012*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.005)
ring 1500m -0.006** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.003)
ring 2000m 0.005** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
employment 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 5E-4*** 4E-4*** 5E-4
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
land value -3E-5 -3E-5 -2E-5 -1E-5 -3E-5 -3E-5 -2E-5 -2E-5 -3E-5
1992 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent 2010 0.056
(0.059)
migrants 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
dist research 0.162 -0.162 -0.148 0.014 -0.019 -0.113 -0.090 0.167 0.236* 0.155
institute (0.166) (0.106) (0.107) (0.163) (0.145) (0.105) (0.105) (0.223) (0.123) (0.123)
dist univer- 0.269* 0.201** 0.195* 0.270** 0.275** 0.171* 0.156 0.271 0.197** 0.284***
sity (0.143) (0.100) (0.101) (0.127) (0.119) (0.103) (0.100) (0.171) (0.091) (0.110)
dist VC -0.170 -0.426*** -0.435*** -0.373*** -0.370*** -0.359*** -0.335*** -0.166 -0.244** -0.155*
(0.134) (0.071) (0.073) (0.084) (0.080) (0.097) (0.095) (0.184) (0.091) (0.093)
dist to water -0.522*** -0.395*** -0.371*** -0.267** -0.295** -0.369*** -0.372*** -0.522*** -0.390*** -0.487***
(0.128) (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.116) (0.124) (0.124) (0.129) (0.108) (0.128)133
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dist to green 0.704 0.603 0.534 0.233 0.165 0.563 0.652 0.709 0.649* 0.516
space (0.487) (0.459) (0.476) (0.474) (0.476) (0.437) (0.430) (0.442) (0.364) (0.449)
sport 0.228*** 0.197*** 0.189** 0.194** 0.196** 0.131 0.146* 0.229** 0.203*** 0.232***
(0.077) (0.073) (0.075) (0.088) (0.084) (0.094) (0.088) (0.089) (0.062) (0.071)
bus dens 0.063 0.080* 0.067 0.020 0.021 0.079* 0.086** 0.061 -0.020 0.043
(0.060) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.085) (0.049) (0.045)
light rail dens 0.642 0.665 0.420 1.132 1.123 0.504 0.583 0.657 0.755* 0.466
(0.695) (0.532) (0.552) (0.967) (0.867) (0.584) (0.577) (0.679) (0.432) (0.465)
undergr dens -0.629 -0.449* -0.435 -1.116** -0.986** -0.542* -0.574* -0.641 0.039 -0.731***
(0.408) (0.265) (0.265) (0.524) (0.441) (0.280) (0.297) (0.562) (0.335) (0.263)
tram dens -0.088 -0.035 -0.000 -0.172 -0.181 -0.035 -0.036 -0.093 -0.089 -0.114
(0.142) (0.085) (0.081) (0.138) (0.124) (0.081) (0.082) (0.198) (0.103) (0.087)
U/tram noise 0.015*** 0.010** 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.014** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.010** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
train noise -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.034*** -0.046***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
street noise -0.017 -0.013 -0.013 0.004 0.001 -0.018* -0.016 -0.017 -0.019** -0.019**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
East Berlin 1.748*** 1.269*** 1.194*** 1.957*** 1.983*** 1.488*** 1.434*** 1.761** 1.043*** 1.704***
(0.568) (0.429) (0.452) (0.751) (0.664) (0.439) (0.426) (0.717) (0.390) (0.437)
historic 0.277 -0.097 -0.047 0.084 0.023 -0.240 -0.260 0.285 0.056 0.292
CBD (0.320) (0.288) (0.308) (0.281) (0.271) (0.307) (0.304) (0.432) (0.248) (0.272)
urban 0.202 0.265 0.234 -0.156 -0.134 -0.056 0.052 0.198 0.344 0.222
renewal (0.280) (0.254) (0.256) (0.395) (0.359) (0.280) (0.309) (0.265) (0.220) (0.232)
x coord -0.050 0.064** 0.061* 0.052 0.038 0.019 0.014 -0.052 0.301 -0.040
(0.055) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.068) (0.039) (0.037)
y coord -0.022 -0.017 -0.016 -0.029 -0.022 -0.019 -0.019 -0.022 -0.344 -0.027
(0.042) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.046) (0.029) (0.039)
Constant -4.812* -2.529** -2.402** -3.394** -3.057** -1.669 -1.862 -4.883 -4.657*** -5.380***
(2.476) (1.232) (1.215) (1.641) (1.480) (1.182) (1.195) (3.418) (1.558) (1.707)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Rent 2010
FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
134
A
.2.
Em
piricalresults
Cult (X) ln cult dens cult dens cult pot cult pot cult pot rings rings ln cult dens ln cult dens ln cult dens
IV1 dist Wall dist Wall dist Wall dist Wall p. Wall hist rings hist rings cult 1936 cult 1998 dist Wall
IV2 d. squat d. squat p. squat p. squat dist Wall d. squat
N 15850 15937 15937 15937 15937 15937 15937 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 0.000 5.526 6.942 7.049 3.219 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.043 0.012
OVERIDP 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.073 0.307 0.911
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, OVERID (OVERIDP) denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the overidentification test (and its
p-value). IVs: dens denotes a density measure, dist a Euclidean distance measure, pot a potentiality measure, rings the amenity rings. Cult stands for the the cul-
tural amenity to be instrumented. Column (10) includes rents from 2010 (Immobilien Scout, 2012) instead of 1992 land values.
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Table A.5.: Estimation results: Placebo firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
architects consultancies engineering insurance law publisher finance agencies
log cult dens 0.110 0.567*** -0.187 -0.221 -0.147 0.234 -0.551* 0.836**
(0.196) (0.216) (0.336) (0.465) (0.176) (0.376) (0.320) (0.333)
employment 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 3E-4*** 4E-4***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent -5E-6 1E-4*** 5E-5* 8E-5** 8E-5*** 6E-5* 1E-4*** 4E-5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
migrants 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
dist research inst 0.039 0.071 -0.004 -0.022 0.033 0.162 0.011 0.012
(0.048) (0.047) (0.063) (0.082) (0.040) (0.132) (0.062) (0.108)
dist university -0.042 -0.054 -0.002 0.039 -0.085*** 0.041 -0.007 -0.010
(0.030) (0.038) (0.046) (0.062) (0.025) (0.083) (0.059) (0.080)
dist VC -0.089** 0.021 -0.099** -0.087 -0.051 -0.128 -0.147*** -0.025
(0.035) (0.043) (0.049) (0.084) (0.036) (0.106) (0.055) (0.086)
dist to water 0.005 0.081 -0.082 -0.055 -0.027 -0.017 0.005 0.052
(0.041) (0.049) (0.070) (0.097) (0.037) (0.098) (0.074) (0.095)
dist to green space 0.197 0.180 -0.001 -0.230 -0.138 -0.237 -0.260 -0.235
(0.169) (0.207) (0.226) (0.392) (0.156) (0.490) (0.492) (0.457)
sport 0.133*** 0.125*** 0.062 0.242*** 0.124*** 0.199** 0.194*** 0.124*
(0.045) (0.047) (0.068) (0.057) (0.037) (0.091) (0.061) (0.067)
bus dens -0.004 -0.032 0.021 0.019 0.052** 0.030 0.080 0.043
(0.024) (0.028) (0.043) (0.054) (0.023) (0.052) (0.058) (0.048)
light rail dens 1.429*** 1.260*** 1.123** 1.481** 1.576*** 1.574*** 1.837*** 0.760
(0.269) (0.285) (0.488) (0.609) (0.245) (0.521) (0.601) (0.474)
undergr dens 0.362 -0.292 0.343 0.570 0.717*** 0.619* 0.830** -0.695**
(0.220) (0.240) (0.402) (0.538) (0.180) (0.321) (0.370) (0.307)
tram dens -0.126** -0.210*** -0.129 -0.028 0.007 -0.018 0.005 -0.219**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.108) (0.123) (0.050) (0.091) (0.116) (0.086)
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U/tram noise 0.009*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.009*** 0.007 0.002 0.010**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
train noise -0.025*** -0.034*** -0.015** -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.039*** -0.044***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016) (0.009) (0.013)
street noise -0.055*** -0.028*** -0.016** -0.013 -0.023*** -0.053*** 0.002 -0.025**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011)
East Berlin 0.747*** 1.012*** 0.709* 0.395 0.468*** 0.565 0.649* 1.257***
(0.220) (0.244) (0.374) (0.449) (0.175) (0.433) (0.382) (0.410)
historic CBD -0.035 0.092 -0.895** -1.128** -0.779*** -0.294 -0.916** 0.687**
(0.191) (0.211) (0.394) (0.546) (0.183) (0.346) (0.427) (0.288)
urban renewal 0.701*** 0.563*** 0.782*** 0.702** 1.027*** 0.378 0.681** 1.001***
(0.144) (0.163) (0.251) (0.345) (0.149) (0.379) (0.318) (0.254)
x coord -0.056*** -0.067*** -0.011 0.004 -0.026* -0.015 -0.001 -0.072**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.032) (0.014) (0.041) (0.024) (0.034)
y coord -0.032*** -0.017 0.004 -0.008 -0.027*** -0.045 -0.008 -0.022
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.028) (0.018) (0.025)
Constant 2.350*** -0.437 -2.143*** -2.594*** 1.352*** -0.433 -2.539*** -1.895
(0.436) (0.537) (0.692) (0.918) (0.366) (1.136) (0.834) (1.180)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
OVERID 5.102 0.677 0.001 2.167 2.510 3.117 0.014 0.241
OVERIDP 0.024 0.410 0.974 0.141 0.113 0.077 0.906 0.624
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Instruments: distance to Wall, squat density, OVERID (OVERIDP)
denotes Hansen’s J statistic of the overidentification test (and its p-value). There are at least ten law firms per voting precincts (instead of
five).
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Table A.6.: Estimation results: Placebo firms - first stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
architects consultancies engineering insurance law publisher finance agencies
log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens log cult dens
dist wall -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
squat density 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.112***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
employment -3E-5* -3E-5** -3E-5** -3E-5* -1E-5 -3E-5** -3E-5** 3E-5**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rent 5E-5*** 5E-5*** 2E-6 5E-6 5E-5*** 2E-5*** 4E-5*** 3E-5***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
migrants 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dist research inst -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
dist university 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
dist VC -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.064***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
dist to water -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.101***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
dist to green space -0.152*** -0.157*** -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.149*** -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.147***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
sport 0.020** 0.022** 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 0.022** 0.023** 0.022**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
bus dens 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.096***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
light rail dens 1.256*** 1.172*** 1.138*** 1.125*** 1.159*** 1.170*** 1.170*** 1.215***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
undergr dens 1.053*** 1.044*** 1.097*** 1.097*** 1.051*** 1.065*** 1.049*** 1.045***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
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tram dens 0.282*** 0.267*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.268*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
U/ram noise 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
train noise 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
street noise -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001* -0.001** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
East Berlin -0.633*** -0.607*** -0.655*** -0.652*** -0.612*** -0.649*** -0.636*** -0.643***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
historic CBD -0.370*** -0.473*** -0.727*** -0.713*** -0.428*** -0.584*** -0.565*** -0.575***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
urban renewal 0.093*** 0.014 0.056* 0.058* 0.048 0.034 0.036 0.065*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
x coord 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
y coord -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.968*** 0.964*** 0.977*** 0.971*** 0.939*** 0.967*** 0.974*** 0.981***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
F 856.351 1856.923 3059.642 3419.338 1093.501 3356.475 3017.632 3036.796
R2 0.855 0.849 0.844 0.844 0.852 0.847 0.847 0.848
N 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850 15850
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1. Introduction
This appendix complements Chapter 4. Section B.2 provides an illustration of how a planner
determines the Pareto-efficient designation share and adds to the theory section of the main
chapter. Section B.3 complements the empirical strategy section of the main text by providing
a more detailed discussion of the control variables in tobit designation process models. The
section also links the reduced form difference-in-differences parameters to the marginal policy
effect in the theoretical model. Section B.4 provides a detailed overview of the data we use, its
sources, and how they are processed. Finally, Section B.5 complements the empirical results
section of the main text by showing the results of a variety of robustness tests and model
alterations not reported in the main chapter.
B.2. Theory and context
This section briefly illustrates how a planner determines the Pareto-efficient designation share.
The equilibrium between the social marginal benefits (MB) of designation (equation (4.9) in
the main text) and the marginal costs (MC) (equation (4.10)) is depicted by Figure B.1 on page
142. At point A the designation share D is Pareto-efficient. Social marginal benefits equal the
private marginal costs associated with designation. A further extension would benefit all owners
to the left of A as they would profit from increasing the expected heritage in the neighbourhood
without experiencing a change in marginal cost. To the right of A, however, the social marginal
benefit would also increase, but the increase would not compensate for the private marginal
costs associated with a change in the designation status from undesignated to designated. The
expansion would not be Pareto-optimal.
If there is, for instance, a change in preferences and residents develop a greater taste for
external heritage γ their marginal benefits curve shifts to the right. A Pareto-optimal planner
adapts to this situation and raises the designation share to set marginal benefits equal to
marginal costs again. This new Pareto-optimal equilibrium is illustrated by point B where the
designation share increases to D′ .
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Figure B.1.: Designation equilibrium
B.3. Empirical strategy
B.3.1. Designation process - control variables
This section provides a detailed description and motivation of the control variables we use
to account for the determinants of conservation area designation that are unrelated to the
mechanisms modelled in our theory. In particular we try to control for composition effects,
neighbourhood sorting, heterogeneity in terms of homeownership, and whether the heritage in
a neighbourhood is at particular risk.
We add the initial period (1991) degree share for two reasons. First, we assume that the
highly educated derive higher (net-)benefits from neighbourhood heritage. To the extent that
this group is capable of more efficiently articulating their will in a political bargaining a higher
degree share will make the designation more likely. It is important to control for the initial
degree share since levels and changes may be correlated in either direction. On the one hand
there may be catch-up growth in the degree share of less educated regions, i.e. mean reversion.
On the other hand, people with degrees may be more likely to move to areas with an already
high share of people with degrees, which would imply a self-reinforcing process leading to spatial
segregation.
We also include a control for the extent of designation in the initial period (1991). The
share of designated land area in the total ward area would be (positively) correlated with the
change in the designation share if designations spark further designations as in a contagion
model. Initial designation also helps to control for the possibility that the skilled may be
attracted to areas with a lot of designated land. Another set of controls is driven by the interest
in homeowners within the designation process. Homeowners experience extra benefits/costs
from designation since, unlike renters, they are not compensated for changes in neighbourhood
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quality by increases in degrees or rents. Homeowners, thus have additional incentives to engage
in political bargaining. Similar to the other controls, homeownership status enters in lagged
levels and differences. In a final specification we also add an interaction of the logged change in
degree with homeownership (rescaled to a zero mean to make coefficients comparable). We use
average household size (both in differences and lagged levels) to control for the presumption
that larger households are more likely to lobby against designation and the resulting constraint
on available floor space.
We add a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain from ward-level regressions
of log property prices on a time trend (and property controls).
A larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty regarding the
future of the neighbourhood and, thus, potentially increases the optimal designation share. To
control for a potentially positive correlation between owners’ risk aversion and the value of their
properties - typically their largest assets - we add a measure of neighbourhood appreciation.
We generate ward-level property price trends in n separate auxiliary regressions of the following
type:
log (Pitn) = an +Xinbn + βnTt + εitn (B.1)
where X is a vector of property and neighbourhood characteristics and T is a linear time trend.
To avoid a reverse effect of designation on the property price trend we only consider transactions
that occur outside conservation areas.
A second set of controls deals with potential development risk. Areas that experience devel-
opment pressure or are in poor and/or declining condition may be more likely to be designated
in order to protect against the threats to the heritage character of the neighbourhood. We use
the vacancy rate, a density measure of listed buildings as well as score measures for a conser-
vation area’s condition, vulnerability and trajectory provided by English Heritage to capture
development pressure. We expect that neighbourhoods with few vacancies will be put under
higher development pressure. Vacancies enter the specification both in differences and lagged
levels. The reason for the differenced term is that a change in development pressure is likely to
lead to a change in designation status as a result. We argue that the lagged level may also cap-
ture changes (not just levels) in development pressure. This is because of external factors and
conditions (i.e. population growth) that effect areas unevenly depending on their level in cer-
tain attributes (e.g. vacant housing). It seems likely that general population growth would put
greater development pressure on neighbourhoods with lower vacancy rates. The score measures
reflect the development risk inside a conservation area and come from a survey provided by
English Heritage. The higher the condition score, the worse the heritage conditions. A higher
vulnerability as well as a higher trajectory are also indicated by higher scores. Except for the
score variables, all control variables enter our empirical specification in logs.
While taking first-differences of the empirical specification will remove all time-invariant
ward-specific effects that might impact on the level of designation (including the heritage itself),
it will not help if there are location-specific effects that impact on the changes in designation
status. For example, if there is heterogeneity across Local Authorities (LAs) about how difficult
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or easy it is to designate arising from different bureaucratic practices then this would affect
changes in designation for all wards within a particular LA. We therefore estimate a fixed effects
specification for the 166 English Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). The TTWAs are designed
to approximate city regions which can be described as somehow self-contained economic areas
from a job market perspective. By applying a TTWA fixed effect model we are therefore able
to control for socio-economic heterogeneity across TTWAs.
B.3.2. Difference-in-differences
This section motivates the difference-in-differences approach for the estimation of the marginal
policy effect. Firstly, we illustrate how the policy and heritage effects are difficult to disentangle
in a simple cross-sectional hedonic estimation. Secondly, we lay out how the difference-in-
differences treatment effect is used to estimate the marginal policy effect laid out in terms of
the structural parameters of our model.
Cross-sectional hedonics
Taking logs of the spatial equilibrium price equation (4.17) from the main text gives:1
log θ(x) = τ + 11− δ logα(x) +
ϕh(x)
1− δ +
γE[H | D]
1− δ −
cD˜(x)
1− δ (B.2)
The following heritage and policy effects determine the bid rent:
Policy cost = cD˜(x)1− δ (B.3)
External heritage effect (conditional on designation) = γE[H | D]1− δ (B.4)
Internal heritage effect = ϕh(x)1− δ (B.5)
Consider the cross-sectional reduced form equation:
pit = ℵIi +X ′iµ+ fn + Yt + it (B.6)
where pit is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property i in time period t,
Ii is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation
area, Xi is a vector of controls for property, neighbourhood, and environmental characteristics,
fn is a set of n location fixed effects and Yt are year effects. The coefficient ℵ on the CAi
dummy identifies the policy cost associated with the location of a property inside a conservation
area D˜(x) = 1. The policy cost should have a negative effect on logged house prices. The
coefficient also partly identifies the internal heritage effect. Specifically, it identifies the value
1Where τ is a constant and equal to: log(1− δ) + δ1−δ log δ + 11−δ logW .
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of the difference between the mean internal heritage inside conservation areas and the mean
internal heritage outside conservation areas (i.e. ϕ/(1 − δ)(hCAi=1 − hCAi=0). This should be
positive because the policymaker would normally designate areas that have the most heritage.
Finally, under the existence of some spatial decay in externalities, it will also identify the
value of the difference inside and outside conservation areas in the external heritage effect
(i.e. γ(1− δ)(E[H | D]CAi=1 − E[H | D]CAi=1). This is a function of internal heritage and will
therefore also be positive.
The coefficient ℵ thus reflects a composite effect of policy costs, policy benefits, and correl-
ated internal heritage effect. Furthermore, in reality the actual distribution of internal heritage
is unknown and there is likely a spatial decay to externalities, further complicating the estim-
ate.2 In practice, ℵ will also be affected by unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that are
correlated with the distance to the conservation area. A positive ℵ parameter, at best, tells us
only that the overall higher levels of heritage (internal and external) combined with the policy
benefits of conservation outweigh the policy costs. This does not provide a comprehensive eval-
uation of the policy effect itself. To try and disentangle these effects we implement a different
empirical approach.
Difference-in-differences
Using the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the marginal effect of a change
in designation status offers an improved identification.
Our empirical difference-in-differences specification is equation (4.26) from the main paper:
pit = βIIi + βEEi + βIPost(Ii × Postit) + βEPost(Ei × Postit) +X ′iµ+ fn + Yt + it (B.7)
Table B.1 on page 146 illustrates the conditional mean prices (after controlling for time effects)
for the treatment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment periods. It is important to
note that the year fixed effects Yt capture the general development of price over time. Without
this feature it would be necessary to control for the overall growth in price between the pre-
and post-treatment periods via the inclusion of a non-interacted version of Postit.
Our treatment coefficient βIPost essentially differentiates across the treatment and control
groups before and after designation and is, thus defined as follows:
βIPost = (p¯TreatPost − p¯TreatPre )− (p¯ConPost − p¯ConPre ) (B.8)
Let us assume that the relationship between the observed conditional mean and the theoretical
bid rent is given by:
p¯TreatPost = θTreatPost + uTreatPost (B.9)
where uTreatPost are partially unobservable factors specific to properties in the Treated-Post cell.
The same relationship applies for the other cells (Treated-Pre, Control-Post and Control-Pre).
2In a general case the estimate would be equal to:
ℵ = ϕ1−δ (hCAi=1 − hCAi=0) + γ1−δ (E[H | D]CAi=1 − E[H | D]CAi=1)
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At the heart of our identification strategy we assume that the price trends unrelated to the policy
are the same within the treatment and the control group. The typical identifying assumption
on which the difference-in-differences identification strategy relies can be expressed as follows:
(uTreatPost − uTreatPre ) = (uConPost − uConPre ) (B.10)
The credibility of the counterfactual rests on the likelihood that the treatment group, in the
absence of the intervention, would have followed a trend that is similar to that of the control
group. An appropriate definition of the control group is therefore a critical element of the
identification strategy. We therefore consider a number of different control groups in which
we try to reduce the potential heterogeneity between properties in the treatment and control
group.
Table B.1.: Conditional mean prices
Conditional mean of prices Pre Post
Treated (internal) p¯TreatPre = βI p¯TreatPost = βI + βIPost
Control p¯ConPre = 0 p¯ConPost = 0
Treatment effect = (p¯TreatPost − p¯TreatPre )− (p¯ConPost − p¯ConPre )
Treatment effect = ([βI + βIPost]− [βI ])− ([0]− [0])
Treatment effect = βPost
Notes: The conditional mean of prices in the treatment group in the pre-period is denoted p¯TreatPre .
This represents the log of prices conditional on fixed and year effects (fn + Yt) and controls Xi.
The same notation is used for the other groups.
The first treatment group is a spatial match where we choose the observations that fall within
a 2 km buffer surrounding conservation areas that changed designation status during the ob-
servation period (1995–2010). As an alternative, we consider a number of matching procedures
that rest on the idea that properties inside conservation areas generally share similarities. Prop-
erties in conservation areas that did not change designation status therefore potentially qualify
as a control group. To make the areas in the treatment and control group more similar, we
select conservation areas based on similarities with those in our treatment group (Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1983). For the matching procedure we only make use of variables that turn out to
have significant impact in the auxiliary propensity score matching regression.3 We use a nearest
neighbour matching procedure, which produces a broader and a narrower group.
Under the assumptions made it is straightforward to demonstrate that the DD treatment
coefficient gives the pure policy effect we are interested in. Combining the theoretical bid rent
of equation (4.17) from the main paper with the definition of p¯TreatPost in equation (B.9) gives
3A list of significant controls in propensity score matching regressions is included in the next subsection.
146
B.3. Empirical strategy
the conditional mean price of (treated) properties inside newly designated conservation areas
before (pre) and after (post) designation can be expressed as follows:4
p¯TreatPre = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
ϕhi
1− δ +
γE[H | D]
1− δ + u
Treat
Pre (B.11)
p¯TreatPost = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
ϕhi
1− δ +
γ
1− δ
(
E[H | D] + dE[H | D]dD
)
− cD˜i1− δ + u
Treat
Post (B.12)
where a new designation is represented as an increase in designation share D. For a control
group sufficiently far away to not be exposed to the heritage externality we similarly get:
p¯ConPre = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
γE[H | D]
1− δ + u
Con
Pre (B.13)
p¯ConPost = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
γE[H | D]
1− δ + u
Con
Post (B.14)
where there is (by definition) no new designation. Given the common trend assumption of
equation (B.10), βIPost identifies the pure net policy effect of designation:
βIPost = γ1− δ
dE[H | D]
dD −
cD˜i
1− δ (B.15)
In the empirical implementation of the DD strategy we also consider alternative treatment
groups that consist of properties just outside conservation areas, which are potentially exposed
to spillovers, but not to the cost of designation. The interpretation of the external treatment
co-efficient can be derived analogically where designation leads to benefits but without the
associated costs:
p¯TreatPre = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
γE[H | D]
1− δ + u
Treat
Pre (B.16)
p¯TreatPost = τ +
1
1− δ logαi +
γ
1− δ
(
E[H | D] + dE[H | D]dD
)
+ uTreatPost (B.17)
Under the common trends assumption the treatment coefficient reflects the pure policy benefit
associated with the reduction in uncertainty as predicted by the stylized theory:
βEPost = γ1− δ +
dE[H | D]
dD (B.18)
Propensity score matching regression
In order to determine the control group for the difference-in-differences specification a propensity
score matching approach was employed. We used a stepwise elimination approach in order to
determine which variables have a significant impact on propensity score. With a significance
4Where the theoretical locations x have been replaced by observed housing transactions i.
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level criterion of 10% the following variables remained in the final CA propensity score estim-
ation:
CA characteristics: Urban, Commercial, Residential, Industrial, World Heritage Site, At
Risk and Article 4 Status.
Environmental characteristics: Land Cover Type 9 (Inland bare ground), Land Cover
Type 3 (Mountains, moors and heathland), distance to nearest National Nature Reserve, dis-
tance to nearest National Park, National Park (kernel density) and Area of Outstanding Natural
Beauty (kernel density).
Neighbourhood characteristics: Median Income and Ethnicity Herfindahl index.
Amenities: Distance to nearest Bar, distance to nearest Underground Station, distance to
nearest Hospital, distance to nearest Motorway and distance to nearest TTWA centroid.
Semi-parametric temporal and spatial estimations of treatment effects
We estimate a semi-parametric version of (4.27) that replaces the Y Dit variables with a full
set of years-since-designation bins. We group transactions into bins depending on the number
of years that have passed since the conservation area they fall into or are near to had been
designated. Negative values indicate years prior to designation. These bins (b) are captured by
a set of dummy variables PTb:
pit =
∑
b
βIb (PT bi × Ii) +
∑
b
βEb (PT bi × Ei) +
∑
b
βbPT
b
i +X
′
iµ+ fn + Yt + it (B.19)
The parameters βIb and βEb give the difference in prices between treatment and control groups
in each years-since-designation bin b. The results of this semi-parametric estimation are plotted
in Figure B.2 on page 169 in Section B.5.2. In order to allow for a casual inspection of the fit
of the parametric models the semi-parametric point-estimates are also plotted in Figure 4.2 on
page 77 (internal) and Figure 4.3 on page 78 (external) of the main text.
As with the temporal models, we relax the parametric constraints of the spatial estimations
by replacing the distance variable in equation with distance bins:
pit =
∑
d
βd(DBdi × Ti) +
∑
d
βPostd (DBdi × Ti × Postit) +X
′
iµ+ fn + Yt + it (B.20)
where DBdi are positive (external) and negative (internal) distance bins from the designation
area boundary and βPostd are d treatment effect parameters at different distances inside and
outside the conservation area. If the planner designates in a Pareto-optimal manner then the
bin that corresponds to the locations just inside the treated conservation area should indicate
a zero treatment effect. This may or may not be associated with a positive effect for the
bins deepest inside the conservation area. Furthermore, if there are significant externalities
associated with the designation (and heritage in general) then the bins just outside the boundary
should indicate a positive effect. A lower effect for further out bins would indicate a spatial
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decay to this externality. The results from this specification are presented Figure B.3 on page
170 in Section B.5.2 and in Figure 4.4 on page 81 of the main text.
B.4. Data
B.4.1. Data sources
Housing transactions
The transactions data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the Nationwide Building
Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observa-
tions and include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed property
characteristics. These characteristics include floor space (m2), the type of property (detached,
semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms
and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer
information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a
first-time buyer.
Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing
it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates. With this information it is possible within a Geo-
graphical Information System environment to calculate distances to conservation area borders
and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. Furthermore it is
possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g. densities) for the amenities and
environmental characteristics that will be used as control variables. Since the data set refers
to postcodes rather than individual properties, it is not possible, however, to analyze repeated
sales of the same property. This is a limitation shared with most property transaction data
sets available in England, including the land registry data.
Neighbourhood characteristics
The main variables used for estimating capitalization effects of neighbourhood characteristics
are median income and ethnic composition. The income data is a model-based estimate of
median household income produced by Experian for Super Output Areas of the lower level
(LSOA). This is assigned to the transaction data based on postcode. The data on ethnicity
was made available by the 2001 UK Census at the level of Output Area (OA). Shares of each of
the 16 ethnic groups and a Herfindahl index were computed to capture the ethnic composition
of neighbourhoods. The Herfindahl index (HI) is calculated according to the following relation:
HI = ∑Ni=1 s2i , where si is the share of ethnicity i in the LSOA, and N is the total number of
ethnicities.
Environmental variables
The environmental variables capture the amenity value of environmental designations, features
of the natural environment, different types of land cover and different types of land use.
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Geographical data (in the form of ESRI shapefiles) for UK National Parks, Areas of Out-
standing Natural Beauty, and National Nature Reserves are available from Natural England.
National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty are protected areas of countryside
designated because of their significant landscape value. National Nature Reserves are “estab-
lished to protect sensitive features and to provide ‘outdoor laboratories’ for research” (National
England website). Straight line distances to these designations were computed for the hous-
ing units as geographically located by their postcodes. Furthermore, density measures that
take into account both the distance to and the size of the features were created. We apply a
kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2 km which is considered to be the
maximum distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005).
The location of lakes, rivers and coastline are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. The
distance to these features is also computed for the housing units from the transaction data.
The UK Land Cover Map produced by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology describes land
coverage by 26 categories as identified by satellite images. We follow Mourato et al. (2010)
who construct nine broad land cover types from the 26 categories. Shares of each of these nine
categories in 1 km grid squares are calculated and the housing units take on the value of the
grid square in which they reside.
The generalized Land Use Database (GLUD) available from the Department for Communities
and Local Government gives area shares of nine different types of land use within Super Output
Areas, lower level (LSOA). These nine land use types are domestic buildings, non-domestic
buildings, roads, paths, rail, domestic gardens, green space, water, and other land use. These
shares are assigned to the housing units based on the LSOA in which they are located.
Amenities
The locational amenities variables capture the benefits a location offers in terms of accessibility,
employment opportunities, schools quality, and the proximity of cultural and entertainment
establishments.
Employment accessibility is captured both by the distance to Travel to Work Area (TTWA)
centroid and a measure of employment potentiality. TTWAs are defined such that 75 per cent
of employees who work in the area also live within that area. Thus they represent independent
employment zones and the distance to the centre of these zones is a proxy for accessibility to
employment locations. A more complex measure of accessibility is the employment potentiality
index (Ahlfeldt, 2011b).5 This is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and
represents an average of employment in neighbouring LSOAs weighted by their distance.
Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11) assessment scores are available from the Department for Education
at the Super Output Area, middle layer (MSOA). School quality is thus captured at the hous-
ing unit level by computing a distance-weighted average of the KS2 scores of nearby MSOA
centroids.6
5Further detail on the construction of the employment potentiality measure is provided in Section B.4.2.
6This is calculated as an Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) with a threshold distance of 5 km and a power of
two.
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Geographical data on the locations of motorways, roads, airports, rail stations and rail tracks
are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. Distances were computed from housing units to
motorways, A-roads, B-roads and rail stations to capture accessibility. Buffer zones were created
around the motorways and roads along with distance calculations to rail tracks and airports in
order to capture the disamenity noise effects of transport infrastructure.
Further data on local amenities were taken from the Ordinance Survey (police stations, places
of worship, hospitals, leisure/sports centers) and OpenStreetMap (cafés, restaurants/fast food
outlets, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, theatres/cinemas, kindergartens and monuments,
memorials, monuments, castles, attractions, artwork). The number of listed buildings was
provided by English Heritage. Kernel densities for these amenities were computed for housing
units using a kernel radius of 2 km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986). The
radius of 2 km is consistent with amenities having a significant effect on property prices only
when they are within walking distance.
Table B.2.: Variable description
Variable Description
Dependent variable
Price Per square meter transaction price in Euro of the correspond-
ing plot of land (expressed as natural logarithm). Transaction
data from the Nationwide Building Society (NBS).
Independent variables
CA Effects Dummy variables denoting property transactions taking place
within the boundaries of an currently existing conservation
area, in a conservation area at the time when designated or
where the designation date is unknown as well as various buf-
fer areas surrounding current or treated conservation areas.
Fixed Effect Control Travel to Work Areas, nearest conservation area catchment
areas and interactives with year effects.
Housing information Set of property variables from the NBS including: Number of
bedrooms, number of bathrooms, floor size (in square meter),
new property (dummy), building age (years), tenure (lease-
hold/freehold), central heating (full: gas, electric, oil, solid
fuel), central heating (partial: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel),
garage (single or double), parking space, property type (de-
tached, semi-detached, terraced, bungalow, flat-maisonette).
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Neighbourhood information Set of neighbourhood variables including: media income
(2005, LSOA level), share of white population at total popu-
lation (2001 census, output area level), share of mixed pop-
ulation at total population (2001 census, output area level),
share of black population at total population (2001 census,
output area level), share of Asian population at total popu-
lation (2001 census, output area level), share of Chinese pop-
ulation at total population (2001 census, output area level),
Herfindahl of ethnic segregation (including population shares
of White British, White Irish, White others, Mixed Carib-
bean, Mixed Asian, Mixed Black, Mixed other, Asian In-
dian, Asian Pakistani, Asian others, Black Caribbean, Black
African, Black other, Chinese, Chinese other population, 2001
census output area).
Conservation area Charac-
teristics
Set of characteristic variables for conservation areas from Eng-
lish Heritage including: Conservation area land use (dummy
variables for residential, commercial, industrial or mixed land
use), conservation area type (dummy variable for urban, sub-
urban or rural type), conservation area size (dummy for areas
larger than mean of 128,432.04 square meters), conservation
area (square meter), conservation area has an Article 4 Dir-
ection implemented (dummy), oldness of conservation area
(dummy for areas older than mean of 1981), conservation area
at risk (dummy), conservation area with community support
(dummy), conservation area is World Heritage Site (dummy),
score measures on the condition, vulnerability and trajectory.
Environment Characterist-
ics and Amenities
Set of locational variables processed in GIS including: Na-
tional Parks (distance to, density), Areas of Outstanding
Beauty (distance to, density), Natural Nature Reserves (dis-
tance to, density), distance to nearest lake, distance to
nearest river, distance to nearest coastline, land cover in 1 km
square: Marine and coastal margins; freshwater, wetland and
flood plains; mountains, moors and heathland; semi-natural
grassland; enclosed farmland; coniferous woodland; broad-
leaved/mixed woodland; urban; inland bare ground.
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Other amenities Set of locational variables created in GIS including: Average
key stage 2 test score (MSOA averages as well as interpolated
in GIS), distance to electricity transmission lines, A-Roads
(distance to, buffer dummy variables within 170m), B-Roads
(distance to, buffer dummy variable within 85m), motorway
(distance to, buffer dummy variable within 315m; buffer dis-
tances refer to the distance were noise of maximum speed
drops drown to 50 decibel), distance to all railway stations,
distance to London Underground stations, distance to railway
tracks, distance to bus stations, distance to airports, densities
of cafés, restaurants/fast food places, museums, nightclubs,
bars/pubs, theatres/cinemas, kindergartens, monuments (me-
morial, monument, castles, attraction, artwork), hospitals,
sports/leisure centres, police stations and worship locations,
distance to Travel to Work Areas, employment potentiality
(based on Travel to Work Areas with an time decay para-
meter of 0.073).
Neighbourhood Distance
Controls
Set of neighbourhood distance dummy variables created in
GIS including: Distances outside conservation area border
(up to 50 m, 100 m, 150 m, 200 m, 250 m, 300 m, 350 m, 400
m, 1 km, 2 km and 3 km), distances inside conservation area
border (up to 50 m, 100 m, 150 m, 200 m).
B.4.2. Further notes on data methods
Employment potentiality
The employment potentiality index is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA)
and represents an average of employment in neighbouring LSOAs weighted by their distances.
Employment potentiality is calculated for each Lower Layer Super Output Area i (LSOA) based
on employment in all other LSOAs j using the following equation:
EPi =
∑
j
Eje
−adij , with i 6= j (B.21)
where d measures the straight line distance converted into travel time assuming an overall
average speed of 25km/h (Department for Transport, 2009) and Employment the absolute
number of workers in the respective LSOA. The indicator is weighted by a decay parameter of
a = −0.073 estimated by Ahlfeldt (in press). Internal distances are calculated as:
dii =
1
3
√
Areai
pi
(B.22)
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Kernel densities for National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and
National Nature Reserves
The kernel density is a measure that takes into account both the proximity and the size of
National Parks (NPs), Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs) and National Nature
Reserves (NNRs). Every 100x100 m piece of designated area is assigned a point and the density
of these resulting points calculated for 10 km kernels and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman,
1986, p. 76, equation 4.5) around each housing unit using a kernel density method. The result is
similar to calculating a share of NP area within a circle, the one difference being that the points
are additionally weighted by distance to the housing units according to a normal distribution.
Buffers for motorways and roads
The buffer sizes for the different roads are as follows: B-Road (85 m), A-Road (170 m) and
Motorway (315 m). These distances are calculated based on how far it is expected that the
noise from traffic travelling at the speed limit of the respective roads (Steven, 2005) would
decline to an assumed disamenity threshold level of noise of 50 db (J. P. Nelson, 2008).
Land cover map Broad Categories
Table B.3.: Land Cover Broad categories
1 Marine and coastal margins
2 Freshwater, wetlands, and flood plains
3 Mountains, moors, and heathland
4 Semi-natural grasslands
5 Enclosed farmland
6 Coniferous woodland
7 Broad-leaved/mixed woodland
8 Urban
9 Inland bare ground
Broad categories as defined by Mourato et al. (2010).
B.5. Estimation results
B.5.1. Designation process
In order to test our theoretical implication that changes in heritage preferences lead to changes
in designation we estimate the regression model as outlined in Section 4.3.1. The prediction of
the model is that positive changes in heritage preferences should lead to negative changes in the
share of non-designated land in a neighbourhood. OLS regression results are reported in Table
B.4 on page 155. We drop all zeros and identify the effect based on the sample of observations
with observable changes in conservation area shares. The standard OLS estimates without (1)
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and with a basic set of composition controls (2) are insignificant. Due to the potential sources
of bias in OLS discussed in the main part we re-estimate the two models using our instrumental
variables. The 2SLS estimates (3) and (4) are in line with the tobit results reported in the main
paper and support the theory that a positive change in degree share leads to higher designation.
Table B.4.: Designation process
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
∆ log non designation sharet
∆ log degree sharet(ϑ) -0.009 -0.017 -0.674*** -0.279***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.113) (0.085)
log degree sharet−1 -0.009 -0.106***
(0.013) (0.033)
log designation sharet−1 0.169*** 0.147***
(0.010) (0.023)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.120*** 0.148***
(0.029) (0.035)
log homeownershipt−1 0.025 -0.030
(0.022) (0.026)
∆ log aver. household sizet -0.015 -0.067
(0.064) (0.052)
log aver. household sizet−1 0.005 -0.041
(0.030) (0.064)
Constant -0.044*** -0.033 0.430*** -0.017
(0.012) (0.031) (0.081) (0.062)
IV No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
R2 0.000 0.075 -1.023 0.015
F 0.604 139.420 35.637 19.008
AIC -931.737 -1045.816 210.758 -944.019
Overid 0.966 2.372
OveridP 0.326 0.124
Observations 1621 1621 1621 1621
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density
and employment potential. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects
in (3). *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
Table B.5 on page 157 reports the first stage results to the second-stage results reported in
Table 4.1 on page 70 in the main text. Both IVs are (conditionally) positively correlated with
the change in degree share, as expected.
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Table B.5.: Standard IV models – First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log degree sharet ∆ log degree
sharet×
homeowner-
shipt−1
rail station density 0.124*** 0.112*** 0.124*** 0.103*** 0.128*** -0.007***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002)
employment potentiality 3.2E-08*** 2.5E-08*** 3.2E-08*** 3.8E-08*** 3.2E-08*** 9.5E-10***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
predicted ∆ log degree sharet × homeownershipt−1 -0.403*** 1.118***
(0.048) (0.009)
log degree sharet−1 -0.409*** -0.454*** -0.409*** -0.429*** -0.400*** 0.002***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
log designation sharet−1 -0.021 -0.20 -0.021*** -0.001 -0.025*** -0.005***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.293*** 0.339*** 0.294*** 0.376*** 0.275*** 0.012***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.003)
log homeownershipt−1 0.016 0.054 0.016* 0.073*** 0.210*** -0.060***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011) (0.025) (0.005)
∆ log aver. household sizet -0.075 -0.140* -0.075*** -0.032* -0.052*** 0.020***
(0.084) (0.055) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.004)
log aver. household sizet−1 -0.170 -0.315*** -0.169*** -0.070*** 0.171*** 0.018***
(0.087) (0.090) (0.028) (0.005) (0.028) (0.005)
log price trend 0.004
(0.012)
∆ log vacancy ratet 0.024***
(0.004)
log vacancy ratet−1 0.070***
(0.005)
log listed building density 0.017***
(0.002)
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aver. condition score (1 best, 4 worst) 0.011
(0.014)
aver. vulnerability score (1 low, 8 high) -0.013
(0.013)
aver. trajectory score (-2 improving, 0.002
+2 deteriorating) (0.027)
Constant 0.017 0.136 0.025 0.316*** 0.106*** -0.032***
(0.098) (0.107) (0.039) (0.034) (0.030) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE No Yes No No No No
Price trend No No Yes No No No
Housing Conditions No No No Yes No No
F 420.662 123.00 1756.16 1320.37 2093.28 18708.76
R2 0.688 0.732 0.688 0.699 0.703 0.955
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965 7965
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density and employment potential in all models. Model (4) includes
a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions. We derive the instrument (predicted
∆ log degree sharet × homeownershipt−1) for the interaction term in model (5) by interacting homeownershipt−1 with the predicted values of an auxiliary
regression where we regress ∆ log degree share on the exogenous variables, i.e. on the standard IVs and controls. Standard errors in parentheses and
clustered on fixed effects, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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We have tried four alternative IV models which are based on the benchmark model, i.e.
including the set of controls (Table 4.1, column 2 in the main text). The coefficient estimates
reported in Table B.6 on page 158 remain qualitatively similar and quantitatively close to the
main model. First stage results are reported in Table B.7 on page 159. The alternative instru-
ments, again, pass the validity tests. Only the overidentification test is failed by specification
(1) using employment potentiality and museum density as instruments.
Table B.6.: Alternative IV models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log non designation sharet
∆ log degree sharet(ϑ) -0.488*** -0.512*** -0.502*** -0.557***
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.070)
log degree sharet−1 -0.265*** -0.274*** -0.270*** -0.291***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027)
log designation sharet−1 -0.020 -0.022* -0.022* -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.259*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.251***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
log homeownershipt−1 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.046**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
∆ log aver. household sizet 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.013
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
log aver. household sizet−1 -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.010
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
Constant 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.040
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chi2 340.356 341.226 342.655 331.908
EXOGP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overid 3.544 0.078 0.752 0.201
OveridP 0.060 0.780 0.386 0.654
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7968
Instruments (as densities except Employment Employment Employment Rail station
employment potentiality) potentiality potentiality potentiality
Museum Coffee place Bar Coffee place
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and
clustered on fixed effects, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
Table B.7.: Alternative IV models - First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log degree sharet
employment potentiality 4.4E-08*** 4.3E-08*** 4.1E-08***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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museum density 0.142***
(0.034)
coffee place density 0.004*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.003)
bar density 0.006**
(0.002)
rail station density 0.282***
(0.022)
log degree sharet−1 -0.406*** -0.406*** -0.408*** -0.399***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
log designation sharet−1 -0.019 -0.022 -0.018 -0.031*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.285*** 0.274*** 0.285*** 0.260***
(0.065) (0.063) (0.068) (0.061)
log homeownershipt−1 0.007 -0.002 0.011 -0.038
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031)
∆ log aver. household sizet -0.101 -0.098 -0.088 -0.040
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.108)
log aver. household sizet−1 -0.192* -0.204* -0.188* -0.127
(0.083) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086)
Constant 0.039 0.051 0.035 -0.015
(0.092) (0.094) (0.091) (0.091)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 396.188 517.118 441.850 552.553
R2 0.686 0.685 0.686 0.681
Observations 7965 7965 7965 7968
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and
clustered on fixed effects, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
Furthermore, we have split the long difference between 1991 and 2011 into two shorter differ-
ences of 1991 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011 (Table B.8 on page 160). For the latter short difference
we moreover used the change in income instead of change in degree as a proxy for heritage
preferences (Table B.10 on page 162). The coefficient estimates remain qualitatively similar to
the main model. Their first stages are reported in Table B.9 on page 161. The coefficient of
the key variable is slightly smaller in the benchmark specification of the short different between
1991 and 2001 (Table B.8, column 4) and considerably larger for the period between 2001 and
2011 (column 8). This could be explained with an increase in gentrification over time. In Table
B.10 we use income as a proxy of heritage preference. Focusing on the benchmark specifica-
tion in the final column, doubling income more than quadruples the designation share. The
respective instruments are valid and sufficiently strong. Overall, the results are in line with our
theory; increases in heritage preferences, proxied by change in degree or change in income, lead
to increases in designation shares.
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Table B.8.: Short differences models
1991-2001 2001-2011
∆ log non designation sharet ∆ log non designation sharet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ log degree sharet(ϑ) -0.013 -0.229*** -0.064*** -0.193*** 0.464*** 1.618*** -0.066 -2.790***
(0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.031) (0.051) (0.124) (0.077) (0.910)
log degree sharet−1 -0.063*** -0.291*** -0.140*** -0.689***
(0.005) (0.027) (0.022) (0.036)
log designation sharet−1 -0.034*** -0.021 0.022 0.036
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.109*** 0.251*** 0.225*** 0.895***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.084) (0.236)
log homeownershipt−1 0.061*** 0.046** 0.185*** 0.390***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.025) (0.074)
∆ log aver. household sizet 0.039 0.013 -0.220* -0.813***
(0.034) (0.039) (0.132) (0.257)
log aver. household sizet−1 0.090*** -0.010 0.108 -0.140
(0.031) (0.050) (0.068) (0.107)
Constant 0.153*** 0.231*** -0.011 0.040 0.311*** -0.125*** 0.246*** 0.615***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.031) (0.048) (0.021) (0.042) (0.066) (0.140)
IV No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Chi2 106.812 215.197 171.695 169.534
EXOGP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overid 2.165 1.118 1.485 15.948
OveridP 0.141 0.276 0.223 0.000
Observations 7968 7965 7968 7965 7969 7966 7969 7966
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects, *p< 0.05,
**p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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Table B.9.: Short differences and income models - first stage regressions
1991-2001 2001-2011 2001-2011
∆ log degree sharet ∆ log degree sharet ∆ log incomet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rail station density 0.117*** 0.102*** -0.061*** 0.038*** -0.012 0.018
(0.032) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.037) (0.029)
employment potentiality 5.14E-8*** 4.99E-8*** -1.87E-9 5.69E-9* 5.44E-9
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
log degree sharet−1 -0.262*** -0.209***
(0.011) (0.009)
log incomet−1 -0.095***
(0.020)
log designation sharet−1 -0.040* 0.006 -0.011*
(0.018) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.411*** 0.253*** -0.017
(0.083) (0.029) (0.064)
log homeownershipt−1 -0.038 0.092*** 0.040*
(0.022) (0.009) (0.017)
∆ log aver. household sizet -0.145* -0.217*** 0.220***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.037)
log aver. household sizet−1 -0.236** -0.069* 0.130**
(0.077) (0.030) (0.044)
Constant 0.327*** -0.036 0.390*** 0.112*** 0.255*** 0.741***
(0.008) (0.083) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.113)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
F 34.876 443.629 74.997 544.976 8.308 12.770
R2 0.103 0.504 0.095 0.602 0.004 0.068
Observations 7965 7965 7966 7966 7966 7966
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed
effects, *p< 0.05,**p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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Table B.10.: Income models
2001-2011
∆ log non designation sharet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log incomet -0.204*** -9.152*** -0.210*** -4.357***
(0.068) (1.981) (0.067) (0.959)
log incomet−1 -0.201*** -0.498***
(0.026) (0.078)
log designation sharet−1 0.032* -0.019
(0.018) (0.028)
∆ log homeownershipt 0.278*** 0.134
(0.082) (0.113)
log homeownershipt−1 0.225*** 0.244**
(0.026) (0.036)
∆ log aver. household sizet -0.227* 0.774***
(0.130) (0.276)
log aver. household sizet−1 0.198*** 0.671***
(0.070) (0.145)
Constant 0.535*** 2.825*** 1.702*** 4.203***
(0.026) (0.513) (0.179) (0.630)
IV No Yes No Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Chi2 21.347 122.739
EXOGP 0.000 0.000
Overid 13.591 0.061
OveridP 0.000 0.000
Observations 7969 7966 7969 7966
Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in paren-
theses and clustered on fixed effects, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
B.5.2. Pareto optimality
Table B.11 on page 167 reports the conservation area effects as well as the full set of hedonic
controls, housing characteristics in particular, for the difference-in-differences estimation given
by equation (4.26) in the main text. Column (7) shows that housing units with more bath-
rooms and bedrooms fetch higher prices, as do detached, semi-detached, and bungalows (over
the omitted category flats/maisonettes). The sales price of terraced housing is insignificantly
different from flats/maisonettes. Larger floor spaces are associated with higher price but with
significant diminishing effects. There is a premium for new properties. Leased properties are
of less value than those owned. Properties with parking spaces, single garages and double
garages sell for higher prices than those without any parking facilities. There is a house price
premium for properties with central heating over other types of heating. In order to control
for a potentially non-linear relationship between housing age and house prices we included a
series of house age bins. In order to separate the effects of pure building age (which may be
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associated with deterioration) from the build date (which may strongly determine the architec-
tural style) we allow for age cohort and building data cohort effects. Since the ‘New property’
variable identifies all properties where the build age is zero years, the omitted category from
the age variables is 1–9 years. All of the bins for properties older than this indicate significant
negative premiums. The negative premium increases with age, mostly quickly over the first
few categories and then more slowly until the penultimate category and finally decreases for
buildings over 100 years. The effect of the build date is also non-linear. The general tendency
is for buildings built in earlier periods to have higher prices than buildings built in the omitted
period 2000–2010. However, this effect becomes insignificant in the 60s and 70s; periods asso-
ciated with the architectural styles of the post-ward reconstruction phase that are today less
appreciated than other styles. The greatest premium is attached to houses built pre-1900, the
earliest category.
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Table B.11.: Conservation area premium – designation effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log property transaction price
Inside treated CA × 0.028*** 0.014 0.014 0.003 -0.024 -0.077 -0.003
Post designation (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.070) (0.111) (0.015)
Within 500m buffer of 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.012 -0.005 -0.005
treated CA × Post des. (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.027) (0.022) (0.010)
Inside treated CA -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.062 0.029 -0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.057) (0.108) (0.021)
Within 500m buffer -0.10** -0.004 -0.011** -0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.002
of treated CA (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.030) (0.023) (0.013)
No. of bathrooms 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
No. of bedrooms 0.166*** 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.170*** 0.179*** 0.158***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006)
No. of bedrooms2 -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Detached house 0.254*** 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.194*** 0.235*** 0.216*** 0.193***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.007)
Semi-detached house 0.119*** 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.066*** 0.073***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
Terraced house / 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.015** 0.001 0.002 -0.013 -0.000
country cottage (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006)
Bungalow 0.311*** 0.285*** 0.281*** 0.257*** 0.292*** 0.269*** 0.257***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009)
Floor size (m2) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Floorsize2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
New property 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.047*** 0.076*** 0.077***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.017) (0.006)
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Leasehold -0.054*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.073*** -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.070***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006)
Single garage 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.098***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Double garage 0.190*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.158***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005)
Parking space 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.063***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Central heating 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.094*** 0.095***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Building age: 10-19 -0.047*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.069***
years (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Building age: 20-29 -0.079*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.126*** -0.113***
years (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.021) (0.007)
Building age: 30-39 -0.092*** -0.127*** -0.123*** -0.150*** -0.169*** -0.141*** -0.133***
years (0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.032) (0.027) (0.009)
Building age: 40-49 -0.104*** -0.148*** -0.142*** -0.180*** -0.199*** -0.165*** -0.158***
years (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.036) (0.031) (0.011)
Building age: 50-59 -0.121*** -0.171*** -0.167*** -0.207*** -0.232*** -0.204*** -0.175***
years (0.004) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.044) (0.038) (0.014)
Building age: 60-69 -0.135*** -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.238*** -0.320*** -0.265*** -0.215***
years (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.051) (0.042) (0.018)
Building age: 70-79 -0.136*** -0.213*** -0.207*** -0.263*** -0.326*** -0.273*** -0.234***
years (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.053) (0.046) (0.019)
Building age: 80-89 -0.132*** -0.218*** -0.213*** -0.277*** -0.339*** -0.313*** -0.243***
years (0.007) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.062) (0.054) (0.021)
Building age: 90-99 -0.111*** -0.208*** -0.204*** -0.280*** -0.360*** -0.304*** -0.248***
years (0.008) (0.016) (0.025) (0.027) (0.068) (0.063) (0.023)
Building age: over 100 -0.083*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.261*** -0.348*** -0.284*** -0.227***
years (0.009) (0.017) (0.027) (0.030) (0.074) (0.065) (0.025)
Build date: 1900-1909 0.040*** 0.121*** 0.128*** 0.208*** 0.256*** 0.222*** 0.173***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.028) (0.031) (0.077) (0.067) (0.025)165
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Build date: 1910-1919 0.074*** 0.153*** 0.158*** 0.226*** 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.196***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.027) (0.028) (0.071) (0.059) (0.024)
Build date: 1920-1929 0.093*** 0.157*** 0.162*** 0.215*** 0.225*** 0.189*** 0.190***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025) (0.062) (0.050) (0.021)
Build date: 1930-1939 0.082*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.168*** 0.187*** 0.163*** 0.151***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.021) (0.023) (0.058) (0.045) (0.020)
Build date: 1940-1949 0.040*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.111*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.096***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.058) (0.048) (0.018)
Build date: 1950-1959 0.017*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.057*** 0.017 -0.004 0.046***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.016) (0.018) (0.047) (0.039) (0.015)
Build date: 1960-1969 0.001 0.007 0.018 0.023 -0.017 -0.012 0.011
(0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.044) (0.037) (0.013)
Build date: 1970-1979 -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.008 -0.004 -0.059 -0.046 -0.011
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.042) (0.033) (0.011)
Build date: 1980-1989 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.023 -0.010 0.024***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.038) (0.029) (0.008)
Build date: 1990-1999 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.029*** -0.020 -0.008 0.017**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.034) (0.025) (0.008)
Build date: pre 1900 0.098*** 0.149*** 0.162*** 0.244*** 0.312*** 0.259*** 0.216***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.029) (0.031) (0.081) (0.070) (0.026)
Location controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbourhood controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward effects Yes Yes No No No No No
Nearest treated CA effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Matched CA effects No No No No No No Yes
Treatment group: 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2010 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2010
CAs designated
Control group Full England Within 2km Within 2km Within 500m Within 500m Within 500m Within 500m
sample of treated CA of treated CA of CA des- of CA des- of CA des- of pre-1996
ignated before ignated before ignated before CA matched
1996 & within 1987-95 & 2003-10 & on propen-
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2km of treated within 2km of within 2km of sity score
CA treated CA treated CA
R2 0.921 0.922 0.915 0.915 0.861 0.864 0.909
AIC -587375.2 -156426.4 -130469.1 -67046.3 -5408.8 -8475.7 -41184.2
Observation 1,088k 302k 302k 178k 21k 32k 133k
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects
for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Semi-parametric temporal and spatial treatment effects
Figure B.2 on page 169 reports the results for the semi-parametric estimation of the temporal
effects of designation using equation (B.19). Instead of simply presenting our two strongest
specifications, as we do in the main text, here we present a different dimension to the results
bin by comparing the bin estimates for the naïve DD in the left panels to the matched CA
control group in the right panels. The left charts show that the post-period internal and
external estimates deviate significantly from the pre-period mean (hence the significant DD
estimates) but that this is driven by a general upward trends. This corroborates the results
in Table 4.2 on page 73, column (1) of the main text where no significant discontinuity nor
shift in trend for the naïve control group exists and hence the advantages of the RDD-DD over
the standard DD method is high-lighted. The charts in the right panels also corroborate the
evidence presented using the parametric trends equations in the main text. Specifically, they
show that for the internal effects the post-treatment estimates tend not to deviate significantly
from the pre-treatment effects but that there are upward shifts in the trend when compared
to the pre-treatment trend. For the external effects there is a general upward trend in the less
carefully matched control groups and a downward trend in the stronger control groups but no
shift in the trend at the designation date.
Figure B.3 on page 170 demonstrates the semi-parametric spatial effects using different bin
sizes of 100 m and 200 m using appendix equation (B.20). These semi-parametric charts closely
resemble their parametric counterparts. Notably, there is no significant and positive effect in
the first bin outside the conservation area when using the preferred specification of column (7)
from Table B.11 on page 167. This is consistent with the parametric findings and baseline DD
findings that there is no significant external policy effect and that our second hypothesis cannot
be accepted. There is, however, one significant bin inside the conservation area at 200-300 m.
This provides some support for the idea that heritage externalities are stronger deeper within
the conservation areas such that there may be a positive policy effect. This effect then declines
to zero for the deepest bin of greater than 300 m.
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Figure B.2.: Semi-parametric temporal bins estimates
(a) Internal effects: Full dataset
Tab. B.11, column (1)
(b) Internal effects: Matched CA
Tab. B.11, column (7)
(c) External effects: Full dataset
Tab. B.11, column (1)
(d) External effects: Matched CA
Tab. B.11, column (7)
Note: The solid black line plots the estimated differences between treatment group and control group against
year since designation date using equation (B.19). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence intervals. The
left charts show results for the control group used in column (1) of appendix Table B.11 on page 167. The right
charts show results for the control group used in column (7) of appendix Table B.11. The horizontal red line
illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.
169
B. Appendix to Chapter 4
Figure B.3.: Semi-parametric spatial bins estimates
(a) 200 m bins: Full datasetTab. 4.4, column (1) (b) 200 m bins: Matched CATab. 4.4, column (5)
(c) 100 m bins: Full datasetTab. 4.4, column (1) (d) 100 m bins: Matched CATab. 4.4, column (5)
Note: The solid black line plots estimate the difference-in-differences treatment effect at different distances from
the conservation area boundary using appendix equation (B.20). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence
intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used Table 4.4 on page 80, column (1). The right
charts show results for the control group used in Tab. 4.4, column (5). The horizontal red lines illustrate the
mean of the pre-treatment estimates, the final pre-period bin and the first post-period bin.
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The appendix to Chapter 5 is structured as follows: I begin by reporting the reduced form PVAR
estimates in Section C.1 which complement the results from Section 5.5. As the reduced form
results cannot be interpreted structurally, the interpretation is limited to the corresponding
IRF in the main text. This is followed by a robustness test of modifiable areal unit problem
(Section C.2), the presentation of the cumulative IRF (Section C.3) and finally the introduction
and discussion of a land use location choice model which serves as an additional robustness test
(Section C.4).
C.1. Reduced form PVAR estimates
Table C.1.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR (municipality level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
pop pop pop railDens railDens railDens
popt−1 0.800*** 0.818*** 0.792*** -0.029 -0.0139 -0.022***
(0.030) (0.049) (0.031) (0.031) (0.118) (0.035)
railDenst−1 0.029** -0.086*** 0.036** 0.745*** 0.803*** 0.739***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.079) (0.072) (0.084)
Observations 1015 132 883 1015 132 883
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.2.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR (block level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
LV LV LV railDens railDens railDens
LVt−1 0.529*** 0.524*** 0.515*** 0.079*** 0.571*** 0.073***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.006) (0.028) (0.008)
railDenst−1 0.157*** 0.076*** 0.200*** 0.738*** 0.641*** 0.677***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030)
Observations 7759 1992 5767 7759 1955 5767
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.3.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR (150m grid level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
LV LV LV railDens railDens railDens
LVt−1 0.512*** 0.593*** 0.503*** 0.128*** 0.588*** 0.054***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005)
railDenst−1 0.039*** -0.024*** 0.054*** 0.537*** 0.624*** 0.470***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.063) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 26083 3192 22886 26083 3192 22886
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.4.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR anticipation model (municipality level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
pop pop pop railDens railDens railDens
popt−1 0.796*** 0.850*** 0.772*** 0.049** -0.727*** 0.077***
(0.033) (0.059) (0.037) (0.027) (0.334) (0.022)
railDenst−1 0.045*** -0.029*** 0.089** 0.517*** 0.484*** 0.481***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.026) (0.067) (0.162) (0.072)
Observations 993 123 810 933 123 810
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.5.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR anticipation model (block level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
LV LV LV railDens railDens railDens
LVt−1 0.547*** 0.472*** 0.546*** 0.153*** -0.078* 0.163***
(0.012) (0.030) (0.013) (0.012) (0.060) (0.015)
railDenst−1 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.043*** 0.250*** 0.282*** 0.250***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029)
Observations 7590 1955 5635 7590 1955 5635
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table C.6.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR anticipation model (150m grid level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
LV LV LV railDens railDens railDens
LVt−1 0.514*** 0.586*** 0.503*** 0.113*** -0.311*** 0.110***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.036) (0.006)
railDenst−1 0.027*** -0.043*** 0.044*** 0.334*** 0.310*** 0.367***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.025) (0.021) (0.015)
Observations 25856 3091 22765 25856 3091 22765
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
C.2. IRF for the 300m grid model
To address any multiple areal unit problem (MAUP) concerns, the raw land value and transport
data have alternatively been aggregated to grid squares with a length of 300 m instead of 150
m. The reduced form estimates are given by Table C.7 on page 174 and the respective IRF
by Figure C.1 on page 174. The IRF patterns are very similar to the 150m grid sample IRF
derived in the main text, rejecting any MAUP concerns regarding the aggregation of the grid
level data.
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Table C.7.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR (300m grid level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
LV LV LV railDens railDens railDens
LVt−1 0.547*** 0.604*** 0.542*** 0.147*** 0.608*** 0.158***
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.012) (0.045) (0.013)
railDenst−1 0.019*** -0.028*** 0.026*** 0.490*** 0.613*** 0.437***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.046) (0.041)
Observations 7817 828 6989 7817 828 6989
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure C.1.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR 300 m grid model
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
C.3. Cumulative impulse response functions
The cumulative impulse responses (CIRF) for the total sample are illustrated by Figure C.2
on page 175, for the core sample by Figure C.3 on page 176 and for the periphery sample by
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Figure C.4 on page 177. The curves illustrate the response to a shock accumulated over all
time periods.
Looking at the CIRF based on the total sample (Figure C.2), population over time responds
positively to transport shocks (almost up to 0.3 standard deviations after six periods) while
the planner’s response to population shocks is negative over time. The CIRF for the land value
- transport relationship is positive in both ways. The CIRF for the block sample estimates
indicate again that the inner block sample is slightly biased by centrality. In the core, population
and transport respond negatively to each other (Figure C.3) which is in line with transport
being more responsive to economic as opposed to residential activity. The CIRF for the land
value samples are positive again where the land value response is significantly less pronounced
than the transport response, which constantly increases over time. The CIRF derived from
the periphery estimates (Figure C.4) further illustrate the positive population response due
to the decentralisation partly driven by the outbidding of residents by firms. Land values and
transport responses accumulated over time also stay positive in both directions in the periphery.
Figure C.2.: Cumulative impulse responses (total sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
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Figure C.3.: Cumulative impulse responses (core sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
C.4. Land use location choice model
C.4.1. Motivation
As a robustness test and accompanying the PVAR models a multinomial choice model of
different land use is developed in order to predict actual land use patterns. The discrete model’s
intention is to confirm the expectations about the distinct behaviour of firms and residents and
the assumed outbidding process in particular. Owing to the nature of discrete models, I only
test the supply-sided relationship of transport affecting land use. Moreover, it is important to
note that only correlations are reported to shed some light into the outbidding process but it
is not the author’s intention to establish any causal relations.
C.4.2. Data
This section gives a brief overview of additional land use data I make use of to estimate a
location choice model of different land use patterns.
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Figure C.4.: Cumulative impulse responses (periphery sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
The data were extracted from specific land use maps (Aust, 1986/1987) of Berlin for 1850,
1880, 1910 and 1940. These historical maps illustrate areas of different land use types, each
devoted to either industrial, public, residential, business or mixed use. To control for natural
amenities which could drive the results, water bodies and green spaces were also extracted from
the Aust maps. Proximity to water, green space and overground tracks were computed in the
GIS environment.
Over time, land use does not only change by designation but also by location and size.
Therefore a unit of analysis is required which is able to capture these changes. Housing blocks
as well as land value plots would not be able to describe the evolution appropriately. A grid
square is able to take on a different land use type in every period; clustered grid squares
then reflect spatial adjustments. Above all, the grid approach enables me to derive initially
undeveloped land. I designate all grids as being undeveloped if they are covered by neither
built-up structure (including streets), nor green space, nor water. Moreover, there are several
technical advantages of using grid squares as discussed in Section 5.3. The selection of a
reasonable grid size is based on the smallest land use areas in the data. The smallest areas
range between 150 and 1,136 square meters. Based on this, grids with an area of 650 square
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meters were chosen, hence with a length of 25 meters. A grid square takes on a land use type if
at least 50% of the square is covered with that respective land use. The grid panel is strongly
balanced over 4 periods and consists of 215,600 observations per period, covering a total area
of 140.14 square kilometres (entire Gross-Berlin: 891.85 square kilometres).
As for the PVAR models, I distinguish between a core and peripheral region within the ana-
lysis to capture the presumably distinct behaviour of economic agents in the city. As suggested
(and tested) by Ahlfeldt & Wendland (2011), I define the underground station “Stadtmitte”
(downtown) as centroid of the CBD. The station lies in the prestigious Friedrichstraße, sur-
rounded by the boulevards Unter den Linden and Leipziger Straße.
Table C.8 on page 178 reports the number of grid squares for each land use type and time
period. Public land use has been excluded due to its broad definition. The indicated public
areas range from governmental buildings to military zones. It is important to note that there
are two independent grid samples for distinct empirical models. To clarify, in one instance I use
150 m grid squares for estimating the relation between transport and land values in a PVAR
model (300 m grid squares in a robustness test) and in another 25 m grids for the land use
location choice model.
Table C.8.: Land use grid sample summary statistics
Land use 1850 1880 1910 1940
Business 197 453 2,869 4,789
Mixed 7,688 11,756 7,788 7,990
Residential 4,252 10,179 39,006 54,194
Industry 2,407 7,141 10,680 13,387
Undeveloped 78,088 66,187 27,481 17,050
Total 92,612 95,716 87,824 97,410
Notes: A grid square takes on a land use type if at least
50% of the square is covered with that respective land
use. Grids are considered to be undeveloped if they are
neither covered by built-up structure (including streets),
nor green space, nor water.
C.4.3. Empirical strategy
Similar to the location choice model for footloose start-ups established in Section 3.4 the multi-
nomial choice model is derived from utility theory. In random utility models, an urban economic
agent (either resident or firm) chooses a location i over all other locations if location i’s utility is
at least as high as the utility of all other locations, i.e. if ui ≥ uj, for all j 6= i. The probability
of an agent choosing i over j can then be expressed by:
Pi = Prob{ui ≥ uj;∀j 6= i} (C.1)
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In this context, utility is assumed to be mainly defined by the local transport infrastructure.
Hence, the choice model predicts the probability of a certain type of land use to locate at location
i, conditional on the transport network at that particular location. I expect the increase in
station density to have a larger effect on businesses than on residents (land use intensification).
In fact, in central locations residents are expected to be driven out by high rail density.
The multinomial logit model describes a choice situation where the values have no natural
order, γm ∈ {1, 2, . . . J}. The empirical specification takes the following form:
LUi = αi + βrailDensi + γ
∑
i
Li + δ
∑
i
Tt + εi (C.2)
where LUi indicates the type of land use, railDensi is station density, Li a vector of locational
controls and Tt time fixed effects. The discrete land use variable LUi is defined by:
LUi =

1 if business
2 if mixed
3 if residential
4 if industry
5 if undeveloped

(C.3)
The estimation results of the land use model as well as further robustness exercises are reported
and discussed in the next part.
C.4.4. Results
The estimates of the multinomial logit model are reported in Table C.10 on page 181. The
model is estimated separately for the core and the periphery sample.
Table C.9.: Results for multinomial land use model
Core Periphery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business
railDens 1.901*** 1.139*** 1.105*** 3.659*** 2.536*** 2.128***
(0.036) (0.087) (0.089) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
Mixed
railDens 0.193*** -0.930*** -1.062*** 3.116*** 2.549*** 2.075***
(0.032) (0.083) (0.086) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024)
Residential
railDens 0.808*** -2.209*** -2.092*** 2.725*** 1.443*** 1.041***
(0.031) (0.083) (0.085) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Industrial
railDens 1.440*** -2.030*** -2.510*** 1.936*** 0.722*** 0.092***
(0.036) (0.095) (0.102) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023)
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
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Observations 41253 41253 41253 239697 239697 239697
pseudo R2 0.073 0.144 0.153 0.114 0.160 0.203
Notes: Base outcome 5 (undeveloped). Constants are significant in all models but not reported for bre-
vity. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Starting with the core area, the probability that a location is of business land use increases
with station density compared to undeveloped areas (column 1). Station density also increases
the likelihood of being a mixed, a residential and an industrial area compared to the base
outcome. Nevertheless, the effect is largest for business areas, followed by residential and
industrial areas. When controlling for time fixed effects, see column (2), the probability of
locations being mixed, residential or industrial decreases significantly and is even negative
compared to undeveloped land. Only the likelihood of business land use increases with higher
station density. The estimates stay relatively robust when additionally controlling for locational
amenity effects (column 3). The amenity controls are distance to the nearest overground tracks
(considered as disamenity due to negative noise/view effects (Ahlfeldt et al., 2011)), nearest
green space and nearest water body (positive amenities). The individual effects are not reported
in the table for reasons of brevity. Overall, the improved transport only increases the likelihood
for areas to be used as business land (compared to the base outcome). This is not surprising
since the choice model is only estimated for the core area.
In the baseline model of the sample covering only peripheral Berlin (same table, column 4),
increased transport density raises the probability of being developed compared to undeveloped.
The effect is still the largest for business areas but not as strong as in the core-area estimation.
Controlling for time fixed effects and amenity controls slightly changes the picture. While the
likelihood of being a business area stays high, its effect decreases relatively compared to mixed
land use. When time dummies are added (column 5) the likelihood of being a location of
mixed land use is even slightly higher than being a business location as a response to transport
shocks. The probabilities of the two land use categories are fairly similar when adding the
amenity controls. In contrast to the core-model, the likelihood of residential or industrial
location increases with transport improvement. Comparing the estimates for the core and
periphery one can observe the assumed outbidding of residents due to transport shocks. In
the core, businesses are attracted by an increase in station density whereas all other land use
types experience a negative effect. In the periphery, however, transport also attracts residential,
industrial and especially mixed land use.
Table ?? on page ?? reports a rather flexible distinction between core and periphery by
interacting each transport variable with distance to CBD (and distance to CBD2). In all three
models the probability of a business location is described by a positive binomial interaction
between land use and distance to CBD, whereas mixed, residential and industrial land use is
described by a negative binomial one. In all models the probability of a business location is
highest in the CBD. This likelihood decreases with distance until the parabola is upward sloped
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again. The other land use categories’ probabilities decline continuously with distance due to
their negative slope.
Table C.10.: Results for multinomial land use model (total sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Business
railDens 4.931*** 4.863*** 4.039***
(0.053) (0.056) (0.052)
railDens x distCBD -0.875*** -1.107*** -1.104***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
railDens x distCBD2 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.077***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mixed
railDens 2.734*** 3.272*** 2.432***
(0.051) (0.054) (0.050)
railDens x distCBD 0.172*** -0.105*** -0.087***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
railDens x distCBD2 -0.098*** -0.054*** -0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Residential
railDens 2.187*** 2.007*** 1.450***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.045)
railDens x distCBD 0.246*** -0.019*** -0.044*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
railDens x distCBD2 -0.098*** -0.054*** -0.048***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Industrial
railDens 1.559*** 1.421*** 0.169**
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056)
railDens x distCBD 0.263*** -0.013 0.214***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
railDens x distCBD2 -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.058***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Observations 280950 280950 280950
pseudo R2 0.073 0.144 0.153
Notes: Base outcome 5 (undeveloped). Constants are significant
in all models but not reported to save space. Standard errors in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Interpretation is restricted to the more demanding model, the estimates of which are reported
in column (3). Plotting the estimated probability against distance to CBD (see Figure C.5 on
page 182) results in a picture which shares similarities with the Alonso-Mills-Muth Model
(AMM). Starting from the CBD, a location is most likely to be of business land use. The effect
declines with distance. At approximately 2 km from the CBD, mixed land use takes over, i.e.
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between 2 km and 4.5 km an increase in station density most likely results in an area becoming
“mixed”. After that, improved transport has the strongest effect on residential land use, i.e. up
to a distance of about 6.8 km from the CBD station density is most likely to attract residents.
The estimated probability for industrial land use is relatively low and becomes negative at
around 4.25 km. This means that improved transport does not attract any industry within
the city. As the land use sample covers a rather central area, it contains only a few industrial
areas, which most probably results in an underestimation of industrial land use probability.
Summing up, the estimates from the multinomial land use model provide further evidence
for the outbidding process. In line with traditional models, a transport improvement leads to
an outbidding of residents by firms in the core.
Figure C.5.: Predicted land use probabilities over distance to CBD (in km)
Notes: Land use probability estimates come from Table C.10.
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The appendix complements Chapter 6 and is structured as follows: First of all, the study area
of Chicago is illustrated on a map (Section D.1). Secondly, the appendix reports the reduced
form PVAR estimates in Section D.2. And finally Section D.3 presents the cumulative IRF.
D.1. Data
The empirical analysis on the interaction between transport and development is based on US
census tract data for Chicago. The tract definition of 1990 is used as the baseline geography
(Minnesota Population Center, 2011). Figure D.1 on page 184 provides an overview of the
study area. As one can see, the ‘L’ network does not cover the entire study area but only the
area framed in black by Figure (a). In Figure (c) the Central Business District is indicated by
a red border. I hereby follow the definition from City of Chicago (2010). The Union Loop,
which circulates though downtown Chicago, is located in the middle of the CBD.
D.2. Empirical results
The following tables complement the estimation results from Section 6.4.2. As the reduced form
results cannot be interpreted structurally, the interpretation is limited to the corresponding
IRF in the main text. Figure D.2 on page 185 illustrated the IRF from the main text but with
individual Y-axes.
Table D.1.: Results for reduced form 2-PVAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total core periphery total core periphery
pop pop pop L Dens L Dens L Dens
popt−1 0.567*** 0.544*** 0.562*** -0.008 -0.139 -0.006
(0.260) (0.078) (0.026) (0.011) (0.118) (0.012)
L Denst−1 0.072*** -0.134*** 0.088*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.795***
(0.013) (0.068) (0.012) (0.038) (0.105) (0.040)
Observations 3603 251 3352 3603 251 3352
Notes: (1) 1-lag VAR is estimated by GMM, (2) variables are estimated in logs, (3) variables are
time-demeaned and Helmert transformed prior to estimation, (4) standard errors in parentheses,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure D.1.: Study area of Chicago (2010)
(a) Census tracts (b) The “L” network
(c) Central Business District (d) Legend
D.3. Cumulative impulse response functions
The cumulative impulse responses (CIRF) for the total sample are illustrated by Figure D.3
on page 186, for the core sample by Figure D.4 on page 186 and for the periphery sample by
Figure D.5 on page 187. The curves illustrate the response to a shock accumulated over six
time periods.
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Figure D.2.: Impulse responses for 2-PVAR model (individual Y-axes)
Notes: Dotted lines indicate 5% error bands generated by Monte-Carlo with 500 repetitions.
Looking at the CIRF based on the total sample (Figure D.3), population over time responds
positively to transport shocks (about 0.23 standard deviations after six periods) while the
planner’s response to population shocks is negative over time. In the core, population and
transport respond negatively to each other (Figure D.4) which is in line with transport be-
ing more responsive to economic instead of residential activity. The CIRF derived from the
periphery estimates (Figure D.5) further illustrate the positive population response due to the
decentralisation partly driven by the outbidding of residents by firms.
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Figure D.3.: Cumulative impulse responses (total sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
Figure D.4.: Cumulative impulse responses (core sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
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Figure D.5.: Cumulative impulse responses (periphery sample)
Notes: Cumulative IRFs illustrate accumulated effect of a one standard deviation shock (in logs) on the response
variable (in logs) in units of standard deviation.
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